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About the AAAS Project 
The American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) Center for Science, 
Technology, and Security Policy (CSTSP) received a grant from the Naval Postgraduate 
School, a part of the Department of Defense, to identify new opportunities and approaches 
for future bioengagement in the MENA region based on regional consultations with 
scientific and health experts. AAAS held regional consultations in Morocco (with North 
African participants)
1
 and Jordan (with Middle East participants) wherein regional and 
U.S. experts discussed gaps in bioengagement, suggested opportunities for future 
engagement, and explored metrics of effectiveness and long-term impact of 
bioengagement efforts. To facilitate these discussions, AAAS supported a collaborative 
grant that evaluated the impact of regional laboratory biosafety and biosecurity efforts, and 
commissioned two papers to identify lessons learned from past and current regional efforts 
and suggest new approaches for future bioengagement.
2
  The collaborative grant and 
commissioned papers were discussed and/or presented in Morocco and Jordan.  
 
During the implementation of AAAS’s project, the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome 
(MERS) coronavirus emerged in Saudi Arabia, Somalia saw its first case of polio since the 
1970s, H7N9 influenza virus emerged in Southeast Asia, Syrian refugees entered Jordan 
and other neighboring countries bringing unknown infections, and chemical weapons were 
used on Syrian citizens. Scientific and health experts from MENA countries expressed 
concern about these occurrences and identified opportunities for engagement that 
minimized these and other socio-political concerns. 
 
AAAS carried out this project as DTRA explored cooperative bioengagement in MENA 
countries and as the U.S. Congress wrote and introduced a bill on cooperative threat 
reduction in the Middle East and North Africa. These policy and programmatic 
developments offered a unique opportunity to provide regional input in U.S.- MENA 
cooperative bioengagement. 
  
                                                          
1 The first consultation was held in Morocco and involved scientists and health experts from Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, 
and Egypt. 
2 In 2010, AAAS sponsored a collaborative grant competition between U.S. and MENA scientists. The collaborative 
grant supported in the current study is not related to the 2010 competition. 
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Future Opportunities for U.S.-MENA 
Cooperative Bioengagement 
Countering biological threats presents a complexity not seen with either nuclear or 
chemical weapons. The pathogens and toxins used to develop biological weapons in past 
offensive weapons programs could be found naturally. The scientific knowledge, skills, 
equipment, and facilities needed to develop biological weapons are the same as those 
needed for "peaceful, prophylactic" research and diagnostic uses. Being able to distinguish 
between malicious and peaceful uses is the most difficult challenge to identifying illicit 
activities and developing programs to counter possible illicit activities.  
 
Despite this challenge, several efforts have and can be undertaken to counter biological 
threats caused by nations, terrorist organizations, or individuals with malicious intent. For 
over two decades, the security community has advocated a web of prevention approach, 
which involves the use of several complementary activities to counter biological threats. 
As the focus of concern transitioned to terrorism, this web of prevention approach has 
taken on a wider scope - to include activities that build on security, science, culture and 
religion, health, and law and governance. All of these approaches are equally as important 
for countering biological threats.  
 
This report focuses on scientific 
engagement to counter biological threats. 
It recognizes the important role that 
scientists can play in preventing and 
responding to biological risks and threats. 
The report builds on years of cooperative 
threat reduction and cooperative 
engagement to identify new opportunities 
and approaches for future engagement in 
the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region. 
Modern Bioengagement Programs 
 
Cooperative biological engagement emerged 
in the 2000s as a new way to engage 
scientists who might not be involved with 
biological weapons development or use, but 
who might be working in and around unsafe 
environments, which might include the 
presence of terrorist organizations.  Today, 
bioengagement efforts largely focus on four 
main areas: infectious disease surveillance, 
laboratory biosafety and biosecurity, 
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cooperation. Within each of these broad areas are numerous, more targeted efforts.  
 
In the area of infectious disease surveillance, bioengagement activities include 
strengthening of health systems to rapidly detect and report outbreaks of potential 
international concern; animal-human health disease surveillance and management 
(commonly referred to as “one health”3); enhancing detection of potential outbreaks at the 
community level; and upgrading the biosafety and biosecurity of diagnostic laboratories. 
Many bioengagement programs, which focus on infectious disease surveillance (also 
referred to as “biosurveillance”), use the International Health Regulations (2005), and the 
associated core competencies, as their primary guidance. 
 
In the area of laboratory biosafety and biosecurity,
4
 bioengagement programs primarily 
focus on laboratory personnel training to encourage that safe procedures are followed; 
biorisk management to establish or enhance the laboratory management system to promote 
risk mitigation; development of national biosafety associations to provide local leadership 
on laboratory biosafety and biosecurity; and upgrades to laboratories to consolidate 
“especially dangerous” pathogens into a single (or fewer than what might currently exist) 
facility, enhance physical safety and security measures, and improve accountability of 
laboratory stocks of pathogens. “Biorisk management”, which was initially developed in 
2008 and subsequently revised in 2011, is a management guideline for enhancing 
laboratory biosafety and biosecurity initially developed by the European standardization 
organization in 2008. (The biorisk management standards were subsequently revised in 
2011. Efforts are currently underway to gain support for making the biorisk management 
an ISO standard.)  
 
The broad area of responsible science is relatively new to the bioengagement sphere. This 
area primarily includes education and training of “dual use research of concern” within the 
broader context of responsible science. However, efforts to improve bioethics, including 
research involving human and animal subjects, have begun. This approach emerged from 
numerous attempts to communicate and educate scientists about “dual use research of 
concern” and ways to minimize those risks. “Dual use research of concern” is the idea that 
legitimate, beneficial research could be directly used by malicious individuals to cause 
harm. Initial communication about “dual use research of concern” unintentionally caused 
scientists within the region to feel as though they were the threat. By placing the “dual 
use” issue within the broader concept of responsible science, scientists understood the risk 
as an ethical dilemma affecting all scientists. 
 
Though bioengagement programs tend to focus on these major areas, on occasion research 
collaboration and scientific exchanges are supported. (Several U.S. government agencies 
support international scientific collaborations but most of these collaborations are not 
funded through cooperative threat reduction (CTR)-derived biological engagement 
                                                          
3 Although the concept of One Health is typically used to describe the link between the health of wild and domestic 
animal populations and humans, it should link the health of plants, the environment, wild and domestic animals, and 
humans. 
4 The use of language is extremely important when referring to biosafety and biosecurity. For years, security experts have 
cited the numerous definitions that both terms have. However, the term “biosafety” might elicit different conceptual 
understanding depending on the overarching framework under which it is addressed. The Cartagena Protocol discusses 
biosafety as preventing genetically modified, laboratory adapted organisms from being released into the environment and 
broader population. Whereas the Biological and Weapons Toxins Convention, a nonproliferation treaty, defines 
laboratory biosafety as measures to prevent accidental release of dangerous pathogens. Efforts focused on biosafety and 
biosecurity must account for the different definitions and conceptual understanding of the terms as they design and 
implement their programs. 
 
 
8 | P a g e  
 
programs.)  However over the past decade, scientific cooperation in the context of 
bioengagement has decreased significantly because measuring its effectiveness at reducing 
biological risks through research cooperation is extremely difficult. The result is that 
scientific engagement now tends to focus more on those programs that can be measured 
more easily rather than those programs that might promote trust, open communication, and 
transparency.  
 
The primary countries that support scientific engagement include the United States, 
Canada, and the European Union with the United States leading many of the efforts. The 
relevant funding agencies (in the U.S., the primary agencies are the Departments of State 
and Defense) support both governmental and non-governmental organizations to carry out 
the aforementioned programs.  
Challenges of Bioengagement Programs 
 
Bioengagement programs – i.e., scientific engagement with biological sciences experts and 
human and animal health experts – face several challenges. The challenges include limited 
funding, inadequate means to evaluate program success, lack of sustainability of programs, 
and lack of coordination among funding agencies.  
 
Funding, evaluation measures, and sustainability of programs are interconnected and lead 
to the development of short-term goals for bioengagement activities. Funding for 
bioengagement activities is allocated on a yearly basis, preventing implementers from 
developing long-term goals or strategies for their activities. In addition, funding agencies 
tend to support programs that have tangible outcomes that contribute to nonproliferation 
goals of the country funding the activity. Although funders work with foreign governments 
to identify activities of mutual interest, bioengagement programs are often developed to 
meet the donor country’s security interests. Further complicating this situation is the reality 
that the U.S. Congress continues to perceive cooperative scientific engagement through the 
same lens as cooperative threat reduction (CTR) programs – which included dismantling 
weapons programs and redirecting weapons scientists – and to hold relevant agencies 
accountable for their funding decisions based on this perception.  
 
Demonstrating success of bioengagement programs is inherently difficult because no 
evaluation criteria exist to measure the ultimate goal of the programs, which is to prevent 
terrorist acquisition of tools and expertise and identify possible uses quickly. No definitive 
measures exist to measure the effectiveness of programs focused on the prevention goals. 
During the past few years, several organizations have attempted to develop evaluation 
criteria or metrics for scientific engagement programs. The 2012 National Research 
Council report on CTR metrics for the Department of Defense recommended tailored 
evaluation criteria based on specific program objectives. In another effort, metrics are 
being developed that align closely with CTR nonproliferation goals. In this report, a 
leading security expert recommends the use of participatory metrics in which partners 
develop the evaluation criteria jointly. While participatory evaluation might work for 
cooperative programs, many of the current bioengagement programs are not partnership-
based.  
 
Coordination among funding agencies and donor countries is a separate challenge that 
affects the long-term implementation of bioengagement programs in certain regions. A 
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large number of funding agencies and implementers support or carry out bioengagement 
activities, particularly in regions where terrorist concerns and/or biological weapons 
concerns are high. Independent efforts on infectious disease surveillance, laboratory 
biosafety and biosecurity, scientific responsibility, and scientific cooperation further 
complicate the bioengagement landscape in the MENA region. Bioengagement programs 
convey the biosafety/bioethics/biosecurity messages differently depending on the mission 
and expertise of funding and implementing organization. Although some agencies and 
implementers do discuss and try to coordinate their efforts, duplication of bioengagement 
programs persists.  Coordination problems will continue to grow as the number of donor 
countries and funding agencies grows. 
 
Specifically focusing on bioengagement efforts in the Middle East and North Africa, 
differences in scientific capacity across the region (in part caused by access to materials, 
local investment in science and technology, or laws governing or restricting certain types 
of research) further complicate the development of programs. For example, experience 
with laboratory biosafety and biosecurity programs varies greatly across the region. In 
some countries, scientists are well-versed in biosafety and desire more evolved or 
advanced engagement efforts on laboratory biosafety and biosecurity. However in other 
countries, the basic laboratory biosafety and biosecurity training activities are important 
for raising local awareness of the issues; scientists in these countries often face problems 
in implementing procedures that reflect the biosafety and biosecurity training received. Yet 
in other countries, the basic infrastructure (e.g., continuous or reliable electricity or access 
to the internet) prevents full implementation of laboratory biosafety and biosecurity 
procedures. In addition, the harsh environmental conditions in the countries require 
different types of procedures and equipment to fully implement containment of harmful 
pathogens. Beyond laboratory biosafety and biosecurity, efforts on infectious disease 
surveillance are complicated with concerns about sample sharing and access to vaccines 
and drugs developed from pathogens that emerged in the region, and responsible science 
efforts are complicated by the different understandings of research risks and ethical 
concerns.  
Recommendations for Future Bioengagement in the Middle East and 
North Africa 
       
Local ownership and sustainability of activities initially introduced through bioengagement 
efforts are highly dependent on the active participation of regional scientists and tailored 
approaches based on the legal and social environment in different countries. The following 
section describes new opportunities for bioengagement and specific improvements to the 
process of bioengagement that account for differences in capacity and need throughout the 
Middle East and North African region.  
 
The recommendations build on current challenges, gaps, and needs in addressing 
biological risks as identified by experts from the U.S. and Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region. Of importance, the opportunities and approaches described below 
contribute to the decades-long concept of web of prevention in which a variety of programs 
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Opportunities for Future Bioengagement 
 
1. Facilitate the development of national strategies and implementation plans for 
addressing biological risks. 
 
Nearly all of the government funded efforts focus on very discrete activities to 
reduce biological risks in research and diagnostic laboratories in biosafety, 
biosecurity, and ethics. These efforts involve education and training, development 
of biosafety associations, and facility upgrades.  
 
More recently, the Biosafety and Biosecurity International Consortium – a regional 
organization initiated by the International Council for the Life Sciences and fully 
adopted and maintained by regional scientists in health, research, and the 
environment – began an effort to engage ministerial-level experts to develop a 
national strategy for addressing biological risks. With U.S. government support, 
scientists from the American University of Beirut have initiated a parallel effort to 
develop biosafety and biosecurity policies and procedures for the major Lebanese 
universities.  
 
Scientists and health officials in Morocco advocated for foreign assistance in 
developing a national framework that incorporates biological risk mitigation and 
involves experts from government, universities, and civil society.  
 
Scientists from Tunisia and Oman supported the development of national level 
strategies that promote science and technology innovation and simultaneously 
address associated safety, security, ethical, and environmental risks. These 
strategies would promote science and technology advancement to help address 
national and regional problems while embedding safety and security into the fabric 
of the life science enterprise. 
 
2. Encourage regional efforts to address biological risks through cooperation, 
regional resource development, and strategy development. 
 
Scientists and health officials advocated for the development of regional efforts to 
address biological risks. These experts recognize the importance of national 
strategy development and implementation is a necessary first step. The significant 
changes and turmoil currently affecting scientists and stressing health systems in 
several countries in the region – in part because of the social political change, the 
threat of terrorism, and the events in Syria – suggest that regional efforts to address 
biological risks could promote sharing of expertise, experiences, and practices to 
minimize potential harm caused by natural or man-made events. Through regional 
efforts, scientists could help each other develop policies and procedures and 
implement practices to identify, assess, and mitigate common biological risks. This 
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3. Enhance regional capacity to manage and dispose of hazardous biological 
waste and ensure the safe transportation of hazardous biological materials. 
 
Despite efforts to enhance laboratory biosafety and biosecurity, regional scientists 
and health experts stated that significant gaps exist in waste management and 
transportation of hazardous biological materials.  
 
Bioengagement activities that focus on developing policies and procedures, 
training laboratory staff, and implementing practices to reduce risks associated with 
disposal of laboratory waste and transportation of harmful pathogens would 
address regional needs. 
 
4. Revive the bilateral Science and Technology Agreements and support for 
scientific cooperation. 
 
Prior to 2001, the United States signed a bilateral Science and Technology 
Agreement (S&T Agreements) with Egypt and funded scientific cooperation 
between U.S. and Egypt for over twenty years under this Agreement; in 2011, the 
U.S. stopped supporting these cooperative programs   
 
After 2001, the United States established bilateral S&T Agreements with several 
MENA countries to promote scientific cooperation and reduce the influence of 
terrorism. However, the U.S. did not provide financial support for bilateral S&T 
Agreements with the other countries. The lack of funding for science cooperation 
prompted a lack of confidence in the U.S. government’s commitment to develop 
strong scientific ties with countries across the MENA region. 
 
Support for scientific cooperation breeds trust, transparency, and open lines of 
communication between MENA countries and the United States. Scientific 
partnerships built on mutual interest and trust could withstand social political 
changes in the U.S. or MENA countries. The U.S. Naval Medical Research Unit -3 
in Cairo, Egypt is an example of a robust partnership strong enough to endure 
changes in the socio-political environment. However without the recognition of 
how scientific cooperation could address biological risks, governments are unlikely 
to dedicate resources and support for these activities. 
 
5. Support cooperative research in areas that affect the research environment, 
including the behavioral sciences. 
 
Much of the biological threat reduction and bioengagement efforts have focused on 
research in the natural sciences, particularly microbiology. However, research in 
the behavioral and social sciences can provide important solutions to addressing 
biological risks and enhancing the environment in which research is done. These 
solutions could be extended to diagnostic laboratories, in addition to research 
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6. Support scientific exchanges with U.S. and regional scientists to transfer 
knowledge about how to address biological risks. 
 
Rarely, bioengagement programs enable scientific exchanges. However, these 
programs could improve understanding of differences in risk perception, share 
policies and practices to prevent or mitigate biological risks, and enhance trust and 
the foundation for future scientific cooperation. 
 
Approaches for Future Bioengagement 
 
1. Support bioengagement programs that promote scientific leadership and 
address biological risks as part of the entire scientific system. 
 
Leadership is assumed by those who hold high-level positions and those who have 
the skills to lead peer groups. Bioengagement activities that recruit both types of 
individuals to lead by example and address biological risks as part of their routine 
conduct of science will result in long-term adoption of risk reduction measures and 
greater awareness among a larger group of regional scientists.  
 
During the past decade, several "young leaders" groups have emerged throughout 
the world, some of which address biological risks as a core mission. These groups 
should be encouraged to take on more leadership opportunities to counter 
biological threats as part of the overall science and technology enterprise. 
 
2. Support programs whose sole purpose is to build trust and transparency 
between U.S. implementers and regional scientists.  
 
Trust and transparency is critically important in the Middle East and North Africa. 
Funding agencies and implementers of bioengagement programs must demonstrate 
their trustworthiness to MENA scientists, health officials, and regional government 
officials by consistently and openly describing their motivations, intentions, and 
prospect of future interaction. In addition, implementers must take great care in not 
over-promising on what they can provide to regional scientists. 
 
3. Tailor training and other activities to meet the actual needs within the region. 
 
Bioengagement programs that could be applied to any country and any scientist do 
not take into account the unique socio-cultural issues, governing frameworks, 
scientific infrastructures, and capacity needs of different countries. Tailoring 
training programs and capacity-building efforts to the particular environment and 
needs of different countries would enhance adoption and implementation of these 
activities.  
 
4. Support programs that develop and maintain scientific partnerships in 
research, behavioral training, and capacity building. 
 
Partnerships between scientists from the U.S. and MENA countries could be 
important vehicles to conducting research of mutual interest, developing and 
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carrying out training programs to identify and mitigate biological risks, and 
improving the scientific environment to characterize and address biological risks. 
 
5. Increase local ownership of activities by involving local scientists in the 
development of programs and evaluation criteria for programs. 
 
Bioengagement programs that involve regional scientists as partners ensure that the 
activities are designed to meet the particular needs of the country, can be 
implemented in the country, and incorporate particular cultural and social 
sensitivities existing in the country.  
 
Involving scientific partners in the development of evaluation criteria (participatory 
evaluations) might promote local ownership of bioengagement programs and 
increase their likelihood of success. 
 
6. Develop programs that build on local knowledge and expertise in addressing 
biological risks. 
 
Scientists and health experts in several MENA countries are well-versed in 
laboratory biosafety, biosecurity, and bioethics. Current programs tend to use the 
same training materials for all scientists in the region regardless of their degree of 
awareness of biosecurity and biosafety issues. This has resulted in several scientists 
carrying out independent partnerships and programs to address infrastructure or 
training gaps and design more sophisticated efforts to address biological risks. 
 
U.S. bioengagement programs should build on local expertise and experiences to 
ensure that local needs are being addressed and efforts reflect the level of expertise 




The following lists potential improvements to the broader initiative of scientific 
engagement to address biological risks. This list draws from the themes gleaned from 
evaluating the lessons learned from past and current bioengagement efforts – in general 
and specifically focusing on biosafety – and consulting with leading regional scientists, 
health experts, and government experts. If bioengagement efforts are to become 
sustainable, adopted in the region, and address unaddressed needs, funding agencies and 
implementers should incorporate the following process improvements. 
 
1. Increase coordination of bioengagement efforts in the region.  
 
2. Design initiatives that engage both government and nongovernmental 
scientists to promote both top down and bottom up approaches to addressing 
biological risks. 
 
3. Design bioengagement programs that can easily exist within the broader 
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4. Encourage donor and recipient countries to contribute to the funding and 
developing of bioengagement programs. 
 
5. Develop a tiered system of evaluation which include broader criteria to assess 
the entire program, metrics to assess individual activities, and measures for 
scientists to demonstrate value of their participation to their superiors. 
Brief History of Biological Engagement 
 
Cooperative bioengagement is rooted in cooperative threat reduction (CTR). In the early 
1990s, the United States and several other countries created cooperative threat reduction 
programs to prevent the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological materials from Soviet 
weapons facilities to rouge countries or terrorist organizations.  Initially, the program 
focused on securing and dismantling nuclear weapons and associated facilities from the 
former Soviet Union. In 1994, the program expanded to secure chemical and biological 
materials, dismantling chemical and biological weapons facilities, and redirecting former 
weapons scientists. In the United States, the first U.S. government agency involved in 
cooperative threat reduction was the Defense Threat Reduction Agency; a few years after 
the establishment of the program, the Department of State began supporting CTR 
activities, particularly those involving scientist redirection.  
 
The CTR programs expanded beyond the countries of the former Soviet Union to Iraq and 
Libya in 2003. Although Iraq had ended its chemical and biological weapons program 
before 2003, its scientists who had weapons expertise were discretely placed in military 
and civilian companies, universities, and ministries.
5
  Consequently, the program in Iraq 
primarily involved securing chemical and biological weapons expertise. Unlike Iraq, Libya 
had an active nuclear and chemical weapons programs until December 2003 at which time 
they announced they were ending their program.
6
  CTR programs in Libya focused more 
on securing and dismantlement of the nuclear materials and chemical weapons. 
 
Beginning in 2006, the Department of State expanded its biological cooperative threat 
reduction programs beyond former weapons scientists to scientists who work in countries 
and regions fraught with terrorism threats. These newer programs engaged non-weapons 
scientists to minimize the risk that their expertise, knowledge, and skills could be 
inappropriately used by a terrorist or that their laboratories, pathogens, materials, and 
equipment could be acquired by terrorists. In 2009, the U.S. National Research Council 
recommended that the Defense Threat Reduction Agency transform its biological CTR 
program to engage non-weapons scientists on topics of infectious disease surveillance, 
capacity-building, and scientific partnerships in addition to securing harmful pathogens.
7
   
 
During the past 7 years, the Departments of State and Defense have expanded their CTR 
programs to non-weapons scientists; to countries in Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, the 
                                                          
5 Smallwood and Liimatainen. Securing WMD Expertise: Lessons Learned from Iraq. (2011) Arms Control Association. 
Available at:  
6 National Research Council. Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction. (2009) 
National Academies Press (Washington, DC). P. 35. 
7 National Research Council. Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction. (2009) 
National Academies Press (Washington, DC).r 
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Middle East and North Africa; and to capacity-building in biosurveillance, biosecurity and 
biosafety, and scientific responsibility.  
U.S. Bioengagement Programs 
 
The Department of State Biosecurity Engagement Program (BEP) was among the first 
U.S. government agencies to transform threat reduction to engagement. Initially, efforts 
included broad scientific cooperation efforts and now, the focus is on safeguarding 
laboratories, managing laboratory biosafety and biosecurity risks, and strengthening public 
and animal health systems. To a lesser degree, BEP supports education of scientists about 
responsible science. 
  
With financial and Congressional pressure, along with assessed threats, BEP has focused 
on efforts in three major areas: 1) compliance with the Biological and Toxins Weapons 
Convention, United National Security Council Resolution 1540, and International Health 
Regulations; 2) laboratory biosafety and biosecurity (i.e., biorisk management); and 3) 
surveillance of infectious disease outbreaks. BEP achieves these goals through the specific 
objectives of: 
 
 “Assisting partner countries in maintaining a balance between 
developing sustainable public and agricultural health infrastructure, 
and ensuring safe and secure pathogen collections.  
 Training in biosafety and pathogen security to promote sound 
laboratory management practices. 
 Engaging bioscience laboratories in collaborative pathogen security 
and biosafety projects, including assistance in risk assessment, safety 
and security consultations, design and implementation. 
 Training in infectious disease surveillance and molecular diagnostics, 
and laboratory capacity building activities.  
 Integrating advances in international biosafety and pathogen security 
into efforts to enhance international infectious disease surveillance, 
diagnostics, response and control.”8 
 
BEP works through several government agencies, including the U.S. National Institutes of 
Health and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; Sandia National Laboratories; 
CRDF Global; and non-governmental implementers. 
 
The 2009 U.S. National Research Council report on new approaches of global threat 
reduction programs recommended a significant shift in biological programs from threat 
reduction to engagement to reduce shared biological risks and threats, including chronic 
diseases, infectious diseases, and deliberate attacks. Based on this report, the Department 
of Defense’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) began supporting cooperative 
biological partnerships (i.e., bioengagement) to achieve its regional and bilateral goals of: 
 
 “Improvements to partner country capabilities in biosafety and 
biosecurity, and to detect, diagnose and report WMD-significant 
disease outbreaks;… 
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 Cooperation in surveillance, detection and interdiction technology 
projects to stop global WMD trafficking; 
 Collaborate in fundamental research with partner country scientists 
and institutions.”9 
 
DTRA’s strategic goals for bioengagement are carried out by its Cooperative Biological 
Engagement Program (CBEP). Until now, CBEP has concentrated its investments and 
efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia; now, CBEP is beginning to conduct 




In addition to the Departments of State and Defense, the U.S. Agency for International 
Development, Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Energy, National 
Institutes of Health, and other U.S. government and non-governmental organizations 
engage scientists in the MENA region to address development, health, science, and 
security issues to varying degrees. Whereas the number of different agencies in the region 
might lead to confusion and possible resentment among local scientists,
11
 the agencies 
nevertheless have the potential to address biological risks with a broad range of 





                                                          
9 http://www.dtra.mil/Missions/nunn-lugar/nunn-lugar-home.aspx 
10 CBEP programs differ from other DoD investments in the MENA region, which includes support for infectious disease 
research. 
11 Resentment has resulted among local scientists when foreign organizations have established new expert centers or 
supported competing efforts. While competition is considered healthy in the U.S. and other countries in the West, in 
many parts of the world such competition vies for the attention of possible funders, government officials, and local 
scientists. In many cases, engagement programs invite the same individuals to participate in sponsored activities causing 
an overload of engagement toward some scientists and no engagement towards others. 
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Regional Consultations 
North Africa Regional Consultation 
Morocco 
May 18-19, 2013 
 
The first of the consultations was held in Casablanca, Morocco, in May 2013 and included 
scientists and health experts from the U.S., Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt. AAAS 
and its local collaborator – the Moroccan Biological Safety Association (MOBSA) – 
invited several experts from Libya without success. The outcomes presented in this 
summary paper are based entirely on the views of the meeting participants, which included 
a diverse set of experts in the research and health sectors, government and non-
governmental sectors, and human and environmental health sectors. 
 
Over the two days of facilitated, participatory discussion, participants were encouraged to 
consider: 1) past and current bioengagement efforts and whether those efforts are sufficient 
for addressing extant biological risks or threats in the region; 2) measures of success for 
effectiveness and long-term implementation; and 3) the regional environment in which 
future bioengagement will be occurring, including the socio-political situation in 
individual countries and the entire region, the current security risks and threats facing the 
region, and the regional benefits of biological sciences to address these security risks 
and/or threats.  
 
Based on meeting discussions, participants developed a framework for bioengagement 
within which security and safety exists. This framework relies heavily on leadership 
promoting success in science, health, responsibility, and security. Building on this 
framework, regional experts identified the following gaps, opportunities, and approaches 
for bioengagement and considered the following sustainability options and metrics. 
 
 
Figure 1. Sustainable Biological Safety and Biological Security Program. The “soup” 
refers to the delicate balance of biological safety and security in the global life science 
enterprise. Developed during the meeting. 
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Top Opportunities for Bioengagement in North Africa 
 
Participants stated that the U.S. can be most helpful in: 
 
1) Supporting North African countries in developing national and regional 
frameworks for addressing biological risks. These frameworks would 
incorporate reciprocal communication between the research and health ministries, 
academic organizations and other non-governmental organizations. Although only 
a part of the overall framework for addressing biological risks, policies and 
practices for promoting laboratory biosafety and biosecurity in both research and 
health services laboratories would be included. In addition, these frameworks could 
be layered onto more general frameworks for science, technology, and innovation. 
 
 
Figure 2. National Framework for Assessing and Managing Biological Risks. 
 
2) Reviving bilateral Science and Technology Agreements and supporting 
cooperative scientific research between the U.S. and North African countries. 
During the meeting, participants discussed several existing efforts for 
bioengagement and scientific engagement, broadly. Participants from each country 
highlighted their positive experiences in cooperative programs that focused on 
laboratory biosafety and biosecurity and infectious disease surveillance. However, 
participants from all countries described their disappointment with the lack of 
implementation of the bilateral science and technology agreements between their 
countries and the U.S.
13
 Determining the effectiveness of bilateral Science and 
Technologies (S&T) agreements to promoting scientific partnerships and reducing 
concerns about terrorism is challenging but should be considered nonetheless. 
 
                                                          
13 For nearly 20 years and until recently, the U.S. and Egyptian scientists have cooperated on a number of research 
projects under the broader umbrella of the bilateral Science and Technology Cooperative Agreement. However, bilateral 
scientific cooperation under the auspices of the U.S.-Egypt S&T Agreement seems to have ended in 2011. Over the past 
decade, the U.S. signed bilateral S&T Agreements with several North African countries, including Morocco, Algeria, 
Tunisia, and Libya, to curb the threat of terrorism and build partnerships between the U.S. and Muslim-majority 
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3) Supporting cooperative research on behavioral sciences to identify scientists 
and engineers who might intend to cause harm. This research would draw from 
current research efforts in the behavioral, psychological, and social sciences to help 
describe characteristics of individuals who pursue activities that cause harm to, 
rather than benefit, all society. 
 
4) Developing procedures to effectively dispose of laboratory wastes. North 
African universities and public health laboratories struggle with management of 
waste from high containment laboratories (i.e., biosafety level 3 laboratories) 
because the region has few, if any, companies that can safely dispose of laboratory 
waste. 
 
While these opportunities were among the most highly discussed possibilities for future 
bioengagement between the U.S. and North African countries, participants listed several 
other possible areas in which cooperation can occur. These areas often addressed gaps in 
current bioengagements efforts, which focus heavily on laboratory biosafety and 
biosecurity, infectious disease surveillance, and responsible science.  
Gaps, Opportunities, and Approaches for Bioengagement Programs 
 
The following sections provide the gaps in cooperation which lead to the identification of 
gaps in bioengagement, possible areas for future bioengagement between the U.S. and 
North African countries, and suggested approaches to carry out joint activities. 
 
Gaps in Bioengagement 
• The concepts of laboratory biosafety and biosecurity are not well understood or 
implemented in all research and public health laboratories.  
• Laboratories are old and are in need of improvement. The region does not need 
new laboratories; it simply needs to upgrade existing laboratories, train a 
knowledgeable and capable workforce, and implement best laboratory practices.  
• The link between laboratories, universities, civil society, and government offices is 
not strong in the region. However, participants believed that civil society plays a 
critical role in promoting safe and secure research and health practice, and linking 
the laboratory infrastructure and relevant government offices.  
• Coordination among U.S. government offices supporting bioengagement activities 
is poor.  
• University scientists and engineers might have extremist views posing possible 
threats to scientific advancement and safety in society. Research leadership needs 
to be well-equipped to conduct behavioral profiles of scientists to minimize risks of 
misuse or theft of biological materials. 
• In-person communication about laboratory risks is not optimal and could be 
improved. 
• The legal framework for addressing biological risks is inadequate in each North 
African country and the entire region.  
• North African countries lack a comprehensive approach for addressing biological 
risks (i.e., a vision and roadmap to address biological risks). This approach would 
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build on efforts focused on building capacity to respond to public health 
emergencies and to improve biorisk management.  
• North African countries have sub-optimal investments in building scientific 
capacity while minimizing biological risks in food, human health, and research.  
• Biological risks and risk assessment tools have not been adequately defined for 
regional scientists. North African scientists tend to minimize risks before engaging 
in the research activity.  
• Scientists might not acknowledge their responsibility to address security risks of 
biological research. 
• University research laboratories lack the capacity to develop animal and human 
vaccines. Vaccine research is typically conducted by the private sector and not 
university researchers.  
• North African countries lack waste management companies who can safely dispose 
of waste from laboratories with biosafety level 3 capabilities. 
• North African research institutions are ill-equipped and poorly set-up to encourage 
and facilitate cross-disciplinary research, which is important for science and 
technology progress and innovation. 
• No single resource exists to inform scientists about available grants to which North 
African scientists can apply.  
• North African countries might spend significant resources to counter terrorism 
within their borders, which leaves little to support research, education, and 
responsible science (including laboratory biosafety and biosecurity, ethics, and 
scientists and engineers with malicious intent).  
  
Opportunities for Future Bioengagement 
The U.S. could help North African countries to: 
 
• Provide cooperative grants and reduce barriers to fully implement the 
bilateral Science and Technology Agreements.
14
  
• Engage high-level, well-connected organizations and officials to develop 
national and regional strategies to address biological risks. 
• Support the development of national legal frameworks to address biological 
risks that clearly defines the roles and responsibilities of relevant sectors and 
government agencies.  
• Assist North African governments in developing plans to coordinate across 
relevant ministries to address biological risks and threats. 
• Support joint behavioral research to help regional scientists identify 
approaches to assess whether scientists and engineers have intentions to cause 
harm. 
• Assist in development and implementation of a waste management plans in 
North Africa. 
• Establish infectious disease surveillance networks that include wildlife 
conservation, domestic and experimental animal health, human health, and plant 
health.  
• Empower civil societies to become more involved in addressing laboratory 
biosafety and biosecurity risks.  
                                                          
14 The opportunities highlighted in bold are the top areas for future bioengagement identified by participants.  
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• Develop programs whereby scientists and health official can effectively 
communicate with and educate the public about complex scientific and security 
issues.  
• Develop a system in which scientists can provide input into the policy-making 
process in North African countries. This input could come in the form of scientific 
advice or advocacy on a given issue. 
• Encourage greater involvement of the private sector to drive efforts to prevent or 
minimize biological risks.  
• Conduct forensic analysis to identify perpetrators of terrorist attacks. 
• Establish national and regional biosafety associations to strengthen the role of civil 
society and trade associations in addressing laboratory biosafety and biosecurity. 
• Upgrade and safeguard biological laboratories to improve security at these 
facilities. 
• Establish new journals with the Springer publication group to allow scientists from 
the region to publish in peer-reviewed, international journals. The Springer 
publishing group has a program that allows scientists from underdeveloped 
countries to establish a journal under its auspices to allow them to share their 
research with the international scientific community.  
• Promote regional collaboration to address biosecurity risks and conduct high-
consequence research and diagnostics, if necessary.  
• Engage policy-makers to develop a national strategic management plan to promote 
national innovation in science and technology.  
• Develop the national and regional capacity to translate basic research into applied 
services for society. Examples of these service sectors include the public health and 
biotechnology sectors. 
• Build private sector capacity in the region and incorporate good laboratory 
practices during development efforts.  
• Conduct exercises with regional scientists to identify barriers to international 
collaboration, which need to be addressed to promote scientific cooperation.  
• Establish training sessions, train-the-trainer programs, or full training centers to 
educate scientists and health practitioners about biological risk management and 
transportation of infectious agents.  
• Promote bioengagement efforts that seek to raise awareness of biosecurity 
concerns.  
• Support more collaboration in the biological sciences with a focus on medical and 
microbiological research. 
• Support the development of national academies of sciences and efforts to link these 
academies with the InterAcademy Panel.  
• Promote the development of the Libyan scientific and educational infrastructure by 
providing young Libyan scientists with education and training in the life sciences 
and responsible science, and enabling senior scientists to continue working in the 
laboratory.  
• Conduct an impact assessment of past and current bioengagement efforts in North 
Africa to identify special gaps which scientific cooperation could address.  
• Facilitate linkages between university research efforts and public health needs to 
strengthen the scientific foundation for identification and control of local health 
challenges. 
• Develop a laboratory management committee to help scientists identify and assess 
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Approaches for Future Bioengagement 
During the discussion, participants suggested several approaches which could help efforts 
to promote engagement between scientists from the U.S. and North African countries. 
These approaches include: 
   
• Treating bioengagement efforts as a development effort rather than a security 
activity.  
• Including a wide range of scientific disciplines in bioengagement efforts, including 
non-microbiological sciences disciplines, non-research and non-public health 
sectors, and research involving any biological materials. 
• Developing bioengagement programs that have a broader health focus than 
pathogens, such as cancer. 
• Focusing on scientist responsibility and contribution to society to promote good 
laboratory practices, including ethics, safety, and security. 
• Including individuals that have access to policymakers and researchers to help 
bridge differences and communication gaps between these sectors.  
• Developing programs that promote building of trust between international partners 
and researchers within the same institution. 
• Ensuring that projects and partnerships take into account regional cultures, political 
environments, and social systems when developing projects and choosing partners. 
• Designing projects jointly with partners to encourage co-ownership of project 
activities, responsibilities, and results.  
• Integrating the identification and mitigation of laboratory risks with research and 
health practice.  
• Building on the global efforts undertaken in response to the 2001 anthrax letters 
and other infectious disease outbreaks of international concern. 
• Addressing biological risks and inappropriate use of biological research and results 
through social responsibility and development.  
• Assembling global teams to conduct external evaluations or support self-
assessment of scientific engagement programs. 
• Developing projects on a foundation of common interests, concerns, and 
vulnerabilities.  
• Build on existing programs when developing new bioengagement programs and 
projects. 
• Preparing peer-review papers that encourage scientists to participate in science 
engagement programs. 
• Involving professors, who might be able to communicate with both researchers and 
regulators. 
Sustainability and Evaluation of Bioengagement Programs 
 
Participants were asked to consider effectiveness and longer term impact of 
bioengagement programs. The following sections list ways for encouraging long-term 
implementation of programs or maintenance of scientific partnerships, and possible criteria 
for evaluating specific engagement activities. 
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Sustainability of Programs and Partnerships 
Participants were asked how to sustain programs or partnerships initiated through 
bioengagement efforts. The following list comprises suggestions provided by meeting 
participants about possible ways in which to gain long-term benefit from bioengagement 
efforts: 
 
• Legal frameworks help define the roles and responsibilities of all relevant 
stakeholders in the governance and implementation of programs that promote 
science innovation, bioengagement, and risk management. 
• Institutional policies, practices, standards, and accreditation demonstrate to 
potential partners that their counterparts are held to identical or similar standards of 
laboratory practice, which facilitates cooperation. 
• Trust, honesty, and friendship between scientists are crucial for promoting long-
lasting scientific partnerships and open sharing of information.  
• Transparency between scientists and funding agencies is important for gaining 
partners for engagement and facilitating local buy-in and follow-on implementation 
of project activities.  
• Government, citizen, and stakeholder ownership of engagement activities might 
ensure that the activities are designed according to local interests and needs and 
accepted by local scientists.  
• Engagement activities that incorporate plans for transferring information learned or 
replicating the activities might facilitate broader exposure to engagement efforts. 
• Governments involved in scientific engagement activities that have a shared vision 
of the strategies, needs, and expected outcomes of the efforts could facilitate local 
buy-in and long-term implementation of activities. 
• A shared understanding of project objectives between partners could facilitate 
further implementation of project activities and development of follow-on 
activities. 
• Train-the-trainer programs are designed to enable the development of follow-on 
training activities. 
• Although unrealistic, funding priorities that remain consistent over time would 
promote long-term implementation of scientific engagement programs.  
• Support from several funding organizations and philanthropic organizations would 
enable scientists to continue science engagement activities. 
• Training programs that include accreditation or certificates of participation could 
offer sufficient benefit to participants that other scientists might want to participate 
in future training sessions. 
• Strong scientific partnerships built on open communication, mutual interest, and 
trust would enable follow-on scientific projects. 
• Training programs, project audits, and development of services to private industry 
incorporated into the design of projects to promote future interest in engagement 
efforts. 
• Programs that fulfill the missions of recipient organizations have a higher 
likelihood of persisting beyond the initial program and investment.  
• The prospect of employment opportunities for participants of science engagement 
programs might encourage additional scientists to participate in future programs. 
• Sustainability measures developed and incorporated into the design of science 
engagement programs could help identify measures to promote sustainability of 
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activities. The International Atomic Energy Agency paper on indicators for 
sustainable energy development is an example of such indicators.
15
 
• Develop engagement initiatives that support more than one project, training 
program, or other activity. 
 
Evaluation for Effectiveness and Long-term Sustainability of 
Bioengagement Efforts 
Bioengagement programs can be evaluated for successful achievement of specific program 
objectives, the benefits to individual participants, and the contributions to address societal 
and national concerns. 
 
Participants were asked to consider measures to evaluate the effectiveness and long-term 
impact of bioengagement efforts. In doing so, participants focused on measures of success 
of individual projects rather than the overall initiative under which the project was 
developed and supported. Participants stressed the importance of developing evaluation 
criteria based on the objectives of the bioengagement program and program milestones. 
They suggested several ways to assess the impact of programs, including surveys and 
questionnaires. 
 
The following list itemizes specific information that could indicate success with specific 
bioengagement activities: 
 
• The number of new people involved in activities and training programs.  
• The number of joint publications. However, publication number does not 
demonstrate quality of the research or the scientific partnership.  
• The number of biosafety associations that were established through regional 
collaboration.  
• The degree to which regional collaboration occurs.  
• The richness of communication between scientific partners and funding agencies.  
• The level and quality of email communication between scientific partners  
• The degree of transparency between scientific partners and funding agencies.  
• The number of laboratories involved in scientific engagement activities. 
• The number of laboratories and scientists receiving accreditation for management 
of biological risks. 
• The number of students safely, ethically, and securely working in innovative 
scientific fields. 
• The number of new viral sequences added to Genbank. 
• The number of viral strains identified.  
• The number of recommendations from bioengagement programs that have been 
locally implemented. 
• The number of new programs or activities created and implemented in response to 
bioengagement efforts. 
• The number of patents resulting from joint research. 
 
                                                          
15 International Atomic Energy Agency. (2005) Energy Indicators for Sustainable Development: Guidelines and 
Methodologies. Available at: www.pub-iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1222_web.pdf. Accessed on June 27, 
2013; International Atomic Energy Agency. Indicators for Sustainable Energy Development. Available at: 
www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/indicators.pdf. Accessed on June 27, 2013. 
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Some participants highlighted the need for individuals involved in bioengagement 
programs to demonstrate value of the program activity to their supervisors. They suggested 
publication of articles and certificates of training as two possible ways individuals can 
demonstrate their benefit from participating in bioengagement programs to their 
supervisors and colleagues. 
Conclusion 
 
Priority areas for future bioengagement in the North African region tended to focus on 
integration of laboratory biosafety and biosecurity processes into the larger context of 
biological risk mitigation and promotion of science innovation. Participants, who 
represented human health and life science practitioners, generally agreed on the 
importance of regional collaboration and civil society involvement to minimizing the 
harmful consequences of biological risks, which include any risks on the spectrum of 
naturally occurring outbreaks to intentional use of pathogens and toxins. They believed 
that harnessing local abilities and interests could promote local ownership and enhance 
feasibility and sustainability of efforts to reduce biological risks. The challenges scientists 
and health practitioners face during this time of significant social and political change can 
provide a common basis for future partnerships and cooperation between the U.S. and 
North African countries. The suggestions presented in this paper are just a few possible 
opportunities for future bioengagement; ongoing dialogue with regional experts might 
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Middle East Regional Consultation 
Jordan 
June 9-10, 2013 
 
The second of the consultations was held in Amman, Jordan, in June 2013 in collaboration 
with the Jordan University of Science and Technology (JUST) and included scientists and 
health experts from the Afghanistan, Pakistan, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, United Arab 
Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Yemen, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States, including an official from the Jordanian office of the World Health Organization. 
The suggestions presented in this summary paper are based entirely on the views of the 
meeting participants, which included experts in the research and health sectors, 
government and non-governmental sectors, and human and environmental health sectors. 
The suggestions reflect the broad range of ideas and interests of the participants; consensus 
suggestions are highlighted.  
 
Over the two days of facilitated, participatory discussion, participants were encouraged to 
consider: 1) past and current bioengagement efforts and whether those efforts are sufficient 
for addressing extant biological risks or threats in the region; 2) measures of success for 
effectiveness and long-term implementation; and 3) the regional environment in which 
future bioengagement will be occurring, including the socio-political situation in 
individual countries and the entire region, the current security risks and threats facing the 
region, and the regional benefits of biological sciences to address these security risks 
and/or threats.  
 
Local governance frameworks, social norms, and cultural differences might contribute to 
the relative success or failure of science cooperation between U.S. and MENA scientists.  
 
During the meeting, participants stressed the importance of trust and transparency 
throughout any interaction. Some participants questioned the motives of the meeting and 
AAAS’s role during the meeting. Specifically, these participants inquired about the 
underlying purpose of the meeting and direct funding opportunities resulting from the 
discussions. In response to these questions, AAAS stressed that the goal in this and the 
previous meeting in Morocco was to empower scientists to voice their opinions about the 
regional and national needs for addressing biological risks, which could provide a basis for 
positive future bioengagement. This interaction emphasized the importance of honesty, 
openness, and genuine communication among regional experts. Even though trust and 
transparency are equally as important in North America, similar questions were not raised 
during the meeting in Morocco.  
 
In addition to trust, local government support for development and implementation of 
scientific engagement is critically important for promoting international collaboration in 
research and responsible science. Without strong support from local governments, 
scientists from the region might encounter significant challenges and resistance to the 
pursuit of scientific cooperation and research innovation. 
 
Based on the meeting discussions, experts from the broader MENA region identified the 
following gaps, opportunities, and approaches for bioengagement and considered the 
following sustainability options and metrics. The suggestions in bold reflect topics that 
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received significant discussion and consensus agreement during the meeting. Statements 
that were considered particularly important by several participants are italicized. 
 
The meeting discussion resulted in a number of possible opportunities for future 
engagement. At least one participant suggested creating a "roadmap" to assist possible 
funders in navigating the possible future bioengagement efforts. This roadmap could 
facilitate initial and ongoing communication and coordination among interested U.S. 
agencies and local government entities.  
Top Opportunities for Bioengagement in Middle East 
 
Participants stated that the U.S. can be most helpful in: 
 
1) Supporting the development of national strategies and plans to address 
biological risks, including zoonotic, human, and environmental health risks. 
These plans would include roles and responsibilities for the health, science, and 
emergency response sectors. Efforts towards developing national strategies have 
begun in at least one country (Lebanon
16
), but more work could be done with 
experts throughout the region to develop national plans and strategies for 
addressing the wide spectrum of biological risks. 
 
2) Supporting the creation of a regional committee that would identify resources 
and expertise throughout the Middle East. Identification of regional capacity for 
crucial scientific and health needs would help countries develop national plans and 
promote regional cooperation that builds on existing resources (including human, 
facility, and financial resources). Several groups currently active in the Middle East 
region could convene the regional committee and facilitate data collection.
17
 
Ultimately, regional plans and strategies could be developed to promote 
responsible scientific advancement to meet regional needs. 
 
3) Developing scientific exchange programs through non-governmental 
organizations to address biological risks in the laboratory setting. Scientific 
exchange programs offer regional scientists and health practitioners with 
opportunities to learn different approaches and best practices for identifying and 
addressing a broad range of biological risks. Although national-level policies are 
developed by government officials and/or government assigned scientific experts, 
individual scientists and institutional administrators play important roles in 
identifying and reducing risks as they design, conduct, and communicate their 
research or diagnostic work. Non-governmental organizations might have greater 
access to regional and U.S.-based scientists than individual government agencies 
and existing programs to offer such professional development opportunities.  
 
                                                          
16 Two efforts to develop a nationwide program to address biosafety and biosecurity risks have begun in Lebanon. The 
Biosafety and Biosecurity International Conference has initiated a dialogue with officials from relevant Lebanese 
ministries to develop a national framework for addressing biological risks. The U.S. Department of State has funded a 
project by a leading Lebanese scientist, with the help of experts in the U.S., to develop a biosafety and biosecurity 
program among universities in the country. 
17 Existing groups that could convene a regional committee include the Biosafety and Biosecurity International 
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4) Developing robust policies and procedures for transporting hazardous 
materials. Although those individuals involved with “transportation of dangerous 
goods” receive certification from the International Air Transport Association 
(IATA), many of their employers (i.e., research institutions or diagnostic 
laboratories) might not have adequate policies and procedures in place to ensure 
that all staff follow the same rules for transportation of biological materials. 
 
The regional World Health Organization (WHO) offices could provide a forum in which 
scientists and health experts from individual countries could convene, discuss scientific 
capacities and expertise, and develop partnerships to address national level identification 
and response to infectious disease outbreaks. The Jordan office of the WHO offered to set 
up such a meeting for Jordanian stakeholders from the research and health sectors. 
Although the U.S. does not have a direct role in this type of meeting, it could provide 




Participants advocated the involvement of young scientists in all bioengagement activities. 
They stated that this could promote sustainability of programs. 
Gaps, Opportunities, and Approaches for Bioengagement Programs 
 
The following sections provide the gaps in cooperation which lead to the identification of 
possible areas for future bioengagement between the U.S. and Middle Eastern countries, 
and suggested approaches to carry out joint activities. The activities are not listed in any 
particular rank order. The listed activities do not reflect official government views but 
rather demonstrate the broad range of gaps in bioengagement and possible future 
engagement opportunities that could be pursued in the region.  
 
Gaps in Bioengagement 
• Periodic evaluation of programs is essential for assessing the effectiveness of 
program activities and implementing course corrections to improve the outcomes 
of the activities. However, no such evaluation has been undertaken to assess 
investments to improve public health for rapid detection and reporting of infectious 
disease outbreaks. 
• Coordination among U.S. government offices supporting bioengagement activities 
is poor.  
• Past and current bioengagement efforts seem to be fragmented and have little 
follow-up leading regional scientists to question whether sponsors are committed 
to addressing biological risks in the Middle East.  
• Past and current bioengagement approaches are very U.S.-focused and often 
prompt regional scientists to ask: what is the U.S. concerned about, how can 
regional experts address those concerns, and can those solutions be implemented 
feasibly and sustainably in the region. 
                                                          
18 The 2005 International Health Regulations allows the World Health Organization to inquire about possible outbreaks 
of international significance based on unofficial reports as well as official communications. 
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• Past and current bioengagement efforts do not include training on developing and 
writing grant proposals. In addition, no single resource of available funding 
opportunities exists. 
• Laboratory biosafety and biosecurity is not currently integrated into the broader 
context of research or diagnostic activities.  
• Laboratory biosafety and biosecurity practices do not accurately reflect research 
and health risks in the region and do not keep pace with research advances.  
• Although current bioengagement efforts support laboratory capacity building and 
scientist training on biorisk management, many research and diagnostic facilities 
are still in need of physical upgrades, usable equipment, and laboratory biosafety 
and biosecurity education and training of the scientific workforce. 
• Middle Eastern countries do not have laboratories and equipment that can function 
reliably in harsh conditions, such as the dry desert. 
• A strong tension exists between promoting collaborative research and enhancing 
laboratory biosafety and biosecurity. Often, laboratory biosafety and biosecurity 
measures are developed and implemented in ways that hamper research and 
increase difficulties in initiating and maintaining scientific cooperation.
19
  
• Regional scientists and health practitioners are not well-equipped and trained to 
rapidly identify, characterize, and reduce outbreaks of unknown agents or origin.  
• The influx of Syrian refugees in at least three countries has caused public health, 
environmental, and social problems, including outbreaks of infectious diseases 
such as measles, water shortages, problematic waste management in the refugee 
areas and medical outposts, and increased costs of living near the refugee 
encampments. 
• Engagement with Syrian students to promote education in biology and responsible 
science is extremely difficult to carry out. However, such engagement might help 
limit the negative effects of the current environment in Syria. 
• The effects of the social-political changes across the Middle East region on 
research are not known.  
• No education programs exist to counter and reduce the influence of harmful 
ideologies on scientists. 
• Communication between research partners and with the international scientific 
community is poor, in part because the predominant language of science is English. 
In fact, scientists communicate with the global research community through 
scientific publication in English-language, internationally recognized journals. 
• Many scientists are using older technologies to carry out their research. Newer 
technologies could transform the research efforts in the region to address local, 
national, and/or regional challenges. 
• National frameworks for addressing biological risks are rare in the Middle East.  
• Partnerships between regional scientists and between the academic and health 
sectors are absent in much of the region. In addition, regional partnerships 
between scientists, journalists, and experts from other sectors are poor. 
• Translation of science and technology advancements to everyday applications to 
promote economic development in Middle Eastern countries is extremely poor. 
                                                          
19 In recent years, the recognition that responsible science – including laboratory biosafety and biosecurity – can increase 
the level of confidence in the way that collaborative research activities are carried out, has enhanced efforts in promoting 
safe and secure laboratory practice. This approach has increased the interest of scientists around the world to consider 
biosafety and biosecurity as two of many important concepts to address scientific progress and achieve international 
recognition. However, many security programs focus solely on physical and personnel security and safety measures, 
rather than taking this approach.  
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Similarly, translating environmental biotechnology to address environmental 
problems is challenging, but needed in the region. 
• Government support for science and technology research, development, and 
innovation is limited (or even lacking) in some countries, which limits the 
development of new products and services to address national needs. 
• More education of the populous and scientific community about the benefits of 
science to address a broad range of national problems while minimizing potential 
risks associated with the research and development is needed. 
• Naturally-occurring radioactive materials and chemicals are prevalent throughout 
the Middle East and could pose significant environmental, safety, and security risks 
in the region. 
 
Opportunities for Future Bioengagement 
Based on the gaps identified during the meeting, participants listed several possible 
activities with which the U. S. could assist. The top five opportunities for future 
bioengagement, which are described in detail earlier in this summary, are highlighted in 
this section. The other activities are listed to reflect the discussion of the meeting 
accurately.  
 
The U.S. could engage with Middle Eastern countries in public health, laboratory safety 
and security, education of responsible science, laboratory capacity building, 
communication, development of national strategies and public health priorities, and several 
additional areas. Within each of these areas, participants suggested specific opportunities 
for cooperation between the U.S. and Middle Eastern countries. 
 
In the area of public health, the U.S. could assist Middle Eastern countries to: 
 
 Conduct a systems assessment of past and current health engagement efforts. 
 Develop plans to prepare for and respond to a broad range of disasters, including 
natural and man-made disasters. 
 Teach research and diagnostic laboratories how to identify, characterize, and 
mitigate outbreaks of unknown origin. 
 Implement programs to assist in rebuilding Syria by promoting education and 
training in biology, public health practices, and responsible science. 
 Characterize reemerging infectious diseases. 
 Build local capacity for conducting biosurveillance of infectious diseases. 
 Develop more efficient diagnostic tools for detecting infectious diseases in the 
region. 
 Collaborate with NAMRU320 and other regional laboratories to build public health 
capacity. 
 Support research on antimicrobial resistance of pathogens in the region by 




                                                          
20 NAMRU3 is the U.S Naval Medical Research Unit- 3 located in Cairo, Egypt. 
21 Lebanon has studied and tested for antimicrobial resistance of locally important infectious diseases for years. 
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The WHO could convene meetings to promote science and health organizations to 
coordinate efforts and communicate for enhancing health response to infectious disease 
outbreaks and/or crisis management. 
 
In the area of laboratory safety and security, the U.S. could assist Middle Eastern countries 
to: 
 
 Develop robust policies and procedures for transporting hazardous materials, 
including analysis of global distribution of the goods and documentation of 
transfer of materials, for diagnostic and research laboratories.
22
 
 Establish and maintain regional training centers. 
 Promote regional biosafety consortiums. 
 Develop a regional website to share best practices in laboratory biosafety and 
biosecurity. 
 Develop training programs on laboratory biosafety and biosecurity and evaluation 
criteria to assess effectiveness of the programs. 
 Upgrade laboratory facilities and technologies to safeguard dangerous materials 
and minimize the risks of misuse or theft. 
 Integrate laboratory biosafety and biosecurity practices into research and public 
health practice to facilitate research and response to any hazard. 
 
In the area of responsible science, the U.S. could assist Middle Eastern countries to: 
 
 Clarify and document existing codes of conduct and laboratory practice to promote 
safe, ethical, and secure research. 
 Educate and train regional scientists on shared principles of responsible science. 
 
In the area of laboratory capacity building, the U.S. could assist Middle Eastern countries 
to: 
 
 Equip scientists and public health experts to facilitate field and laboratory research 
and diagnostic tests. 
 Train scientists to conduct laboratory and field research and public health 
investigations. 
 
In the area of communication between scientific colleagues, the U.S. could assist Middle 
Eastern countries to: 
 
 Develop and maintain scientific networks to facilitate communication. 
 
In the area of national strategies for scientific research and health priorities, the U.S. can 
assist Middle Eastern countries to: 
 
 Support the development of national strategies and plans to address biological 
risks, including zoonotic, human, and environmental health risks. 
 Develop scientific exchange programs through non-governmental 
organizations to address biological risks. 
                                                          
22 The opportunities highlighted in bold are the top areas for future bioengagement identified by participants. 
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 Develop strategic plans to promote research across the region. 
 Facilitate the implementation of policies to promote safe, ethical, and secure 
research and health practice. 
 Examine how the recent socio-political changes have influenced or been influenced 
by research conducted in the region. 
 Promote stronger links between entrepreneurship, academia, and the health sector 
to encourage application of research efforts to address regional and national health 
challenges. 
 Develop rules and regulations to promote safe, ethical, and secure practices for 
research, health, and transportation of dangerous goods. 
 Raise awareness about the importance of research to addressing national and 
regional problems, including infectious disease outbreaks and high-risk research 
and/or diagnostic activities. 
 
Additional opportunities with which the U.S. can help Middle East countries include: 
 
 Support the creation of a regional committee that would identify resources 
and expertise throughout the Middle East. 
 Develop a strong community-based scientific and health network. 
 Support workshops to train scientists develop grant proposals. 
 Provide a single resource of available funding sources, including government 
agencies and philanthropic organizations, for scientists to identify possible funders 
that support bioengagement and research activities. 
 Encourage the next generation of scientists to: 1) address safety, ethical, and 
security risks of research and health practice; and 2) conduct research and 
diagnostic activities to address national and regional problems. 
 Support research on the health and environmental effects of naturally occurring 
chemical and radiological compounds. 
 Strengthen international cooperation between law enforcement and the scientific 
community to detect, deter, and interdict illicit trafficking of biological materials. 
 
Approaches for Future Bioengagement 
During the discussion, participants suggested several approaches which could help 
promote and strengthen engagement between scientists from the U.S. and Middle Eastern 
countries. These approaches include: 
 
 Coordinating bioengagement activities among U.S. agencies and with other 
countries that support similar, if not identical, efforts in the Middle East. 
 Promoting trust between funders, regional scientists, and cooperative partners and 
improving open communication about intentions and objectives for the 
bioengagement activity (i.e., transparency). Bioengagement efforts greatly benefit 
from regional organizations learning about new organizations and experts who are 
interested in partnering with them on various bioengagement activities. 
 Defining the problem(s) which engagement efforts seek to address prior to 
initiation of any projects and in a clear manner. This includes answering all 
questions regional scientists and health practitioners might have about the project 
rationale, activities, and outcomes before engagement begins. 
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 Encouraging trust-building between the general public and regional scientists. 
 Designing engagement activities that build on the practical challenges of the 
region rather than focusing on addressing the problems of the U.S. 
 Involving early-career scientists in bioengagement activities. 
 Supporting associations of early-career scientists and health practitioners who 
implement the International Health Regulations, address laboratory biosafety and 
biosecurity risks, and conduct biosurveillance activities. 
 Coordinating networks of regional scientists to encourage maximal benefit to 
regional scientists and health professionals, particularly if the networks are 
complementary and not duplicative. 
 Learning about new organizations and experts to encourage expansion of 
bioengagement efforts. 
 Encouraging global scientific partnerships to promote research progress and 
responsible science. 
 Building on common concerns, problems, and needs across the MENA region. 
 Promoting regional scientific collaboration to encourage sharing of experiences in 
conducting certain types of research, engaging in cooperative activities, and 
responding to public health problems. 
 Designing bioengagement activities based on local, national, and international 
needs. 
 Incorporating entrepreneurship into activities to enable translation of research 
results to practical application and develop a business foundation for training 
programs, capacity building, diagnostic testing, and other similar efforts. 
 Including private sector (i.e., industry) in bioengagement activities to: 1) build 
regional commercial research and development (R&D) capacity to address local 
health and environmental problems; and 2) connect regional industry to 
international business partners, including biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
companies and venture capital firms. Explicitly, this approach could assist in the 
economic development of some countries in the region. Implicitly, this approach 
could promote implementation of industry standards of practice, industrial security 
measures to prevent unauthorized access and inappropriate use of commercial 
R&D, transparency, and international linkages between regional biotechnology 
industry and the global scientific and commercial sectors. 
 Focusing on biological materials that do not exist in the U.S. This provides a 
strong scientific incentive for U.S. researchers to participate in cooperative 
activities. However, care should be taken to share intellectual property and results 
among all relevant partners, particularly local partners. 
 Supporting biosurveillance efforts that include assessing the health of wild animal 
populations to facilitate early warning of infectious disease outbreaks in humans or 
domesticated animals. 
 Integrating evaluation methodologies into the design and implementation of 
bioengagement activities.  
Sustainability and Evaluation of Bioengagement Programs 
 
Participants were asked to consider the effectiveness and longer term impact of 
bioengagement programs. The following sections list suggested ways for encouraging 
 
 
34 | P a g e  
 
long-term implementation of programs or maintenance of scientific partnerships, and 
possible criteria for evaluating specific engagement activities. 
Sustainability of Programs and Partnerships 
Participants were asked about ways in which to sustain programs or partnerships initiated 
through bioengagement efforts and gain long-term benefit from those programs. The 
following list comprises suggestions provided by meeting participants: 
 
 Use of evaluation criteria and metrics for projects that are developed jointly with 
all principal partners and the funding organization have a higher likelihood of 
demonstrating value for the project activities. 
 Open communication among project partners and funding organizations increases 
the levels of trust and transparency between these individuals and organizations, 
potentially leading to long-term partnerships. 
 Cooperative projects that are designed jointly with regional scientists and health 
professionals might encourage local ownership of the project activities. 
 Projects that address local needs, build on local interest in the project idea, and are 
initiated and developed by regional scientists have a higher likelihood of promoting 
local ownership of and commitment for project activities. 
 Bioengagement activities that strengthen institutional infrastructure – including 
management, standard of practice, and resources to navigate legal, ethical, safety, 
and security issues – provide a strong foundation upon which regional scientists 
can continue the activities. 
 Scientists that develop business plans to maintain engagement activities beyond 
initial funding might enable the continuation and growth of partnerships and 
programs. 
 Project partners that include plans for transitioning ownership of engagement 
activities to local scientists might increase the likelihood of sustaining those 
activities. 
 The U.S. government and other governmental sponsors that maintain steady, 
continued commitment and funding for bioengagement efforts might demonstrate 
to regional governments and scientific partners that the activities are of sufficient 
value to maintain and strengthen.
23
 
 Projects that provide unique skills and/or knowledge to regional scientists through 
education and training might demonstrate local value and need for the project 
activities. 
 Programs that promote equal partnership between project partners as an end, rather 
than a means to an end, might increase the likelihood of maintaining, expanding, 
and evolving bioengagement efforts. 
 Forums in which scientists can share their experiences, best practices, problems, 
and corrective actions might enable the design of more effective and longer-lasting 
engagement efforts. 
 Projects that provide broad sets of tools, skills, and/or knowledge to regional 
scientists might promote repeated use of those tools, skills, and expertise in their 
workplace and future engagement activities. 
 
                                                          
23 Continued funding generally demonstrates a country’s interest in a given issue or program.  
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Evaluation for Effectiveness and Long-term Sustainability of 
Bioengagement Efforts 
Bioengagement Programs can be evaluated for successful achievement of specific program 
objectives, the benefits to individual participants, and the contributions to address societal 
and national concerns.  
 
Participants were asked to consider measures to evaluate the effectiveness and long-term 
impact of bioengagement efforts. In doing so, participants focused on measures of success 
of individual projects rather than the overall initiative under which the project was 
developed and supported. Participants stressed the importance of developing evaluation 
criteria based on the objectives of the bioengagement program and program milestones. 
They suggested several ways to assess the impact of programs, including surveys and 
questionnaires. 
 
The following list itemizes specific information that could indicate success with specific 
bioengagement activities. 
 
Possible quantitative outcome measures might include: 
 
 The number of laboratory accidents during the engagement program. 
 The number of people trained. 
 The level of capacity-building of laboratories, workforce, institutional 
infrastructure, and/or commercial facilities. 
 The degree to which training programs enhance reliability, accuracy, and 
credibility of regional scientists as tested by proficiency exams. 
 Development of networks or databases to facilitate conversation between regional 
scientists. 
 The amount of international collaboration resulting from programs. 
 The business outcomes resulting from cooperative programs. 
 
Possible qualitative outcome measures might include: 
 
 The level of transparency between project partners. 
 The degree to which scientific partnerships continue. 
 The degree of commitment by project partners. 
 The degree to which knowledge is transferred. 
 The degree to which key concepts and practices from engagement activities are 
integrated into regional training programs and facility management. 
 
Possible evaluation measures that would require detailed analysis might include: 
 
 The type and level of impact that individuals have enhancing safety and security in 
the region. 
 The weaknesses and strengths of activities and the feasibility of implementation of 
future activities. 
 Implementation of self-assessments and discussions about project failures. 
 Benefit of the project activity to the local, national, or regional population. 
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 The degree to which local needs are met. 
 
Some participants highlighted the need for individuals involved in bioengagement 
programs to demonstrate the value of the program activity to their supervisors. They 
suggested publication of articles, initiation of new collaborations, and transfer of 
technologies as possible ways that individuals can demonstrate the benefit of participating 
in bioengagement programs to their supervisors and colleagues. 
Conclusion 
 
Priority areas for future bioengagement in the Middle East focused on the development of 
national and regional strategies for addressing biological risks, policies and procedures for 
transportation of dangerous goods, scientific exchange programs to build partnerships and 
transfer knowledge and skills, and laboratory biosafety and biosecurity. Meeting 
participants, who included scientific and health experts from countries across the broader 
Middle East, stressed the importance of trust and transparency among scientific partners, 
local government support, and inclusion of early-career scientists when developing and 
implementing bioengagement activities. Finally, meeting participants provided valuable 
insight into the outcome and evaluation measures that could be used to assess the success 
and effectiveness of individual bioengagement activities. Building on the years of 
engagement in the MENA region and the meeting described in this summary, participants 
advocated for continued dialogue among regional and U.S. scientists to enable the 
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Day 1: Setting the Context  
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9:00-9:30 Welcome and Meeting Goals 
 
9:30-11:00 Current Efforts in Cooperative Scientific Engagement and 
Mechanisms for Sustainability of the Programs and Relationships 
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4:00-5:00 Benefits and Contributions of Biological Sciences to Addressing 
Security Risks and Threats 
 





Day 2: Open Discussion: Opportunities for Engagement  
9:00-9:30 Breakfast 
 
9:30-11:30 Defining Scientific Engagement 
 What gaps in regional scientific infrastructure, capability, and 
expertise exist to effectively conduct surveillance of dangerous 
pathogens or unusual biological incidents? 
 What should it encompass? 




12:30-2:30 Sustainability of Programs and Measures of Success  
 How can biosafety and biosecurity training programs and physical 
security programs be developed or implemented to ensure ongoing 
implementation and adaptation to evolving threats?  
 How can activities be developed to continue beyond U.S. 
government investment and adapt with evolving threats? 
 
 





3:00-5:00 Opportunities for Engagement  
 What opportunities exist that provide entry points for 
bioengagement? 
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Commissioned Paper: 
Lessons Learned in Cooperative 
Bioengagement in the MENA Region 
 
 
LESSONS LEARNED AND UNLEARNED: 





Scholar/Senior Project Director 
Board on Life Sciences 
The National Academies 
 
This paper is intended to provide a review of the lessons that can be learned from the 
decade of engagement by U.S. biological cooperative threat reduction (CTR or bio-CTR) 
programs in the broader Middle East—North Africa (BMENA) region.25  The specific 
charge is to 
 
 …assess past efforts for cooperative bioengagement in the MENA region and identify key lessons 
learned that affected local acceptance and long-term sustainability of past programs. The paper 
should be written within the broader context of cooperative bioengagement efforts in the Middle 
East/North Africa (MENA) region, noting the continuation of scientist redirection efforts (i.e., in 
Iraq and Libya) and transition to bioengagement with scientists not formally part of biological 
weapons programs (i.e., most other countries in the region). 
 
In order to do so, I believe it is necessary to understand a more general set of lessons that 
apply across all U.S. bio-CTR activities and then address how these apply in the BMENA. 
There are also a few lessons that reflect the particular circumstances of the region. The 
“learned/unlearned” in the paper’s title refers both to initial lessons whose precepts have 
changed over time in response to experience and evolving conditions, and to some which I 
believe have not yet been fully absorbed or effectively implemented. Few if any of these 
lessons will be a surprise to those who design and fund, implement, or follow bio-CTR, or 
“bioengagement” as it is now frequently called. But I believe that, taken together, they 
help explain many of the current realities for bioengagement efforts and the substantial 
challenges that remain for their effective and sustainable implementation. But if those 
challenges can be overcome – and I see hopeful signs from a number of quarters – I also 
believe there are important opportunities for bioengagement in the BMENA to benefit 
U.S., regional, and global security and well-being.  
 
                                                          
24 Any opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of the Naval Postgraduate School, under Grant No. N00244-12-1-0039, the United States 
Government, or the AAAS Board of Directors, Council, or membership. In addition, although this paper draws heavily 
upon reports and activities of the National Academies, ultimately the product is the author’s own, independent analysis, 
and does not necessarily reflect the views of the National Academies.  
25 In addition to the countries traditionally counted as part of the Middle East/North Africa, the BMENA includes 
Afghanistan and Pakistan.     
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Much of my analysis reflects the experience with cooperative threat reduction, 
nonproliferation, and disarmament that I and my colleagues at the National Academies 
have accumulated over the last 25 years, including the final days of the Soviet Union and 
the beginnings of CTR programs in the former Soviet Union (FSU) and continuing to the 
present.
26
  The studies and projects that provide the basis for my own assessments are 
cited; Appendix A contains a longer list of reports reflecting the larger body of work. It is 
worth noting how many of the reports were produced by joint committees from more than 
one academy or through other forms of partnership with counterpart organizations.       
 
The focus of my paper is on current bioengagement programs with explicit security goals. 
I am not including the classic Track II activities on nonproliferation and disarmament in 
which scientists take advantage of the relationships built through their scientific work to 
address other problems (De Cerreno and Keynan, 1998; Evangelista, 1999), and in which 
the National Academies and others have a long and distinguished history.
27
  At present, 
such activities are not a significant element in U.S. government bio-CTR programs. Nor 
am I including more general scientific engagement, except to the extent that it involves or 
overlaps with individuals and institutions that are part of bio-CTR efforts. The project for 
which this paper serves as background, for example, makes the argument that many forms 
of collaboration, such as support for research in the life sciences beyond infectious 
diseases relevant to WMD, ultimately serve U.S. and global security because of the 
relationships they build and the good will they engender through joint activities that fulfill 
important needs for our partners. They may also be more palatable in regions where U.S. 
security relations are difficult and initiatives are likely to be viewed with at least initial 
suspicion. Proponents of “science diplomacy” make the argument explicitly (Royal 
Society, 2010).
28
   AAAS has a Center for Science Diplomacy that promotes its role in 
foreign policy and carries out both general and security-related exchanges and other 
activities.
29
  The State Department’s bio-CTR program has supported a few projects that 
take this broader approach, but it has not yet taken hold across the U.S. government nor 
among other governments and international organizations (see next section). My exclusion 
is not intended as a judgment about a broader framing of bioengagement; the National 
Academies also carry out many activities, including in the BMENA, which reflect these 
wider forms of engagement. My goal is to examine a particular set of activities and the 
implementation challenges they face within their own security-focused context.      
 
 LESSON #1:  CONTINUING, FUNDAMENTAL DISAGREEMENTS 
ABOUT THE PROBLEM AND THE APPROPRIATE REMEDIES 
 
One of the remarkable features of bio-nonproliferation and disarmament over the last 10-
15 years is the degree to which both conceptual frameworks and policy choices are 
disputed. These disagreements take place within and between governments and with 
international organizations. They also take place between the U.S. government and the key 
                                                          
26 The National Academies is the collective name for four nongovernmental organizations:  the National Academy of 
Sciences (NAS), the National Academy of Engineering (NAE), the Institute of Medicine, and the National Research 
Council, which is the operating arm for the NAS and the NAE. For anyone interested in the work done on CTR, these 
and all the reports from the National Academies are available as free pdfs at http://www.nap.edu.   
27 For example, for information about the work of the Committee on International Security and Arms Control over 30 
years with partners in Russia, China, India, and Europe, see http://sites.nationalacademies.org/pga/cisac/index.htm; for an 
account of a decade’s work with Iran, see Scwheitzer (2010).   
28 In June 2013, the Royal Society hosted the first meeting of the presidents of the G8 academies of science and G8 
science ministers as a contribution to the G8 Summit during UK’s presidency (Royal Society, 2013).   
29 More information is available at http://diplomacy.aaas.org/.  
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stakeholders who are essential to the success of its threat reduction efforts. Some of the 
most intense disagreements are rooted in the fundamentally different outlooks of the 
security and scientific communities, as discussed further below.  
 
To me, the sheer variety of disagreements surpass the arguments associated with both 
nuclear and chemical weapons nonproliferation and disarmament, and even the issues 
related to conventional weapons that surfaced during the Arms Trade Treaty 
negotiations.
30
 This is ironic, since the norm embodied by the Biological Weapons 
Convention (BWC), the first multilateral agreement to ban an entire class of weapons, is 
arguably the strongest of those associated with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In 
the words of the president of the 6
th
 BWC Review Conference, Ambassador Masood Khan 
of Pakistan: 
 
The BWC has had marked success in defining a clear and unambiguous global norm, completely 
prohibiting the acquisition and use of biological and toxin weapons under any circumstances. The 
preamble to the Convention so forcefully states: the use of disease as a weapon would be 
"repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” It captures the solemn undertaking of the states parties 
“never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain” such 
weapons. With 155 states parties,
31
 the treaty is not universal, but no country dares argue that 
biological weapons can ever have a legitimate role in national defense. Such is the force of the 
treaty (Khan 2006).  
 
The rest of this section contains examples that illustrate the range and variety of disputes. 
Taken together, the lack of consensus significantly affects current bioengagement 
activities.   
 
What is the Threat? 
 
Current bioengagement programs are focused primarily on the threats posed by non-state 
actors and bioterrorism. This reflects the development and evolution of a broader concern 
with WMD risks that accompanied the end of the Cold War. The uncertain and unstable 
security situation that emerged from the fall of the Soviet Union prompted a major U.S. 
effort to help its former adversary and the newly emerging successor states cope with their 
legacies of nuclear materials, weapons, and delivery systems. 
 
In the realm of biorisks, U.S. policy makers feared that so-called “rogue states” would seek 
WMD as a way to counter the overwhelming superiority of U.S. military forces. In early 
1992, after years of denying accusations, President Yeltsin admitted the existence of a 
huge clandestine biological weapons program in violation of the BWC (Rossiskiye Vesti, 
1992). The admission came as the revelations about Iraq’s efforts to create biological 
weapons – and its general success in evading export controls to achieve this and other 
WMD capabilities – were unfolding in the wake of the first Gulf War. There were also 
reports that Iran and North Korea were seeking to recruit scientists from the now destitute 
illicit bioweapons facilities (see, for example, Miller et al., 2001). By the mid-1990s, the 
United States had decided to expand its CTR programs to include the former Soviet 
bioweapons program. The initial expansion took place through support for collaborative 
research projects that linked U.S. scientists in government and academic laboratories with 
                                                          
30 Again, my point is about variety, reflecting the landscape of modern biology. The intensity and longevity of disputes 
over nuclear weapons policy would be hard to match. 
31 As of August 2013, the BWC had 170 states parties; 10 more states have signed but not ratified the agreement.  
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former bioweapons scientists (NRC, 1997). Collaborative research projects, which focused 
on topics relevant to biodefense, remained a major part of bio-CTR work in the FSU.  
 
At the same time, the first World Trade Center bombings in 1993, the Oklahoma City 
bombings in 1995, and the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo attacks in Tokyo with chemical agents 
combined with the awareness of the vulnerability of vast stocks of fissile materials in the 
former Soviet Union (FSU) sparked growing concern about potential “catastrophic” 
terrorism (Carter et al., 1998). It is important to remember that worries about bioterrorism 
predated the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent anthrax letters in 
October.
32
  But those events turned the already existing threat perceptions and relatively 
modest activities into the highest national security priority receiving tens of billions of 
dollars in funding. As President George W. Bush framed the issue in a speech at West 
Point in June 2002:     
   
The gravest danger to freedom lies at the perilous crossroads of radicalism and technology. When 
the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile 
technology—when that occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power 
to strike great nations. (Bush, 2002) 
 
While perceptions of these new biological threats grew, the publication of a number of 
scientific articles early in the 2000s sparked debates about whether the published methods 
and results of certain types of experiments could provide a “blueprint” or “roadmap” for 
those who sought to cause harm.
33
  This led in turn to a variety of policies and proposals to 
govern the potential risks posed by such “dual use” research.34  
 
It would be an understatement to say that the potential risks of bioterrorism are not 
universally accepted, within or outside the United States. On the level of general policy, 
critics argue that concerns about bioterrorism reflect a general U.S. tendency to “hype” the 
threat of WMD and terrorism (see, for example, Leitenberg, 2006). Some argue that 
investments in biodefense research, since they focus on the pathogens most likely to be 
misused, may actually increase the risks rather than enhance protection (Klotz and 
Sylvester, 2009). Also on a general level, there are arguments that the potential risks of 
bioterrorism pale relative to the day-to-day risks of global infectious disease. In such cases, 
efforts to limit the security risks may restrict or damage the research enterprise that is vital 
to public health, especially if they lead to limits or controls on the conduct of research or 
its dissemination (see, for example, WHO, 2013). The continuing controversies over so-
                                                          
32 The initial “select agent” program in the United States, which provided a regulatory structure to govern the transfer of 
dangerous pathogens, was created in 1996 in response to a domestic incident (NRC 2009a). 
33 Some of the key articles are discussed in Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism (NRC 2004:25-29). Epstein 
(2001) reviews the issues and policy options under discussion at the time; Zilinskas and Tucker (2002) reflect the 
concerns in the security policy community. These discussions have not abated. For example, many similar concerns were 
raised more recently about publications related to the sequencing of the influenza virus from the 1918 pandemic (van 
Aken, 2006; CDC, 2006) and gain of function experiments with the H5N1 avian influenza virus. (Science, 2012). 
34 This is a different use of the term than its traditional definition as science, technology, and equipment with both 
civilian and military applications (e.g., helicopters or high-performance computers). As the U.S. National Science 
Advisory Board for Biosecurity explains the newer concept of dual use: 
 Life sciences research is vital to improving public health, agriculture, and the environment, and to 
strengthening our national security and economy. Yet the very research designed to find ways to better the 
health, welfare and safety of mankind can also yield information or technologies that could potentially be 
misused for harmful purposes. For instance, information from certain life sciences research can be misapplied 
to create dangerous pathogens for employment as weapons, bypass or diminish the effectiveness of medical 
countermeasures, or threaten in other ways the health and safety of humans, animals, plants, and the 
environment. Research yielding new technologies or information with the potential for both benevolent and 
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called gain-of-function research with influenza (first H5N1 and then H7N9) illustrate these 
tensions (Science, 2012).  
 
There are also more technical disputes. Some argue that “Mother Nature is the best 
terrorist,” so why should terrorists or even less technologically-advanced countries do 
anything more than use the highly dangerous pathogens already abundantly available in 
nature? Others question the capacity of such entities to take advantage of the cutting edge 
research, either because the information contained in journal articles does not provide 
sufficient information to recreate experiments or, more broadly, because absorbing and 
using new technology may require substantial tacit knowledge that is not easily transferred 
(Vogel, 2013). These continuing debates directly affect the design and implementation of 
bioengagement programs.   
 
What is the Appropriate Response? 
 
Among the international regimes devoted to WMD nonproliferation and disarmament, 
developments in the life sciences pose some of the greatest challenges to core elements of 
traditional non-proliferation strategies. A report prepared by several national and 
international scientific organizations as an independent contribution to the BWC’s 7th 
Review Conference identified three major trends that were fundamentally affecting the 
implementation of the Convention: 
 
 The rapid pace of change in the life sciences and related fields;  
 The increasing diffusion of life sciences research capacity and its applications, both 
internationally and beyond traditional research institutions; and  
 The extent to which additional scientific and technical disciplines beyond biology 
are increasingly involved in life sciences research (NRC, 2011: 4).  
 
Of these trends, diffusion of capacity is particularly relevant to bio-CTR.  
 
All the major nonproliferation treaties contain a fundamental bargain in which signatories 
agree to forego acquiring or helping others to acquire a particular weapons capability.
35
  In 
return, states in good standing are to have access to technology for peaceful applications. 
Article X of the BWC, for example, states that  
 
The States Parties to this Convention undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the 
fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for 
the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes (BWC, 1972). 
 
At the same time, efforts to limit risks by denying or controlling access to tangible or 
intangible technology are a staple tool of nonproliferation. The report cited above, 
however, concluded that “The continuing, rapid diffusion of research capacity and 
knowledge makes the commitments of [BWC] States Parties in Article III to restrict access 
to knowledge, materials, and technologies for anything other than purposes permitted by 
the Convention more challenging.” It went on to note that “…there is little hope of 
reversing this trend—and multiple reasons beyond the commitments in Article X to see the 
                                                          
35 In the case of nuclear weapons, in addition to the standard bargain, the five declared nuclear powers at the time the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty was signed made a commitment to pursue nuclear disarmament in good faith. UN 
Security Council Resolution 1540, adopted in 2004, addresses terrorism by adding an explicit obligation to prevent non-
state actors from acquiring WMD or the means to deliver them.   
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diffusion as positive and beneficial…” (NRC 2011:5).36  This assessment suggests that 
greater attention to cooperation, because it better reflects current realities, can be a 





As discussed further below with regard to the BMENA, the diffusion of capacity is not 
simply a wave washing over all parts of the world equally. For reasons of poverty, political 
or economic isolation (by choice or imposition from outside), or other factors, some 
countries and the scientists within them still have difficulty gaining access to the 
knowledge and tools of modern life sciences. But these are increasingly the exception, 
especially in areas such as public health research, where concerns about new and 
reemerging infectious disease have sparked research partnerships in a number of poor 
countries where highly dangerous pathogens are endemic.  
 
Cooperation can also help address the sheer complexity of the landscape of modern 
biology. For example, the concept of a “web of prevention,” introduced by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross in its 2002 initiative on “Biotechnology, 
Weapons, and Humanity” emphasizes the wide array of stakeholders needed to address 
biorisks. The potential contributions of many communities are necessary to the successful 
implementation of the BWC and it seems logical to suggest that engaging them will 
require a mix of policies (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2004).  
 
What would be new would be acceptance by the security community that a focus on 
cooperation is genuinely a good thing, an opportunity as much as a necessity. At present, 
there is still a decided preference among many involved in cooperative threat reduction for 
“hard” security responses, in part reflecting the history of the programs and in part a more 
general mindset. As a National Research Council (NRC) report that examined the metrics 
the Department of Defense (DOD) was using to assess its CTR programs noted 
 
Some national security constituencies question whether CBEP [Cooperative Biological Engagement 
Program], which resides in a gray mission space that sometimes overlaps with public health, serves 
their national security goals and whether it should be carried out by DoD. These skeptics have seen 
the Biological Threat Reduction Program shift from efforts to redirect weapons scientists and 
Biopreparat (the Soviet biowarfare agency) to legitimate commercial ventures, to efforts to engage 
nonweapons bioscientists in Central Asia, Africa, and even India, and ask DoD to define the 
security value of today’s capacity building health and biology related programs today (NRC, 
2012:15). 
 
In making the argument for a greater emphasis on cooperation, and genuine acceptance of 
its importance, I want to underscore those efforts to limit access to proliferation-relevant 
knowledge, technologies, and equipment will and should continue. Recent stories about 
the success of the Syrian government in evading export controls and other restrictions in 
amassing its chemical weapons stockpiles are sadly reminiscent of similar Iraqi efforts and 
accomplishments in the 1980s (see, for example, Muller et al., 1993; NTI, 2013; Sanger et 
                                                          
36 Another NRC report (NRC, 2012).commented that, in support of bio-CTR: “DoD argues that biological threats have 
changed greatly in the last 20 years. Proliferation of ability to create dangerous biological agents has already happened 
globally, threats are asymmetric, and only a small amount of material is needed to create a biological weapon that could 
cause billions of dollars of damage to our economy (one expert said that amount could even be “pocket-sized”). With the 
capability already spread widely, intent is more important now, and to know and affect intent the program must 
communicate with capable and knowledgeable individuals with whom we have built some degree of understanding and, 
in some cases, even trust” (NRC, 2012:15-16).  
37 A recent edited volume, Technology Transfers and Non-Proliferation: Between Control and Cooperation (Meier, 
2013) examines these issues across the nuclear, chemical and biological nonproliferation regimes.  
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al., 2013). But my experience with the combination of debates over Article X in the BWC, 
the huge (if perhaps sometimes overly optimistic) hopes being invested in biotechnology 
for development, and the genuine diffusion of capacity to a surprising share of the world 
have persuaded me that there needs to be a better and more strategic mix of tools 
employed to support bio-nonproliferation. The ideas and capabilities are there, but for all 
the reasons addressed in this paper, implementation of a broader approach, for example in 
“scientist engagement,” has not yet fully taken hold.    
 
The “Curse of the Nuclear Model” 
As mentioned above, the roots of the current biosecurity engagement programs lie in 
efforts to cope with “loose nukes” after the fall of the Soviet Union. From the earliest 
attempts to extend these cooperative threat reduction programs from nuclear to biological 
nonproliferation, the programs have struggled against simple or inappropriate applications 
of models and policy prescriptions from one WMD regime to another. This has a number 
of implications, including one with immediate practical consequences for program design 
and one that reflects more fundamental tensions about the nature of “security” as it defines 
biorisk management strategies.  
 
The relative availability of “technical chokepoints” that can provide a focus for 
nonproliferation efforts based on control of essential materials or knowledge is a good 
illustration of the impact of inappropriate analogies. For nuclear nonproliferation, 
plutonium and highly enriched uranium remain the keys to a weapons capability and 
effectively controlling those materials goes a long way toward reducing proliferation risks. 
In 2000, the Congressionally-mandated National Commission on Terrorism (the Bremer 
Commission) recommended that:  “The Secretary of Health and Human Services should 
strengthen physical security standards applicable to the storage, creation, and transport of 
pathogens in research laboratories and other certified facilities in order to protect against 
theft or diversion. These standards should be as rigorous as the physical protection and 
security measures applicable to critical nuclear materials” (National Commission on 
Terrorism, 2000:44). Bipartisan legislation to impose such restrictions, introduced in the 
Senate in late 2000, did not pass the House. The current U.S. Select Agent program, 
however, which developed in its current form in response to the October 2001 anthrax 
letter attacks, includes detailed requirements for inventory controls and accounting for 
quantities of pathogens.  
 
Internationally, UN Security Council Resolution 1540, passed in 2004, makes no 
distinction among nuclear, chemical, or biological materials when it calls on states to 
“develop and maintain appropriate effective measures to account for and secure such items 
in production, use, storage or transport” (UN, 2004; emphasis added). Inventory of 
biological agents have become an important part of cooperative threat 
reduction/bioengagement programs. For example, the guidelines issued in 2012 for 
implementing the voluntary International Laboratory Biorisk Management Standard, 
which was initially developed as a bioengagement activity and subsequently adopted by 
the European Committee for Standardization (CEN 2008), include “records of quantities 
and volumes at an appropriate level and based on risk” (CEN, 2012:33).    
 
There are profound differences, however, between man-made fissile materials and 
naturally occurring, self-replicating biological materials (see Table 1 for a comparison of 
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Table 1 
Characteristics of Fissile Materials and Pathogens  
 
Fissile Materials Biological Pathogens 
Do not exist in nature Generally found in nature 
Nonliving, synthetic Living, replicative 
Difficult and costly to produce Easy and cheap to produce 
Not diverse: plutonium and highly enriched uranium are the 
only fissile materials used in nuclear weapons 
Highly diverse: more than 20 pathogens are suitable for 
biological warfare  
Can be inventoried and tracked in a quantitative manner 
Because pathogens reproduce, inventory control is 
unreliable 
Can be detected at a distance from the emission of ionizing 
radiation  
Cannot be detected at a distance with available 
technologies 
Weapons-grade fissile materials are stored at a limited number 
of military nuclear sites. 
Pathogens are present in many types of facilities and at 
multiple locations within a facility 
Few nonmilitary applications (such as research reactors, 
thermo-electric generators, and production of radioisotopes) 
Many legitimate applications in biomedical research 
and the pharmaceutical/ biotechnology industry 
Source:  Tucker (2003).  
 
As a National Research Council review of the U.S. Select Agent Program
38
 commented  
 
“Unlike nuclear materials, biological organisms have the ability to replicate.
39
  Because a new culture 
can be prepared with as little as a single microorganism, an individual would need only a miniscule—
and undetectable—amount from a single vial to establish a new culture and grow up large volumes of 
the agent in a matter of hours or a day. Therefore, determining that the number of vials is the same 
from one moment to another provides no guarantee that agents have not been removed from the 
laboratory since the original number of vials or tubes could remain the same while the agent itself has 
been removed. Also unlike nuclear materials, it is possible to completely inactivate BSAT materials: 
microorganisms can be autoclaved and even toxins can be denatured so that they no longer pose a 
risk. As convenient as it might be to count vials, volumes, or number of organisms, it is not a 
biologically relevant means of inventory. For these reasons, the committee concluded that undue 
reliance on accounting practices, including counting vials, leads to false security and is counter-
productive.” (NRC, 2009a:115; emphasis in original).  
 
I want to underscore that my point is about inappropriate analogies to the value of detailed 
accounting for exact quantities of biological materials. The NRC committee argued that  
 
It is prudent and appropriate for entities with the responsibility for BSAT laboratories to know what 
types of select agents and toxins are present in their facilities. In addition to maintaining records of 
materials in a facility for security purposes, such listings serve an important safety function in 
detailing materials of concern for laboratory personnel, as well as for first responders in 
emergencies (NRC, 2009:113). 
 
The committee went on to recommend that 
 
Because biological agents have an ability to replicate, accountability is best achieved by controlling 
access to archived stocks and working materials. Requirements for counting the number of vials or 
                                                          
38 “The Federal Select Agent Program oversees the possession, use and transfer of biological select agents and toxins, 
which have the potential to pose a severe threat to public, animal or plant health or to animal or plant products” 
(http://www.selectagents.gov/). The program website contains detailed information about the program and its 
requirements.   
39 Toxins do not generally present the same difficulty as they cannot replicate. 
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other such measures of the quantity of biological select agents (other than when an agent is 
transported from one laboratory site to another) should not be employed because they are both 
unreliable and counter-productive, yielding a false sense of security. A registered entity should 
record the identity of all biological select agents and toxins within that entity, where such agents are 
stored, who has access and when that access is available, and the intended use(s) of the materials 
(NRC, 2009:115). 
  
To the extent that stringent accounting practices rather than overall inventory and access 
control are included or encouraged in efforts to upgrade laboratories as part of bio-CTR 
activities, which they commonly are, they can have significant practical impact on 
program design and implementation. And problems in meeting such accounting standards 
could negatively affect assessments of program success.
40
     
 
What Counts as “Success”? 
 
For a number of reasons, including the urgent challenges of the vulnerability of actual 
WMD programs and continued Congressional skepticism about the value of investing 
billions of dollars in cooperating with a former adversary whose compliance with its 
nonproliferation and disarmament treaty obligations was disputed, many CTR projects 
focused on problems with an apparent and tangible positive impact on WMD threats. A 
classic example is the Nunn-Lugar Scorecard, which maintains a continually updated list 
of the weapons and WMD-related materials that have been destroyed worldwide through 
cooperative activities. Although it began and remains largely about nuclear warheads and 
materials, for a number of years the Scorecard has included some chemical and biological 
weapons-related accomplishments. The January 2013 Scorecard, for example, reports that 
47 (57.3%) of the 82 “Cooperative Biological Engagement Laboratories” on the program’s 
2017 target list have been “secured” (DTRA, 2013).41  Another example is the Megatons 
to Megawatts project, a “government-industry partnership in which bomb-grade uranium 
from dismantled Russian nuclear warheads is being recycled into low enriched uranium 
(LEU) used to produce fuel for American nuclear power plants” (USEC, 2013).42   
 
CTR programs certainly have invested in projects with less obvious and tangible 
nonproliferation impacts, particularly the cooperative research programs managed by the 
International Science and Technology Center and the Science and Technology Center in 
Ukraine.
43
  And over time the stated measures of the program evolved from the tangible, 
hard security “weapons and systems destroyed” to include “nonproliferation capabilities 
enhanced” (NRC, 2009b:7). But cooperative research and similar programs, such as efforts 
in Russia to redirect former WMD facilities and personnel (including entire cities that had 
been closed to Western contact) toward peaceful enterprises, were and remain a “hard sell” 
(Smallwood and Liimatainen, 2011).      
 
                                                          
40 A note on the CEN website, for example, states that: “The free download of this CWA has been made possible through 
funding provided by the Government of Canada's Global Partnership Program” 
(http://www.cen.eu/CEN/sectors/technicalcommitteesworkshops/workshops/Pages/ws31.aspx; accessed August 3, 2013). 
41 Information about the Scorecard may be found at http://www.dtra.mil/Missions/Nunn-Lugar/scorecards.aspx. Links to 
accomplishments reports going back to 2000 may be found in Mella (2013).  
42 According to the USEC website, “475.2 metric tons of bomb-grade HEU have been recycled into 13,723 metric tons of 
LEU, equivalent to 19,008 nuclear warheads eliminated (http://www.usec.com/russian-contracts/megatons-megawatts; 
accessed August 4, 2013). 
43 For further information, see the ISTC and STCU websites at 
http://www.istc.ru/istc/istc.nsf/fa_MainPageMultiLang?OpenForm&lang=Eng and http://www.stcu.int/ respectively. The 
first activities in cooperative biological threat reduction were in fact cooperative research projects; for accounts, see NRC 
(1997 and 2007).  
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As the Cooperative Threat Reduction programs evolved and began to look beyond the 
borders of the FSU, they faced fundamental questions about the appropriate scope of 
activities. A Congressionally mandated NRC study of the future of CTR pondered the 
questions and recommended a different approach, “CTR 2.0.” As the report explains 
 
CTR 2.0, an expression borrowed from the software industry, refers to a more advanced and 
comprehensive approach to cooperative threat reduction. It comprises a set of programs and projects 
undertaken by the United States, as part of a cooperative network that includes a wide range of 
countries, international organizations, and nongovernment partners, to prevent, reduce, mitigate, or 
eliminate common threats to U.S. national security and global stability that have emerged in 
particular since the end of the Cold War. The preferred mechanism and long-term goal for the 
cooperation is partnership, which means that the countries participating should be ready to 
share responsibilities for project definition, organization, management, and financing 
according to a rational division of labor, capacity (including budget capacity), or technical 
capability. Although CTR 2.0 engagements may have to begin under less than ideal 
circumstances, the goal for countries engaged under CTR 2.0 is shared responsibility through 
engagement and partnership [emphasis added]. CTR 2.0 should be capable of rapid response as 
well as longer-term programmatic engagement (NRC, 2009b:8). 
 
The report also argued that  
 
The USG [U.S. government] CTR programs also have produced equally important intangible 
benefits. The human relationships that have been formed at multiple levels are among the most 
important, enduring, and underrecognized benefits of these programs. Working from a basis of 
shared priorities, strategies, goals, and responsibilities in a truly cooperative environment produces 
more than just tangible program success. The concept of long-term engagement, the development of 
lasting ties based on trust built through shared experience, defies the hard metrics that have become 
such an ingrained part of measuring program value, but can be the critical link to success of an 
immediate project and, perhaps more importantly, be the foundation for working together in future 
endeavors. These links have been major contributors to success in the former Soviet Union, and 
time and effort must be invested in each new environment to develop these relationships. Perhaps 
most importantly, these relationships have helped the United States gain insights into personalities 
and government structures that make it possible to design more effective approaches to cooperation.  
This is true not only for the partner or recipient countries but also for the countries with which the 
United States collaborates through the G8 GP [Global Partnership Against the Spread of 
Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction] and other international or multilateral structures 
(NRC, 2009b:33-34). 
 
I have quoted the report at length because (1) “CTR 2.0” has become a catchphrase about 
the new directions in which the U.S. CTR programs are endeavoring to move; and (2) the 
argument for the importance of relationships and other intangible benefits remains the 
subject of substantial controversy with both U.S. programs and the wider community of 
those engaged in CTR.  
. 
How Do We Define “Engagement”? 
 
Are Scientists Part of the Solution or Part of the Problem? 
The roots of bioengagement programs in the “redirection” of former weapons scientists, 
combined with the concerns about “insider threats” for bioterrorism have an 
understandable but unfortunate tendency to provide ambiguous messages to those 
participating in bioengagement programs. A tendency to describe program goals as 
“creating” or “fostering” a culture of responsibility among scientists, rather than 
“expanding” one that already exists but may need to address new issues and challenges, 
can exacerbate the problem. A 2009 document, for example, offering recommendations for 
how the G8’s Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass 
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Destruction (hereinafter, the GP and described further below) could better address 
“knowledge proliferation and scientist engagement” across all areas of WMD, concluded 
 
Closer attention is now needed to engaging scientists and raising awareness and responsibility 
among them, to prevent their knowledge in legitimate scientific disciplines to be diverted for 
unintended malicious purposes, and to strengthen frameworks within which to prevent the spread of 
sensitive information and to promote collaborations to advance common nonproliferation 
objectives.  
 
It is expected that an increasing number of projects in new geographical areas will be directed 
toward fostering awareness of the multiple uses of high risk materials and sensitive know-how and 





This becomes particularly important for programs that attempt to reach a broader swath of 
the life sciences community than those working in high containment laboratories or with 
dangerous pathogens. In the latter situations, some messages about personnel reliability 
can be included as part of the need for more active biosafety procedures and precautions. 
But one has only to consider the strong negative reactions that scientists in the United 
States have had to the personnel reliability programs introduced through the Select Agent 
Program to appreciate how similar efforts might be perceived in regions like the 
BMENA.
45
   
 
When one also considers the continuing controversies about the nature and extent of 
biothreats, and the role of traditional approaches such as restrictions on access to 
knowledge and technology, the challenges for making genuine partnership a foundation of 
engagement are apparent.  
 
Responsibilities or Requirements? 
Broadly speaking, in thinking about how to approach engagement, especially with 
scientists, as part of CTR, there are two ways to frame the issues. The first begins with the 
legal requirements and the obligations that follow from them, whether through national 
law and regulations or from international treaties.
46
 In a few cases, in particular the 
European Union, one may also encounter significant regional regulatory requirements as 
well. Not surprisingly, the natural instinct for most of those in the security community is to 
start from legal obligations, from what one “must” do. 
 
The other approach seeks to take advantage of growing international attention to issues 
related to “research integrity” and responsible conduct of science” to place 
nonproliferation and disarmament within the broader context of the social responsibility of 
science. In this case, the emphasis is more on responsibilities – on what one “should” do as 
part of the scientific community – and may come as much from norms as laws and 
regulations. Efforts to promote responsible conduct of science are not new, but they have 
received increased attention in recent years, in part because of the global diffusion of 
scientific capacity. The efforts reflect a fundamental assumption that science is not 
conducted in a social vacuum; the conduct of science itself may also be shaped by 
                                                          
44 Awareness is defined as “a set of measures aimed at promoting a culture of awareness and responsibility among 
scientists, as defined above, in order to prevent the use of their knowledge for unintended and illegal purposes; enhancing 
the safety and security of scientific facilities and installations, including access to them.” 
45 See, for example, the reports of studies examining personnel reliability issues in response to various proposals to 
increase U.S. requirements in 2008 and 2009 (NSABB, 2009; NRC, 2009a).  
46 Since the BWC requires states parties to enact national implementing legislation, there are clear and obvious links 
between the levels.  
 
 




 The attention devoted to social responsibility by scientific 
societies, advocacy groups, and academic communities has helped to establish norms for 
scientific conduct, as well as a conceptual grounding for training and education. A number 
of high-level declarations and statements in recent years have reinforced the ethical 
imperatives involved in scientific research across the global scientific community.
48
  
Examples of some of these statements may be found in Appendix B.  
 
A recent example that directly addresses biorisks is a project undertaken by the 
InterAcademy Council (IAC) and IAP ─ The Global Network of Science Academies to 
address issues of research integrity and scientific responsibility.
49
  In the first phase of the 
project, IAC and IAP collaborated in developing a short policy report on research integrity 
(IAC and IAP, 2012). The report addresses research practices and management, the reward 
structure for scientists, principles of scientific integrity, and culture. The report is intended 
to be useful throughout the global science community, including the member academies of 
IAC and IAP, research institutions, government agencies, research sponsors, professional 
and scientific unions, and individual scientists. With regard to “Social Responsibility in 
Research Plans,” the report notes 
 
Science and other forms of scholarship have been incredibly productive by seeking 
knowledge unfettered by tradition, ideology, and external pressure. At the same time, 
research can have a profound influence on the environment, human health and well-being, 
economic development, national security, and many other facets of human life. Many areas 
of science and technology can be used for destructive as well as constructive purposes, and 
researchers have a special responsibility to understand and address issues of “dual use.” 
Research on biological pathogens, for example, poses both risks and benefits for human 
health (IAC—IAP, 2012:15) 
 
This leads to the conclusion that “researchers should bear in mind the possible 
consequences of their work, including harmful consequences, in planning research 
projects” (IAC—IAP, 2012:16).  
 
In the second phase, the IAC Expert Committee is developing an educational handbook 
intended for individual scientists, educators, and institutional managers. The handbook 
addresses principles and guidelines for scientific responsibility, including scientific ethics, 
integrity, and responsibility for avoiding misuse of science. Discussions of the BWC and 
the Chemical Weapons Convention are included, along with references to available 
educational materials, as part of a chapter addressing prevention of the misuse of science. 
The handbook, which is scheduled for release late in 2013, is intended for use throughout 
the global science community.  
 
It is important to stress that these two approaches are not mutually exclusive. Many laws 
have a normative basis and bioengagement programs based in a framing as responsible 
                                                          
47 A clear example is the development of standards for the treatment of human subjects in experiments, which developed 
over time, particularly during the twentieth century in response to egregious abuses by researchers. The standards for the 
treatment of laboratory animals have continued to evolve as well.  
48 A number of examples, along with relevant history, are discussed in a report on a National Academies project in the 
BMENA (NRC, 2013). 
49 IAP is a global network of more than 100 of the world's science academies, launched in 1993. Its primary goal is to 
help member academies work together to advise citizens and public officials on the scientific aspects of critical global 
issues. More information is available at http://www.interacademies.net/. The IAC produces reports on scientific, 
technological, and health issues related to the great global challenges of our time to provide knowledge and advice to 
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science address the legal and regulatory structures, including the BWC and other efforts to 
address biorisks, that support good scientific conduct (see, for example, NRC, 2013). But 
where to begin is a fundamental program choice that can have significant consequences. 
My experience with biosecurity issues over the last 10 years, particularly in the context of 
education about dual use issue, suggests that a preference for stressing legal obligations 
usually prevails. More generally, one increasingly hears discussions about a “culture of 
responsibility” in discussions of bioengagement. Again, however, there seems to be a 
preference for stressing a culture of compliance rather than personal responsibility, which 
includes but is not confined to meeting legal responsibilities.  
 
LESSON #2:  PRACTICAL CHALLENGES FOR BIOENGAGEMENT 
IN THE BMENA 
 
The Landscape Is Crowded  
 
U.S. Bioengagement Programs Are Not the Only Ones 
Just as the original U.S. CTR program quickly expanded to engage other countries in 
addressing the urgent nuclear security threats caused by the break-up of the Soviet Union, 
and then the legacies of its chemical and biological weapons programs, the international 
collaboration continues as the focus has expanded beyond the FSU to concerns about the 
threats to global security posed by state or non-state actors’ pursuit of WMD. At their 2002 
summit in Kananaskis, Canada, the G8 countries created the Global Partnership Against 
the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. The initial focus of the 10-
year, $20 billion Global Partnership (GP) was still on the FSU, but in 2008 the GP 
expanded its scope to cover WMD-related threats around the world. At the 2011 summit, 
in Deauville, France, the leaders of the G8 agreed to continue the GP past its original 2012 
end. They also agreed to continue expanding its membership to become more international 
and more of a partnership. The GP includes Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan; the addition 
of Mexico in December 2012 and the Philippines in June 2013 brings the current 
membership to 26 and makes the GP a more genuinely international coalition.  
  
In addition to the collective activities of the GP, most of the individual member countries 
have their own bilateral programs. And the European Union, which is also a GP member, 
is an active presence in its own right through its Joint Actions in support of the BWC and 
its new Centers of Excellence, one of which is devoted to the BMENA.
50
  The GP attempts 
to foster communication and where possible coordination among the many players and 
programs. In 2012, for example, as part of its presidency of the G8 and hence the GP, the 
U.S. produced a compendium of GP member projects across all its WMD areas (GP, 
2012). Appendix C, prepared by Peter Smallwood, provides summary information about 
biological programs in the BMENA drawn from the report.  
 
Bioengagement in the BMENA Is Not Alone 
As bioengagement programs expand beyond their traditional venues in the Former Soviet 
Union (FSU) into new countries and new subjects, they frequently find they are not the 
dominant actors or the largest funders. Bio-CTR is entering already well-occupied territory 
where the initiatives and funds they bring must compete for the attention of potential 
                                                          
50 For more information the Centers of Excellence, see http://www.cbrn-coe.eu/. Information about current and past Joint 
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partners. This is particularly true for biosecurity programs devoted to health security or 
WMD-relevant disaster preparedness and response, but it affects essentially all aspects of 
the new CTR initiatives. For example, assistance with developing national biosafety and 
biosecurity legislation to strengthen biorisk management and support national 
implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention, one of the priorities for the latest 
EU Joint Action in support of the BWC, must operate alongside programs devoted to other 
specific legislative needs, as well as to improving the overall functioning of the legislative 
process.  
 
To get a sense of just how crowded the territory is, one can turn to the results of several 
surveys to assess the impact of recent declarations by aid donors and recipients on 
improving aid effectiveness. The most recent data come from a 2010 survey of 78 aid 
recipients about the implementation of commitments made in the 2005 Paris Declaration 
on Aid Effectives and the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action carried out by the Development 
Advisory Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD). Two questions in the survey asked about the number of separate donor visits and 
how many of them were coordinated with other donors. Across all forms of Official 
Development Assistance, the 78 countries enjoyed more than 20,200 individual donor 
missions in 2010 (emphasis added), of which only about 1 in 5 was coordinated with 
another donor (OECD, 2011). For the six BMENA entities covered by the survey, in 2010 
there were 2,333 donor visits related to all forms of assistance, of which 284 (12%) were 
coordinated. 
 
Afghanistan – 786 visits /47 coordinated 
Egypt – 331 visits /67 coordinated 
Jordan – 174 visits /19 coordinated 
Morocco – 277 visits /54 coordinated 
Pakistan – 487 visits /83 coordinated 
West Bank & Gaza 278 visits /14 coordinated (OECD, 2011).  
 
The sheer number and variety of funders and programs presents major challenges, which 
are discussed further below. One obvious challenge is the potential for overlap and 
duplication of effort, with the accompanying potential waste of funds. This can occur both 
within specific national efforts and across multiple donors. Another is the strain that so 
many separate programs place on the capacities of recipient countries and the 
organizations within them to absorb and manage the additional resources and the 
administrative requirements that come with them. Few if any of the target countries are in 
a position to turn down additional funds. And some current programs have a short-term 
focus; in spite of goals that suggest the contrary, projects may not have meaningful plans 




In this environment, communication and, where feasible, coordination and cooperation 
within countries and among donors is not simply a good thing, it may be essential for 
realizing programs’ hopes of impact. To date, however, the bioengagement programs have 
generally seen themselves as different from “ordinary” foreign assistance programs. Some 
of this, as discussed above, may reflect a perceived need to make clear to skeptics that bio-
                                                          
51 There are also deliberately short-term efforts. One U.S. program, the State Department’s Nonproliferation and 
Disarmament Fund, is specifically intended to respond rapidly to short notice, one-off opportunities. The quintessential 
examples are its support for secret missions to remove vulnerable stocks of fissile materials from sites in Kazakhstan and 
the former Yugoslavia. Further information may be found at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/ndf/. DOD has programs that, for 
example, would enable quick responses to disasters that could include biorisks; the presentations at an NRC workshop in 
June 2013 provide an illustration (see http://www.tvworldwide.com/events/nas/130620/).  
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CTR, especially some of its “softer” activities, is a genuine security program. Some may 
reflect an understandable reluctance to become embroiled in the vastly more complicated 
politics – and unpopularity -- of broader foreign assistance activities. At the moment the 
GP probably has all it can handle in its efforts to foster communication and coordination 
about bioengagement. The traditional inclusion of foreign assistance issues during G8 
summits, however, suggests that over time the GP has the potential to become a forum for 
a broader dialogue.  
 
It’s Crowded in the U.S. Too 
At present two programs are the primary funders of U.S bio-CTR programs:  the State 
Department's Biosecurity Engagement Program (BEP), funded in the range of $35 million 
annually (although that has been shrinking under the general pressures of the ongoing 
budget crisis) and the Cooperative Biological Engagement Program (CBEP) operated by 
the Defense Threat Reduction Agency of DOD, which has annual budgets in the range of 
$250 million.
52
  Other projects and activities that would qualify as bio-CTR are supported 
by other parts of DOD, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH), USAID, the Department of Energy and its national laboratories, 
and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Since a significant portion of BEP’s funds go to 
support the work of other U.S. government agencies, this list of agencies does not 
necessarily reflect substantial additional funding. But it certainly means more U.S. 
government players in the bioengagement mix.  
 
In addition, depending on how generously one defines “bioengagement,” there are 
potentially relevant programs to be found in other parts of the same U.S. agencies. Perhaps 
the largest single set of activities would be the programs devoted to building capacity for 
global disease surveillance (Katz et al., 2010).
53
  The NIH, through the National Institute 
for Allergy and Infectious Disease, which receives the bulk of U.S. funds for biodefense 
research, also carries out relevant projects in the BMENA for laboratory capacity-building 
and collaborative research, while the Fogarty International Center supports programs for 
responsible conduct of research that, although they do not address biosecurity, provide 
education in responsible conduct of science. The Office of Oceans, Environment, and 
Science in the State Department has responsibility for bilateral S&T agreements that may 
address general biotechnology research capacity building and exchanges. The Global 
Innovation through Science & Technology (GIST) program, for example, encourages 
entrepreneurship in the MENA. It is administered by CRDF Global, which is also a major 
BEP implementer. More generally, the Office of the Science Advisor is active in the 
diplomacy related to bilateral S&T cooperation, including in the BMENA.
54
  Another 
initiative for science cooperation, focused largely on the Muslim world, is the White 
House Science Envoys, a program that grew out of President Obama’s speech in Cairo in 
2009. The third group of science envoys was appointed in 2012 and their ranks include a 
number of prominent life scientists.  
   
 
                                                          
52 CBEP now accounts for more than half of the total DOD funding for CTR and has encountered some skepticism from 
Capitol Hill about the shift from the traditional nuclear nonproliferation mission (Philipidis, 2012).   
53 The supplement of which the Katz et al. article is a part, “Disease surveillance, capacity building and implementation 
of the International Health Regulations [IHR(2005)],” contains a number of relevant articles. 
54 The doubling in the number of agreements worldwide over the last ten years has not been accompanied by an 
expansion of the resources to implement them, however. “Some science diplomacy practitioners and academics in the 
United States and abroad are concerned that an S&T agreement with the United States, while once considered an 
important tool, is no longer taken seriously” (Dolan, 2012). 
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Goals and Resources Don’t Match 
 
All too often after the development of national or international strategies to address 
security (or other) challenges, the resources actually available to carry out the strategic 
goals may not be sufficient to meet the challenges. Bio-CTR is no exception. In 2009 the 
White House released its U.S. National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats. 
Several of its seven goals – in particular “Reinforce norms of safe and responsible 
conduct” and “Transform the international dialogue on biological threats” – contain 
commitments that held out the prospect of changing the fundamental framing of 
bioengagement and also expanding its scope significantly (White House, 2009). 
Encouragingly, the document also states that  
 
Life scientists are best positioned to develop, document, and reinforce norms regarding the 
beneficial intent of their contribution to the global community as well as those activities that are 
fundamentally intolerable. Although other communities can make meaningful contributions, only 
the concerted and deliberate effort of distinguished and respected life scientists to develop, 
document, and ultimately promulgate such norms will enable them to be fully endorsed by their 
peers and colleagues. (White House, 2009:8)  
 
After the Strategy was released at the BWC in December 2009, the White House 
undertook an extensive interagency review to try to identify the resources available to 
carry out the commitments and to map them against the objectives.
55
  The results were 
never made public, but it was obvious to most observers that objectives like “Promote 
global health security” and “Expand our capability to prevent, attribute, and apprehend,” 
which are expensive to pursue, were receiving the lion’s share of funding. Funds to 
support to support other forms of scientist engagement were relatively modest and remain 
so.  
 
The GP also struggles with similar issues. As discussed above, scientist engagement is a 
priority. Under the U.S. presidency of the G8 in 2012, a Biological Security Working 
Group was created, which decided to pursue five deliverables: 
 
 Secure and account for materials that represent biological proliferation risks.  
 Develop and maintain appropriate and effective measures to prevent, prepare for, and respond 
to the deliberate misuse of biological agents.  
 Strengthen national and global networks to rapidly identify, confirm and respond to biological 
attacks.  
 Reinforce and strengthen biological nonproliferation principles, practices and instruments.  
 Reduce proliferation risks through the advancement and promotion of safe and responsible 




As of the end of 2012, the Working Group had been able to agree on support for OIE’s 
efforts to complete its rinderpest eradication program and on support for World Health 
Organization to implement the International Health Regulations.
57
 The goals carried over 
into 2013 and the United Kingdom’s the G8 presidency. To date, however, no further 
initiatives have been announced, and certainly no collective investments in “the 
advancement and promotion of safe and responsible conduct in the biological sciences” 
have materialized. 
                                                          
55 Personal communications, early 2010.  
56 The deliverable document is available at http://geneva.USmission.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/GP-
Deliverables.pdf.  
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Current Bioengagement Programs Have Potentially Negative Impacts on Partners 
The growth of U.S. and other bioengagement programs in the BMENA reflects the 
importance of the region for overall efforts to address biorisks. The expansion of 
bioengagement efforts, however, can have consequences for partners in the region that 
would be familiar to anyone who has dealt with other types of assistance and engagement 
programs. The two major U.S. programs do make systematic efforts to communicate and 
coordinate, but how well those efforts extend into the broader landscape of international 
donors and the narrower landscape among program implementers still seems to be work in 
progress.  
 
At this stage it is probably inevitable that there will be duplication of effort. In the area I 
know best, dual use issues and education, the community of implementers is relatively 
small and largely consists of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Communication 
among the NGOs doing the work is good and one finds a number of collaborative efforts.
58
  
Even so, in Pakistan, for example, the University of Bradford, Landau Network Centro 
Volta, the International Council for the Life Sciences (ICLS), and now the National 
Academies are engaging many of the same Pakistani scientists in various aspects of 
education about general biosafety and biosecurity, biological weapons and bioterrorism, 
including dual use issues, and responsible conduct of science. Sandia National 
Laboratories also does training in biosafety and biosecurity. Each program serves a 
somewhat different purpose with somewhat different approaches and these may be 
complementary. It is quite common to find the same people serving as major partners for 
multiple projects. This can promote a greater cumulative impact; the level of experience 
that Pakistani scientists have with many issues related to biorisks was a major advantage 
for the August 2013 National Academies Education Institute in Malaysia that brought 
together scientists from Pakistan, India, and Malaysia. It appears likely that follow up 
activities there could usefully focus on pedagogy to support the Pakistanis' ability to 
implement more effectively the substantive knowledge they acquired through other efforts. 
The National Academies introduces a number of approaches to “active learning;" the 
University of Bradford is currently developing a specific technique to complement its 
extensive online curriculum materials (NRC, 2013; Novossiolova et al., 2013).  
 
But these multiple programs can also risk overloading partners who may not be in a 
position to say no to funding opportunities.
59
  In some cases, groups that are successful in 
gaining multiple awards may have trouble carrying out projects. Sometimes this is because 
they do not have the organizational capacity to undertake so many tasks, but sometime the 
administrative burdens imposed by the reporting requirements of multiple funders make it 
difficult to find time to do the work.
60
  It also can lead to the phenomenon of what a 
distinguished BMENA scientist called “biotourism,” in which the same people attend 
multiple meetings, often with similar purposes and sometimes with limited outcomes.
61
  
                                                          
58 See, for example, the information provided in Sture (2013) and Rappert (2010). 
59 It should be pointed out that this is a problem that can apply equally to implementers in the United States and Europe, 
especially NGOs and in particular if there are few sources of sustained funding. This became a subject of discussion 
during the U.S. presidency of the GP in 2012 and led to suggestions for a “framework” program to support NGOs that 
worked to support implementation of the BWC. To date, nothing has come of the discussions.     
60 This is not just an issue for implementers in the BMENA. The increasing administrative burden on university 
researchers in the United States is a subject of growing concern for the health of the research enterprise. This is relevant 
to U.S. bioengagement to the extent that projects might seek to foster collaborations, such as laboratory “twinning” 
between universities in the United States and the BMENA, for example, in areas related to disease surveillance or 
infectious diseases.    
61 Personal communication, August 2013. 
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This is one reason that BEP has implemented a reporting system for its grantees to try to 
track attendance at meetings.         
 
Another potentially problematic issue is competition among local organizations and 
implementers, who may suddenly be confronted with new funding opportunities. 
Competition is healthy and necessary in principle, but it does not always work well in 
assistance programs. For example, there is a history of NGOs springing up because of 
funding possibilities that do not necessarily have much chance of survival and sustainable 
growth.
62
  This could be a particular problem in the BMENA, where the civil society 
organizations, including scientific bodies that would normally be expected to sustain 
engagement efforts, are generally weaker and more limited. There can also be issues if 
different funders begin to “pick winners” and foster competition between organizations in 
settings where communication and even cooperation and coordination would be more 
desirable. Funder-forced collaborations rarely work well, but that is not the same as 
building in incentives for communication and coordination. Simply bringing different 
implementers together to give them the chance to share experiences and perhaps discover 
common ground can be very helpful, especially if the convening can be done under a 
relatively neutral tent and everyone gets some chance at the spotlight.         
 
Evaluation and Assessment Dilemmas 
 
Issues arising from the need for tangible products from bioengagement programs were 
discussed above. But the programs face more significant challenges when it comes to 
assessment and evaluation.
63
 The most fundamental challenge is existential: for 
nonproliferation, demonstrating success ultimately requires proving a negative. Failure 
may be obvious but if nothing bad happens, can the program claim credit?  When coupled 
with the disagreements over the nature and extent of the threat already discussed, questions 
about defining success extend well beyond methodology.    
 
On another, more practical level, the bioengagement programs are unlikely ever to be 
evaluated in ways that would meet the “gold standard” of impact evaluations.64 They are 
                                                          
62 One of the worst of these types, so-called “briefcase NGOs,” consists of a "briefcase” carrying a well-written proposal 
and little else.”  For a list of other, equally perceptive and derogatory labels, see Fowler (1997).   
63 I am using these terms as they would be used in the field of program evaluation, not their more specific meanings in 
the context of education. See, for example, Wholey et al. (2010). 
64 The World Bank offers a useful discussion of impact evaluations.  
An impact evaluation assesses changes in the well-being of individuals, households, communities or firms that 
can be attributed to a particular project, program or policy. The central impact evaluation question is what 
would have happened to those receiving the intervention if they had not in fact received the program. Since we 
cannot observe this group both with and without the intervention, the key challenge is to develop a 
counterfactual – that is, a group which is as similar as possible (in observable and unobservable dimensions) to 
those receiving the intervention. This comparison allows for the establishment of definitive causality – 
attributing observed changes in welfare to the program, while removing confounding factors.  
Impact evaluation is aimed at providing feedback to help improve the design of programs and policies. In 
addition to providing for improved accountability, impact evaluations are a tool for dynamic learning, allowing 
policymakers to improve ongoing programs and ultimately better allocate funds across programs. There are 
other types of program assessments including organizational reviews and process monitoring, but these do not 
estimate the magnitude of effects with clear causation. Such a causal analysis is essential for understanding the 
relative role of alternative interventions in reducing poverty (What is Impact Evaluation? Available at  
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/EXTISPMA/0,,menuPK:384339~p
agePK:162100~piPK:159310~theSitePK:384329,00.html#whatis.)  
The website also notes: “Impact evaluations demand a substantial amount of information, time and resources. Therefore, 
it is important to select carefully the interventions that will be evaluated. One of the important considerations that could 
govern the selection of interventions (whether they be projects, programs or policies) for impact evaluation is the 
potential of evaluation results for learning.” 
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not alone; in reality, many domestic or international programs cannot meet the ideal.
65
  
Nonproliferation programs face additional challenges, such as the potential inability to 
establish the baseline that is an essential part of good program evaluation, because parts of 
that baseline may include classified information about the threat that cannot be shared. 
Interestingly, public health is one area where rigorous evaluation and assessment methods 
are widely understood and routinely practiced, at least in comparison with other areas of 
foreign assistance. To the best of my knowledge, however, these methods have not been 
applied to the projects to improve disease surveillance capacity that are a key component 
of current bioengagement work.  
 
To their credit, both the State Department and DOD have been working to implement more 
assessment, although at relatively modest levels that seem appropriate to the nature of their 
programming. At present, the efforts focus on developing metrics, including a welcome 
attempt to move from simple outputs (e.g., number of people trained, number of trainings 
conducted) to outcomes (e.g., did people retain what they learned, were changes in 
procedures implemented). But they will continue to struggle with finding ways to identify 
whether some of the desired outcomes – and the even more desirable impacts – took place. 
This is especially true for those efforts that are aimed at achieving longer term behavioral 
change or fostering “leadership,” which are among the key goals of engaging scientists 
(NRC, 2012). 
 
Given this inevitable problem, I want to suggest that one approach for assessing 
bioengagement would be to accept the inevitable problems they face with evaluation and 
consider a different methodology that could help enhance the goals of fostering 
partnership. The general approach is “participatory evaluation,” which is used by the 
World Bank and the UN Development Program, as well as many organizations in the 
United States and elsewhere that put a premium on partnerships.
66
  A hallmark of such 
methods is that partners and participants play a central role in defining what “success” 
would mean and how it would be manifest for the project. This often includes the 
cooperative development of project metrics. Table 2 contains information from the World 





                                                          
65 See, for example NRC (2008) on the struggles of USAID to evaluate the effectiveness of its democracy assistance 
programs.  




K:20509352~menuPK:1278203~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:410306,00.html. Information from UNDP 









Such an approach can never satisfy the objective standards of classic impact evaluation, 
but as already discussed, it seems unlikely that nonproliferation programs would adopt 
such methods. Even if programs did not undertake full-scale participatory evaluations the 
philosophy of working together on key aspects of evaluation seems compatible with CTR 




Challenges for Sustainability 
 
An obvious goal for bioengagement programs is to have the results of the programs be 
sustainable by the targeted audiences and organizations after the projects end and the 
implementers depart. In general, the results of any assistance effort are vulnerable to 
                                                          
67 The NRC report for the DOD CTR programs focused on improving the development and implementation of metrics, 
such as a methodology for setting priorities to avoid overloading the assessment effort. Its inclusion of support for a 




What is Participatory Monitoring & Evaluation? 
Participatory monitoring & evaluation (PM&E) is a process through which stakeholders 
at various levels engage in monitoring or evaluating a particular project, program or 
policy, share control over the content, the process and the results of the M&E activity 
and engage in taking or identifying corrective actions. PM&E focuses on the active 
engagement of primary stakeholders. 
 
Why is Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation important? 
Participation is increasingly being recognized as being integral to the M&E process, 
since it offers new ways of assessing and learning from change that are more inclusive, 
and more responsive to the needs and aspirations of those most directly affected. PM&E 
is geared towards not only measuring the effectiveness of a project, but also towards 
building ownership and empowering beneficiaries; building accountability and 
transparency; and taking corrective actions to improve performance and outcomes. 
 
What are the principles of Participatory Monitoring & Evaluation? 
Conventionally, monitoring and evaluation has involved outside experts coming in to 
measure performance against pre-set indicators, using standardized procedures and 
tools. PM&E differs from more conventional approaches in that it seeks to engage key 
project stakeholders more actively in reflecting and assessing the progress of their 
project and in particular the achievement of results. 
 
Core principles of PM&E are: 
 
 primary stakeholders are active participants – not just sources of information  
 building capacity of local people to analyze, reflect and take action  
 joint learning of stakeholders at various levels  
 catalyzes commitment to taking corrective actions  
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broader political trends and conditions, which in the BMENA at the moment are 
impossible to forecast. In more specific programmatic terms, sometimes sustainability is 
relatively simple to measure; going back to the earliest days of CTR in the FSU, there was 
always the question of whether the equipment that was provided or security and other 
upgrades to laboratories were maintained and used. Other desired impacts, such as 
confidence that the scientists with whom a project has engaged not only would never 
personally engage in bioterrorism but would actively assist in preventing others from 
doing so, are far harder to judge. Assessing whether those sorts of efforts have resulted in 
something sustainable is complicated by all the factors just discussed. As for the programs 
themselves, the nature of the funding, especially the limits on BEP to support largely 
annual versus multi-year grants, and the shifting of country priorities from year to year, 
make it difficult to plan and fund strategically. This tends to put an emphasis on 
identifying projects that offer shorter-term solutions and the possibility of getting in and 
out within a relatively limited time. This can be particularly challenging for scientist 
engagement programs, but it also affects staples of bioengagement such as train-the-trainer 
programs that need at least some level of follow-up and continued support to have real 
hopes of taking hold.  
 
LESSON #3:  CHALLENGES FOR OPERATING IN THE BMENA 
 
The previous sections of this paper have addressed lessons that apply in varying degrees 
wherever the United States and other donors are carrying out bioengagement programs, 
including the BMENA. This section focuses on some of the specific lessons from the 
BMENA, although some of them also could apply in other parts of the world.  
 
Continuing WMD Threats and Issues 
 
The BMENA region was the site of the first expansion of U.S. bioengagement beyond the 
FSU, with initiatives to address the biological weapons (and other WMD) programs of Iraq 
and Libya. U.S. engagement in the BMENA thus began as classic scientist redirection 
efforts (Smallwood and Liimainten, 2011). Over the years, the Iraqi and Libyan programs 
have evolved to become more genuine engagement. And newer efforts in other countries 
are premised on the fact that the scientists involved have not been and are likely never to 
become involved in weapons-related activities, although they may face bioterrorism risks 
and dilemmas. But the programs’ roots in former weapons programs may color their 
current activities. There are reports that, as the bioengagement programs reach out, they 
sometimes encounter questions about whether the interest means the new partners are 
considered suspect or potential security risks (AAAS, 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2013). 
 
More importantly, WMD issues are immediate and urgent in the BMENA and they extend 
beyond terrorism. A number of states are known or presumed to have nuclear, chemical, or 
biological weapons or weapons programs, and a number either remain outside of or are not 
in good standing with the major WMD nonproliferation regimes (see, for example, ODNI, 
2012). Some  of  the efforts to promote a WMD free zone in the Middle East, either 
through formal diplomacy or via nongovernmental channels, have explored whether to 
begin with biological weapons and terrorism (Arms Control Association, 2013). This may 
be the most promising channel but it may also underscore potential biorisks. As this paper 
was being finished, the evolving story of efforts to eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons 
stockpiles suggested that classic CTR approaches might once again have a role to play. 
Given these realities, it seems understandable that activities reflecting a traditional 
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nonproliferation focus and appearing to offer a more direct security payoff had an 




There is considerable variation in the S&T capacity of the countries in the BMENA, in 
part reflecting their very different levels of economic development and in part reflecting 
the consequences of recent conflicts and political instability for existing infrastructure and 
capabilities. It is nonetheless acknowledged that, as a region, the BMENA lags behind 
(UNESCO, 2010).
68
 The general diffusion of S&T capacity discussed earlier has not 
reached all parts of the BMENA and is certainly not evenly distributed.  
 
One effect of this status is that, particularly in the poorer countries, it is harder to employ 
dual use issues as part of the framework for bioengagement. The National Academies 
experience with its Education Institutes suggests that one can successfully introduce the 
concept of dual use as part of a broader discussion of the responsible conduct of science 
(NRC, 2013). The difficulty is practical:  scientists will not see dual use as relevant 
because they do not have the capacity to perform the cutting edge research that is the focus 
of such concerns. Sometimes the lack of capacity reflects poverty; some countries cannot 
even provide the basics of reliable electricity or minimal infrastructure. In other cases, 
conditions reflect actual or perceived attempts to restrain capacity, such as through export 
controls or “biopiracy.”  
 
That said, as with other parts of the world, there are big ambitions and great hopes for what 
science and technology, including and sometimes especially, biotechnology can mean for 
the region’s development (see, for example, Bibliotheca Alexandrina, 2012). A number of 
the wealthier countries in the region are making substantial investments in developing 
capacity in biotechnology. These ambitions also extend to investments in capacity, such as 
workforce or higher education, that could also support broader political and economic 
reform. This ties back to the earlier discussion of how bioengagement programs should 
treat the diffusion of S&T capacity. The recent National Academies experience (NRC, 
2013) suggests that framing its Education Institutes as providing capacity-building for 
participation in the global research enterprise through both responsible conduct and the 




One impact of the current realities on the ground in the BMENA is that there are genuine 
and significant barriers to collaboration. Conditions vary widely but the situation in a 
number of the countries that are priorities for U.S. and broader Western engagement means 
that program implementers face serious security risks. Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Iraq, 
and Libya all remain hazardous. Even if travel is permitted – and in a number of these 
countries it is severely restricted – Western scientists are understandably reluctant to face 
personal risks to their safety. This affects all those implementing programs, but it seems 
reasonable to think that it would be likely to have a greater impact on nongovernmental 
organizations and on projects that involve U.S. or other Western participants without a 
security background, not to mention the beneficiaries of such programs in those nations. 
 
                                                          
68 Various editions of the Arab Human Development Report, for example, address aspects of the problems and current 
capacities in the region; see http://www.arab-hdr.org/.  
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In some cases, travel restrictions mean that cooperative programs must be carried out via 
meetings in third countries, which inevitably affects the nature of the collaboration. More 
generally, continuing political uncertainties make planning and implementing activities 
difficult, and can mean substantial delays in activities. For example, two of the National 
Academies’ BEP-funded activities in the region, the Education Institute and the facilitation 
of a national bioethics curriculum in Algeria, faced delays of many months and needed to 
make a number of major adjustments in their plans; in the case of the Institute, this 
included changing the venue. Fortunately, the delays and difficulties did not affect the 
ultimate successful outcomes, but they certainly made the work harder.  
 
Finally, anyone involved in these sorts of activities also has to think about the potential 
consequences for collaborators in the region if the political situation shifts or deteriorates. 
At the time of this writing, there is substantial uncertainty about the future political course 
of several BMENA countries. What will happen and how the developments in particular 
countries will affect broader conditions in the region is unknown and unknowable at this 




Engagement is Possible:  Signs and Seeds of Success  
 
The larger report to which this paper is contributing will draw on the results of a range of 
bioengagement work in the BMENA. Here I simply want to highlight a few lessons that 
we have drawn from our bioengagement work in the BMENA in the last several years. A 
number of these are also lessons from decades of other work by the National Academies in 
CTR or general scientific engagement, in the BMENA and elsewhere. Some of the general 
lessons include:     
 
 There is genuine and continuing interest among scientists in the region in 
collaborating with the United States and with each other. With regard to the latter, 
it is very common to find that participants in a meeting will want to find a way to 
stay in touch with one another. Even with the difficulties of access to modern 
communications that still exist in some parts of the BMENA, the new technologies 
provide a number of opportunities. Connecting younger scientists is particularly 
appealing, with its promise of immediate gains for research, as well as long-term 
payoffs as they advance in their careers. And, as a generalization, they may be 
more comfortable with relationships that are largely carried out online. Sometimes 
the connections are simply a listserv or perhaps a portal for sharing information and 
experiences. On other occasions, they may develop into a substantial organization 
led by those in the region; an obvious example would be the Biosafety and 
Biosecurity International Consortium (BBIC) fostered by the International Council 
for the Life Sciences (ICLS). Creating structures like the BBIC is one of the main 
organizational goals of the ICLS, but BBIC is now very much “owned” by the 
partners in the region.     
 The opportunity to be engaged in the broader international scientific community, 
through exchanges, research collaborations, and publications, is a powerful lure for 
scientists. This turned out to have an unexpectedly strong appeal for scientists from 
the FSU bioweapons program and has been true in the BMENA redirection 
programs as well. But this is a much broader and more general motivation for 
engagement, and can be used to promote adherence to international expectations, 
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norms, and standards. Part of the design of the National Academies work on the 
Education Institutes is to use the appeal of being part of the community to address 
responsible conduct in general along with specific issues biosafety and biosecurity. 
This is also another reflection of the growing diffusion of research collaborations 
and capacity in the life sciences (NRC, 2011). Not surprisingly, the growth in 
collaboration is particularly true for research related to public health.
69
   
 As mentioned above, the concept of dual use research in the life sciences can be 
controversial and sometimes does not seem relevant to bioengagement participants. 
I believe those objections can be relatively easily overcome with planning and 
appropriate framing, as our Education Institutes demonstrate. But it also may be 
possible to find different ways of framing the dual use problem in the first place 
that still serve the original purpose. As the report on the first Education Institute 
concluded: 
Through the case studies presented and the discussions held, it became 
apparent that "multiple uses" might be a preferable descriptor since 
virtually all scientific activities are on a continuum from exemplary to 
malicious conduct.
70
  Given the differences between cultural norms, 
perspectives, and levels of scientific research among countries, scientists 
may be uncertain about boundaries of ethical/unethical behavior that "dual 
use" connotes because these behaviors are more complex than these two 
categories imply. There could, therefore, be value in emphasizing a 
continuum rather than a starker dichotomy of research and behavior as part 
of the discussions at the institutes (NRC, 2013:82). 
 Finally, all of the work on dual use issues and bioengagement in which I have been 
involved over the last decade has persuaded me that using responsible conduct of 
science is the best approach for framing scientist engagement related to biosecurity 
and dual use issues. I want to emphasize that this does not mean avoiding 
discussions of relevant laws and regulations, particularly the BWC as the legal 
embodiment of the fundamental international norm. This is about where one begins 
and how best to reach one group of essential stakeholders for efforts to reduce 
biorisks. Responsible conduct is the foundation on which one builds and should be 
seen as complementary to the more detailed attention to security issues and legal 
requirements that those in certain areas of research will need.           
                                                          
69 See, for example, work done by the Harvard-Sussex Program as a contribution to the 7th BWC review conference 
(Ilchmann et al., 2011). 
70 The term was adopted by the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry for the educational materials on 
Multiple Uses of Chemicals that it developed in 2007 cooperation with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons. The material, which was being updated when this report went to press, may be found at 
http://multiple.kcvs.ca/. The IAC-IAP project on Responsible Conduct in the Global Research Enterprise chose the term 
“misuse” (IAC—IAP, 2012).   
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Security (2005) 
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Workshop Proceedings (2004) 
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APPENDIX B: 
Examples of Statements Related to Responsible Conduct of Science from 
U.S. and International Science Organizations and Forums  
 
Researchers have learned that they cannot dissociate themselves from the uses of the new 
knowledge they generate. They need to take into consideration the reasonably foreseeable 
consequences of their own activities. They also have an obligation to participate in the 
social mechanisms, both within the research community and in the broader society, that 
explore the implications of research and impose constraints on research if those constraints 
are justified. (IAC and IAP, 2012:15) 
 
In this era of global science, the scientific establishment needs to implement continuous 
self-reflection to appropriately evaluate its responsibilities, duties and rules of conduct in 
research and innovation. A universal code of conduct addressing the rights, freedoms and 
responsibilities of scientific researchers, and the universal rules of scientific research 
should be shared by the world’s scientific community. Furthermore, these rules and 
policies should be respected by the states and adopted by their national legislations. 
 
Scientists should strengthen their individual and institutional responsibilities to avoid 
possible harm to society due to ignorance or misjudgment of the consequences of new 
discoveries and applications of scientific knowledge. 
 
It is the responsibility of those who promote science and scientists to maintain the primacy 
of moral and social concerns over short-term economic interest in the selection and 
implementation of industrialized research projects. (World Science Forum, 2011) 
 
Such practice [of science], in all its aspects, requires freedom of movement, association, 
expression and communication for scientists, as well as equitable access to data, 
information, and other resources for research. It requires responsibility at all levels to carry 
out and communicate scientific work with integrity, respect, fairness, trustworthiness, and 
transparency, recognising its benefits and possible harms (ICSU, 2011). 
 
Researchers and research institutions should recognize that they have an ethical obligation 
to weigh societal benefits against risks inherent in their work” (2nd WCRI, 2010) 
 
The practice of scientific research and the use of knowledge from that research should 
always aim at the welfare of humankind, including the reduction of poverty, be respectful 
of the dignity and rights of human beings, and of the global environment, and take fully 
into account our responsibility towards present and future generations, and further that  
 
All scientists should commit themselves to high ethical standards, and a code of ethics 
based on relevant norms enshrined in international human rights instruments should be 
established for scientific professions. The social responsibility of scientists requires that 
they maintain high standards of scientific integrity and quality control, share their 
knowledge, communicate with the public and educate the younger generation. Political 
authorities should respect such action by scientists. Science curricula should include 
science ethics, as well as training in the history and philosophy of science and its cultural 
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Even scientists conducting the most fundamental research need to be aware that their work 
can ultimately have a great impact on society. Construction of the atomic bomb and the 
development of recombinant DNA—events that grew out of basic research on the nucleus 
of the atom and investigations of certain bacterial enzymes, respectively—are two 
examples of how seemingly arcane areas of science can have tremendous societal 
consequences. The occurrence and consequences of discoveries in basic research are 
virtually impossible to foresee. Nevertheless, the scientific community must recognize the 
potential for such discoveries and be prepared to address the questions that they raise. If 
scientists do find that their discoveries have implications for some important aspect of 
public affairs, they have a responsibility to call attention to the public issues involved. . . . 
science and technology have become such integral parts of society that scientists can no 
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The objectives of the Scientific Engagement Defining Gaps and Creating Opportunities for 
Cooperative Research and Global Security in the Broader Middle East and North Africa 
(BMENA) Region project were to identify and assess the overall impact of global 
biosecurity capacity-building initiatives undertaken in recent years in the BMENA region, 
and to then apply the knowledge gained from this assessment to suggest ways to build 
cooperative regional biosafety opportunities.  
 
The project had three specific aims: 
1. To assess the impact of existing initiatives; 
2. To identify and evaluate gaps in biosurveillance and implementation of biosafety 
practices from individual country perspectives; and  
3. To recommend sustainable biosurveillance and biosafety programs from a regional 
perspective.  
 
The principal investigators and research team used a five-stage methodology to reach 
these specific aims, including completing the following activities: 
 
Stage 1: Conducted a thorough desktop review of recent international initiatives in the 
region using commercial search engines and interviews with scientific thought-leaders; 
 
Stage 2: Developed a statistically representative survey database to distribute via a web-
portal and using the information acquired in the desktop review;  
 
Stage 3:  Activated regional networks by engaging biosafety and other scientific 
associations, working groups, and active forums in the region via e-mails, personal calls, 
letters etc. The chairs/presidents of these forums and associations received an initial 
briefing on the survey and then reviewed the full survey via a webinar;  
 
Stage 4: Surveyed the members of these scientific associations /forums of the region, 
which was facilitated by their respective presidents/ chairs; and  
 
Stage 5: Provided this Final Report of the trends identified in the desktop review and 
outcomes of the survey analysis, comparisons of gaps and opportunities among countries 
in the region, and conclusions/recommendations for sustainable regional cooperative 
research and global biosecurity.  
 
The project also included three pilot innovations to incentivize survey participation as 
well as enhance the long-term impact of the project. The innovations were funded through 
privately donated funds to the Frontline Foundation:  
 
1. An annual scholarship program for a BMENA scientist to study at the biosafety and 
biosecurity training course at Colorado State University (the project Regional 
Coordinator from Egypt attended the program in July 2013); 
2. A visiting international scholar award for a BMENA scientist to participate in an 
annual biosecurity conference in the U.S. (the project country leader from Morocco 
won a “lucky draw” to attend the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
Biosafety Symposium in January 2014); and 
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3. A web-based regional biosafety training network/resource center for fully accredited 
continuing education, patterned after a similar successful program developed by 
Frontline Foundation with the National Institutes of Health (NIH) for the Asia-Pacific 
region (http://www.apbtn.org/apbtn/). Frontline Foundation will be providing at no 
cost to survey respondents up to three distance-learning courses on proper selection 





TASK 1:  Desktop Review 
The emergence of biotechnology and biodiversity gave rise to multiple international 
concerns including how to perform risk assessment and risk mitigation of the impacts of 
new research products. Arising from these concerns, biosafety and biosecurity became hot 
topics for scientists and policy makers throughout the region.  
 
These international concerns, at the forefront in the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED), were formally recognized in what became the 
Earth Summit, which was held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992[1]. This resulted in the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, from which came the 1993 Cartagena Protocol of 
Biosafety. With the ratification of the Cartagena Protocol, member countries initiated 
biosafety efforts focusing on the effects of conservation and sustainable use of biological 
diversity on the earth[2]. 
 
The possibility of biotechnology being used for malicious purposes by non-state actors is 
generating new anxieties among biosafety and biosecurity experts. This concern has been 
raised globally, since the events of 9/11 and the mailed anthrax bioterrorism of 2001. The 
added scrutiny to prevent additional bio events helped promote an international focus in 
biosafety and biosecurity on how to combat bio-terrorism, especially in countries with the 
backdrop of dynamic or unstable geopolitical circumstances [3-6]. With the support of 
international organizations that focus on preventing bioterrorism, a number of biosafety 
initiatives have developed and/or been deployed in the BMENA region to help build 
institutional capacity of individual countries and develop skilled senior personnel in this 
field.  
 
The goals of the “Scientific Engagement: Defining Gaps and Creating Opportunities for 
Co-operative Research and Global Security in the Broader Middle East and North Africa 
(BMENA) Region” project were to identify the biosafety initiatives and programs in 
BMENA region over the last decade and to assess the overall regional impact of these 
initiatives. In addition, the project attempted to highlight existing biosafety practices that 
are adequately developed and biosafety practices that are underdeveloped and require 
further attention. The project, funded by the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science (AAAS), has been a collaborative effort between Aga Khan University Hospital 
(Karachi, Pakistan) and the Frontline Healthcare Workers Safety Foundation. Ltd. (USA). 
 
The co-Principal Investigator, Dr. Erum Khan at Aga Kahn University Hospital, and 
support staff conducted a literature review of the biosafety / biosecurity initiatives 
conducted in BMENA during the past ten years in order to assess the infrastructure for 
biorisk management at national levels for BMENA countries. Her staff did not restrict 
collection of those practices focused on preventing bioterrorism; instead, Dr. Khan’s staff 
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included all biosafety efforts, including those initiated in response to the Cartagena 
Protocol and those begun to prevent malicious use of biology and biotechnology. The 
research team conducted a desktop review using various commercial search engines, and 
consulted with those individuals in various BMENA countries who collaborated on recent 
biosafety initiatives.  
 
TASK 2:  Statistical Survey 
The co-PIs recruited a team of country leaders and selected two regional coordinators to 
serve as “conduits” to life scientists in each BMENA country. These life scientists would 
be surveyed regarding their experiences and opinions about biosafety capacity building in 
their country. The project concept was to have the country leaders obtain mailing lists of 
members of a biosafety association or other relevant life sciences professional 
associations, and then select a random sample of 30 members to receive the survey 
questionnaire by email. Either the country leaders would distribute the questionnaires by 
email or the country leaders would provide a sample list of email addresses to the Co-PIs, 
who would in turn distribute the questionnaires.  
 
The Co-PIs, project team members, and country leaders finalized plans to conduct the 
surveys during two separate webinars, conducted via GoToMeeting, an online meeting 
platform. The team members and country leaders are identified in Appendix C. 
 
The CO-PIs and the Frontline Foundation survey statistician used the information gathered 
during the desktop review to build a survey instrument in the commercially available 
Survey Monkey platform. Great care was taken to develop a sampling system that would 
protect the confidentiality of survey participants and their responses from concerns about 
local government interference, particularly if government officials perceived the responses 
to be less than complementary. The survey instrument is provided in Appendix D.  
 
The survey was administered to the life scientists identified for each participating country 
either by the country leaders, or by the Frontline team using the commercially available 
Mail Chimp software program within the Survey Monkey platform. 
 
The survey sought to make broad observations about capacity needs or gaps in biological 
risk management in the BMENA region. It also included questions about challenges (e.g., 
lack of human resource, monetary funds, skills etc.) and success of capacity building 
initiatives taken by the native governments / international agencies. Comments were 
solicited to assess if the international initiatives were demand driven and sustainable, and 





TASK 1:  Desktop Review 
The data on existing infrastructure for biorisk management (biosafety and biosecurity) in 
the BMENA countries was assessed via a review of past training events, seminars, 
conferences, and policy documents collected through consultation with regional 
collaborators from each of the BMENA countries. In addition, a desktop review was 
conducted by two research staff using the commercial search engines Google, Yahoo!, 
PubMed, and the Cochrane Database. To enhance the search, the researchers also explored 
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additional databases including the World Bank and the Biosafety Clearing House, which 
was developed after the Cartagena Protocol. Searches were exhaustive, but due to the lack 
of publically available information, the existence of other projects cannot be ruled out. For 
example, numerous small-scale projects conducted at academic institutions may not have 
been highlighted in the desktop review if they did not appear in any of the above-
mentioned search engines or databases. Despite this limitation, the researchers recorded 
and studied a significant number of biosafety initiatives in the BMENA region. 
 
The researchers found a total of 326 items using the following keywords: biosafety, bio-
security, biorisk management, biotechnology, Bioterrorism, living modified organisms, 
genetically modified organisms, broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA), 
Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, 
Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, 
Turkey, UAE, and Yemen. The results returned were: 202 items from Google, 43 items 
from Yahoo!, one item from PubMed, and zero items from the Cochrane Review
71
. Based 
on the primary key words, a total of 154 references were eventually found to be relevant to 
the study and researchers determined 15 more relevant search terms based on these 
references. The desktop review database includes lead organizations, funding 


























                                                          
71 Cochrane Reviews “are systematic reviews of primary research in health care and health policy, and are international 
recognized as the highest in evidence-based health care.” See http://www.cochrane.org/cochrane-reviews. Accessed on: 
October 11, 2013. 
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TASK 2:  Statistical Survey 
The data from the desktop review was compiled in a systematic manner on a standardized 
format. The survey instrument was generated to assess the awareness of scientists in the 
BMENA region (i.e., members of biosafety or similar professional associations) regarding 
biological risk management activities and capacity-building initiatives carried out by their 
government and/or national or international organizations in their country and the region. 
It was also aimed at assessing BMENA scientists’ understanding of the current 
deficiencies in biological risk management activities and the best possible solutions to 
address these problems. This survey was distributed to randomly selected scientists, 
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biologists, and members of the biosafety associations in the BMENA region who had been 
identified by individual BMENA country leaders. 
 
The sampling strategy was to use a two-stage stratified, then simple-random design and a 
sample size designed to achieve accuracy and precision sufficient to be useful and 
meaningful. The survey instrument was designed and pilot tested for readability, proper 
interpretability, and inclusion of quantifiable measures. Questions on the survey 
instrument covered successes and gaps in biosurveillance and biosafety practices, ideas for 
sustainable cooperative research, and generalizable training opportunities. The sample size 
was to be 30 from each of 12 national associations. Thirty is a classical statistical sample 
size for invocation of the Central Limit Theorem and approximation of Normal 
distributions, and is also the WHO’s recommendation for stratified design in their “30 by 





TASK 1:  Desktop Review 
Although the desktop review was successfully completed for all BMENA countries, we 
were only successful in recruiting eleven country leaders for the study survey. The 
BMENA countries for which we had a country leader are underlined in the report below. 
 
AFGHANISTAN: 
The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is a landlocked sovereign state in the Middle 
East and has a rich cultural heritage. Recently in the news as a war-torn state, it has 
begun rebuilding its infrastructure in many aspects, including biosafety and bio-
security. Afghanistan recently joined the Cartagena Protocol of Biosafety in January 
2013 and the agreement went into force in May 2013[7]. Afghanistan has been an 
active member in biosafety in the region and Afghan scientists have attended a 
number of regional conferences on biosafety since 2010[8-15]. Afghanistan has 
been actively involved in workshops and conferences focusing on risk assessment 
and risk management. More recently, Afghan scientists were involved in meetings 
that included biosecurity as part of the overall system in which science is conducted; 
these meetings, which were held by AAAS through a grant by the U.S. Department 
of State Biosecurity Engagement Program (BEP), included topics on responsible 
science, information sharing, and science’s contributions to addressing socio-
economic issues. However, further attention could be provided to human resource 
development, institutional building, and professional development. 
 
ALGERIA: 
Algeria became a member of the Cartagena protocol in 2000[104].  Very little 
published information on biosafety is available after the development of a National 
Biosafety Framework in 2004[105]. However, Algerian delegates have regularly 
attended a number of regional and international conferences on biosafety [8, 9, 12, 
17, 106], which indicates a healthy interest of the professionals in that field to better 
the country’s infrastructure. A workshop titled “Introduction to Bio-risk 
Management” was conducted in 2011 with the aid of the Sandia National 
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BAHRAIN: 
The kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 33 countries making up an island in 
the Middle East. Bahrain participated in the Biological Weapons and Toxins 
Convention 2008 intersessional meeting on biosafety and biosecurity. Subsequently, 
Bahrain has become a member of the Cartagena Protocol of Biosafety[16].  
 
Bahraini representatives have attended a number of international conferences on 
biosafety in the BMENA region [14, 15, 17], which were sponsored by International 
Federation of Biosafety Associations (IFBA), International Conference of the Life 
Sciences (ICLS), Biological Weapons Convention, and the relevant government 
institutions of the countries. These conferences have involved lecture-based, 
educational sessions on a broad set of biosafety topics. However, hands-on training 
of individuals has not been provided. This is a vulnerability which must be 
addressed to better equip the Biosafety initiative in the country. 
 
EGYPT: 
In Egypt, which became a signatory to the Cartagena Protocol in 2000 [70] and an 
active member in 2004, work on biosafety began comparatively earlier than other 
countries in the region. The degree to which biosafety work progressed varied; 
Egypt experienced periods of latency in carrying out the work. Various national and 
international agencies such as the International Society for Chemotherapy Infection 
and Cancer (ISC), Sandia National Laboratory IBTR, Egyptian Environmental 
Agency, and the Agricultural Genetic Engineering Research Institute (AGERI) have 
organized biosafety conferences that took place in in Cairo and Alexandria[71] and 
covered a wide range of topics , including  education and awareness, risk 
management, technology transfer, and information exchange[72-74]. In addition, 
several conferences focused on the topic of  identification of living modified 
organisms; these conferences should be encouraged to continue  [75-77]. Another 
aspect that should be encouraged is institutional building and human resource 
development, and dissemination of information about biosafety to Egyptian 
institutes outside of Cairo and Alexandria. 
 
IRAN: 
The situation of conducting workshops, seminars, and conferences in Iran is not 
very different to that of other countries. Iran became a signatory member of the 
Cartagena protocol in 2001[99] and was actively pursuing biosafety activities 
between 2003-2004 [100]. Following this initial period of activity, biosafety efforts 
in Iran fell dormant until 2011. In 2004,Iran developed a “National Biosafety 
Framework Of Iran” [101] and had a conference on “Implementation of the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: National Experiences and Perspectives” [102]. In 
2011, Iran held an event on biosafety in Tehran, which was organized by National 
Institute of Genetic Engineering & Biotechnology (NIGEB, Tehran, Iran) and the 
International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (ICGEB)[103]  and 
focused on bioethics, risk management and identification of living modified 
organisms. This seminar seems to be a ray of hope for further development of 
biosafety in Iran and should be encouraged. 
 
IRAQ: 
By 2004, a framework [86] on biosafety was established in Iraq, which is not yet a 
signatory to the Cartagena protocol. Following the framework development, not 
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much work was done in the field of biosafety until 2010 when a “Laboratory 
Biosafety & Bio-security Seminar” was held in Baghdad with the support of Sandia 
National Laboratory’s IBTR [87]. Since 2010, Iraqi delegates have been attending a 
number of international conferences on biosafety and security [8, 13, 15]. However 
a lot of work still remains to be done on risk awareness, education, human resource 
training, risk management, and identification of living modified organisms. Efforts 
on these issues should be encouraged in the future. 
 
ISRAEL: 
The European Biological Safety Association (EBSA) founded an association on 
biosafety called Israel Biosafety Association (IBSA) in Israel in 2007 [108]  to 
increase biosafety awareness, education and risk management among professionals 
in this field. However, no workshop or conference proceedings were retrievable 
from Israel in this field. 
 
JORDAN: 
Jordan became a signatory to the Cartagena protocol in 2000 [78] and during the 
past 8 years, Jordan has done a significant amount of work on biosafety with the 
help of a number of organizations such as Princess Haya Biotechnology Center 
(Jordan University of Science and Technology), American Biological Safety 
Association, Sandia National Laboratory’s IBTR, Biosafety and Biosecurity 
International Consortium, European Commission Joint Research Centre, and Royal 
Scientific Society [79-82]. All the workshops have taken place in Amman but 
awareness-raising and educational workshops should also be held in other Jordanian 
cities to expand the reach of these programs. [65, 80, 83, 84]. In addition, Jordanian 
delegates have attended a number of regional and international conferences on 
biosafety and bio-security [14, 34, 43, 85]. However, no appreciable work has been 
done in certain key aspects of biosafety such as identification of laboratory modified 
organisms [83, 84], technology transfer, and human resource development [83]. 
Future efforts should address these issues.  
 
KUWAIT: 
Kuwait is not a signatory of the Cartagena Protocol, but is very active in biosafety. 
Kuwaitis have actively participated in many national and international biosafety and 
biosecurity conferences. The Kuwait Institute of Scientific Research (KISR) 
organized an event in Kuwait City, Kuwait in 2010 with the support of the 
International Centre for Genetics and Biotechnology (ICGEB); this event focused 
on risk assessment and management and living modified organisms. In 2011, KISR 
co-hosted a conference with AAAS-CSTSP on safe and secure biological research, 
which included a video-teleconference for regional countries that focused on 
bioethics, biosafety, and the dual use dilemma [8, 18]. Kuwaiti delegates have 
attended a number of international and regional conferences that include sessions on 
biosafety awareness and education, and information transfer [11-15, 17, 19]. 
Additional topics to include in future efforts are human resource training and 
institutional building, both of which has not been considered. 
 
LEBANON: 
The Lebanese Republic has been an active member of the Cartagena protocol since 
2013[20] and has played an active role in international in biosafety and biosecurity 
 
 
82 | P a g e  
 
since 2008. It is a progressive state in biosafety and biosecurity and has participated 
actively in many regional and international conferences focused on these topics.  
 
Lebanon hosted national workshops in 2007 on “Organic culture in Lebanon” with 
the support of Association for Lebanese Organic Agriculture (ALOA). Following 
that, Lebanon did not host any conferences until 2013, but Lebanese delegates have 
attended a number of regional and international conferences on various aspects of 
biosafety, especially information exchange, awareness, and socio-economic 
considerations. 
 
In 2013, Lebanon hosted a national workshop on “Biosecurity & Biosafety Strategy 
in Case of a Biological, Chemical or Nuclear Crisis” with the support of WHO, 
ICLS, World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), and the Ministry of 
Agriculture of Lebanon. Although this workshop included sessions on human 
resource development, this topic should be addressed in greater detail in the future.  
 
LIBYA: 
Libya has been party to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety since 2005[21], but it 
has been a more active participant in international biosafety since 2009. Libyan 
representatives have attended the latest two Biosafety and Biosecurity International 
Consortium conferences [15, 17] and other regional and international conferences 
focusing on various aspects of biosafety.  
 
The Environment General Authority, a government agency, has recently conducted 
a national training workshop in 2012 with the sponsorship of the Biosafety Clearing 
House  and assistance of the United Nations Environmental Programme-Division of 
Environmental Law and Conventions Regional Advisor[22]. This should be 
encouraged in the future.  
 
Libyan representatives have attended conferences discussing  living and genetically 
modified organisms [18, 23]. However, more emphasis should be placed on 




The Islamic Republic of Mauritania has not held any conventions or national 
symposiums on the biosafety, but its scientists have attended international 
conferences since 2008[14]. Attendance at international conferences has  increased 
since it became a signatory to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety in 2005[24]. 
Most of these conferences have focused on risk assessment and management, 
information handling, and human resource development, with a focus on developing 
the biosafety skills of local professionals [15, 25]. Involvement of Mauritanian 
delegates’ in international biosafety activities should be encouraged further.  
 
MOROCCO: 
The Kingdom of Morocco became a signatory to the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety in May 2000, but it did not fully implement the Protocol until July 
2011[26]. Morocco also ratified and acceded as a state party the Biological and 
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Since 2007, Moroccan representatives have been very active in regional and 
international forums [8, 9, 11-15, 25, 27, 28]. In 2007, Morocco participated in the 
Biosafety and Biosecurity International Conference process and became a founding 
member of the group.  
 
In 2009,  the Moroccan Biosafety Association (MOBSA) was created by a group of 
Moroccan scientists concerned with the dissemination of information that poses 
biological risks and its impact on public health, animals, agriculture, plants and the 
environment.[112]  In 2011, MOBSA partnered with the Faculty of Sciences of 
Tétouan and established a University Master’s Degree on chemical, biological, and 
radiological security; this graduate degree includes a full module on biosafety and 
biosecurity. This curriculum, which is approved by the Ministry of Higher 
Education, has been gradually distributed to other academic institutions through 
training courses held at several Moroccan state universities.  
 
The Ministry of Health is considering a Proposal of a National Biosafety Guide for 
Biosafety in the Laboratories. In addition, the Ministry has shared a draft of the 
future Pathogens Law with MOBSA. 
 
Morocco hosted international conferences on biosafety [17, 29-31] in 2001, 2009 
and 2012, with the support of the Islamic Academy of Science and the Ministry of 
Education, Higher Education, Training and Scientific Research. Organizations such 
as International Council for the Life Sciences, Islamic Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (IESCO), and the Standing Committee on Scientific and 
Technological Cooperation of the Organization of the Islamic Conference 
(COMSTECH) have assisted Morocco’s conferences. The focus of the national and 
international conferences has been on raising awareness of biological risks, 
information transfer, and socio-economic considerations. Future conferences 
should focus on human resource development and institutional building. 
 
In 2012, MOBSA contributed to the development and implementation of the 
International Federation of Biosafety Associations’ biosafety advocacy strategy. 
 
OMAN: 
The Sultanate of Oman hosted an “International Conference on Biosafety” in 2005 
with the support of the Ministry of Regional Municipalities, Environment and 
Water Resources[32]. This conference, the first and only since Oman became a 
party to the Cartagena Protocol of Biosafety in 2003[33], focused on various issues 
such as risk assessment and management, and identification of genetically and 
living modified organisms.  
 
Following that conference, Omani delegates were not active in the field of 
biosafety until 2008, when they resumed regular participation in regional and 
international conferences [14, 15, 17, 18, 34]. These conferences have focused on 
information exchange, risk assessment and management, and socio-economic 
considerations. Conferences that focus on human resource development and 
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PAKISTAN: 
The Islamic Republic of Pakistan became a signatory to the Cartagena protocol in 
2001 and an active member in 2009[47]. Since 2008, Pakistan has carried out a lot 
of work on biosafety. Pakistan has established two nongovernmental organizations 
to address biosafety - the Pakistan Biological Safety Association (PBSA), which is a 
nationwide group, and the Biosafety Association of Pakistan (BSAP), which is a 
university-based group primarily involving scientists from the southern part of the 
country. Most initiatives have concentrated on raising awareness and education [48-
56], risk assessment [16, 57-60], risk management, and human resource and 
personnel training [15, 20, 61-65]. Rarely have these efforts focused on 
identification of living modified organisms[51].  
 
In 2009, PBSA, in collaboration with the U.S. Department of State Biosecurity 
Engagement Program, developed the Master Trainers Program to develop 
professional resources.  Unfortunately, the project halted prematurely because of the 
political situation between the donor agency and the recipient country.  
 
PBSA has conducted workshops in different cities of Pakistan since 2008, which is 
a good indicator of the dedication to dissemination of information throughout the 
country[67-69]. Pakistani delegates have attended a number of international and 
regional seminars on biosafety [8, 12, 13, 65]. Further work on developing the 
Pakistani infrastructure and institutions should be encouraged.  
 
PALESTINE: 
Palestine is not a signatory of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. However in 
2009, Palestinian representatives in the field of biosafety attended the 2
nd
 Biosafety 
and Biosecurity International Conference[17]. In addition, they have been 
relatively active in organizing conferences at home on Biotechnology Research and 
Application.  
 
Biosafety initiatives have taken place on the university-level with conferences 
organized by Al Najah University in Nablus in 2010 and Al-Quds University in 
Abu Dies in 2012. No efforts have taken place at the national and international 
levels. [35, 36]. However, biosecurity issues and socio-economic considerations 
have not been addressed adequately as a part of these initiatives and should be 
considered in the future. 
 
QATAR: 
Qatar became a member of the Cartagena protocol in 2007[109]. However since 
then, very little information is available on biosafety in Qatar. In 2013, a “Biorisk 
Management Workshop” was conducted and fully supported by Hamdard Medical 
Centre in Doha[110]. In this workshop, human resource development, education, 
risk awareness and risk management were addressed. No international agencies 
were involved in the planning or implementing of the conference.  
 
SAUDI ARABIA: 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a signatory to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
since 2007[37], has been an active member of biosafety conferences between 2009-
2012. The Saudi delegates have been active primarily at the regional level; Saudi 
Arabia hosted the First International Conference on Biotechnology in 2009 at the 
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King Saud University[38].  
 
Saudi delegates have attended a number of international conferences, which 
focused on most aspects of biosafety and biosecurity except for human resource 
development and technology transfer, both of which should receive greater focus in 
the future[8, 14, 15, 17, 18]. However since 2011, Saudis have not participated in 
many national or international conferences. Saudis should be encouraged to 
participate in international biosafety conferences.  
 
SUDAN: 
The Republic of Sudan has been a signatory to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
since 2005[39], and hosted international biosafety conferences in 2005, 2007 and 
2010[40-42]. All of these conferences were held in Khartoum with the support of 
the Ministry of Science and Technology and various collaborative organizations 
such as the International Service for National Agricultural Research, International 
Food Policy Research Institute, World Animal Health Organization, Regional 
Commission for Africa, Food and Agriculture Organizations, and African Union 
Interafrican Bureau for Animal Resources. 
 
Sudanese representatives have attended various regional biosafety conferences and 
seminars, which primarily focused on identification of genetically and living 
modified organisms [18, 34, 43], socio-economic considerations, raising 
awareness, and information transfer [14, 15, 17, 42]. Aspects of biosafety that have 
been neglected are the development of human resources in Sudan, and the 
development of framework to regulate and monitor biosafety in Sudan.  
 
SYRIA: 
The Syrian Arab Republic became a signatory to the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety in 2004[44]. Syria has received more attention because of concerns about 
bioterrorism[45] rather than because of its presence at national and international 
biosafety conferences. Syria joined the international biosafety scene in August 2008 
in Geneva and since then, Syrians have attended a number of regional conferences 
on the topic, albeit without any focus on training of individuals or institutions [14, 
15]. 
 
Syrian delegates have conducted a conference in Aleppo, Syria on “Detection of 
genetically modified organisms and biosafety for food and agriculture” in 2010 
under the supervision of the (Food and Agriculture Organization, International 
Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas, and the General Commission for 
Scientific and Agricultural Research [18, 43]. This conference focused on socio-
economic factors and biosafety.  
 
TUNISIA: 
The Republic of Tunisia has been a signatory of the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety since 2001[46]. It has been an active member since 2003 and regularly 
involved in various regional events on biosafety since 2009[8, 12-15, 17, 34]. Their 
involvement was especially evident in 2011, when the AAAS-CSTSP collaborated 
with the Institut Pasteur de Tunis and the University El Manar, Faculty of Science 
of Tunis to host a workshop entitled “Infectious Disease and International 
Engagement: Responsible Bioscience for a Safe and Secure Society - Workshop 
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Turkey signed the Cartagena protocol in 2000 and developed  a National Biosafety 
Framework in 2002-2004 [91]. Turkey resumed their involvement in biosafety in 
2009, according to their participation in publically available references. Beginning 
in 2009, Turkey held biosafety conferences with the help of a number of 
international agencies such as Sandia National Laboratories’ IBTR program and the 
European Union Reference Laboratory for GM Food and Feed [92-94]. These 
conferences mostly focused on risk assessment and management, education, and 
information exchange. Future topics to include should be identification of living 
modified organisms, institutional building, and human resource development. 
 
UAE: 
During the past 5 years, a tremendous amount of work has been done in the UAE in 
the field of biosafety. A number of workshops and conferences have been arranged, 
mainly in Dubai and Abu Dhabi [38, 88, 89]. Sandia National Laboratories’ IBTR 
program, with funding from the U.S. Department of State Biosecurity Engagement 
Program, is the primary organization involved in holding the events. [40, 90]. The 
events focused on raising awareness, risk assessment, and risk management; 
however, future events should include identification of laboratory modified 
organisms, human resource training, and technology transfer to improve the existing 
infrastructure. UAE delegates actively attend regional biosafety conferences in 
Jordan, Syria, and other countries [13, 15, 85]. 
 
YEMEN: 
Yemen began addressing biosafety in 2003 by preparing a National Progress Report 
[95]. In 20005, Yemen formed a National Development Framework and [96], 
became a signatory to the Cartagena protocol [97]. In 2011, Sandia National 
Laboratories IBTR program held a conference entitled “Introduction to Laboratory 
Bio-risk Management” in Sana’a [98]. Yemeni delegates have attended a number of 
regional and international biosafety conferences [12, 15, 17, 19, 43] that focused on 
risk assessment and management, education and awareness, and identification of 
living modified organisms. In addition to these topics, institutional and human 
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Table 1. NGO’s / Institutes Conducting Biosafety / Biosecurity Activities in the 










FIG 2: Timeline Of Countries Joining the Cartagena Protocol: 
The following timeline details the order in which various BMENA countries joined the 
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Fig 3: General Awareness and Education Workshops in the BMENA Region from 





Fig. 4: Technology Transfer: 2001-2013 
We considered technology transfer as any activity involving the introduction of a new 
technology to any country or institution, or any activity involved in increasing the 
proficiency of various professionals in biosafety practices.  
 
 
TASK 2:  Statistical Survey 
The survey instrument is attached as Appendix D, and the raw survey response data are 
available as noted in Appendix E. The country coordinators, regional coordinators and/or 
the principal investigators generated lists of potential survey participants from membership 
rosters of biosafety or similar scientific societies from several BMENA countries. The 
original survey design called for country coordinators to send out survey participation 
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requests, which in practice was followed by some coordinators. In countries in which the 
internet was not sufficiently reliable, the Frontline Foundation staff created and sent survey 
participation requests at the behest of the country coordinators. In both distribution 
processes, the country coordinators’ names, institutional affiliation, and title appeared as 
“recommending” survey participation. This was done to minimize fear of reprisal for 
offering comments or points of view that might be at odds with existing national or 
regional policies. This was done in addition to stating that all survey comments were 
anonymous and confidential. 
 
The survey software used was SurveyMonkey (SM), an internationally recognized leader 
in online surveying technology. SM offers state-of-the-art features in both survey design 
and delivery capabilities. To help manage panels of potential survey respondents, SM has a 
dedicated email service called MailChimp, which allows for targeted delivery of requests 
for survey participation. 
 
The survey was initially released as a pilot, using Pakistan as the test group. The pilot 
survey was released on 5 June 2013. Fifty requests were sent out, 25 individuals reviewed 
the survey, and 23 individuals agreed to participate. (The survey, as part of Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) protocol, requires respondents to agree to take the survey once they 
have read and understood the statement about any potential harm caused by participating 
in the survey. Only after they agreed were individual able to proceed to the questionnaire. 
After agreeing to participate and having the ability to read the survey questions, some 
respondents stopped participating. This step of gaining access to the body of survey 
questions is referred to as “reviewing” the survey.)  The 50% participation rate was 
exceedingly high and probably due to the respect and personal relationship that 
respondents have with the co-PI in Pakistan. 
 
The final survey was released on 30 June 2013. Approximately 215 invitations were sent 
out among 11 countries (some country associations had less than 30 members). Twenty-
eight participants reviewed the survey and 23 agreed to participate. The 11% participation 
rate was slightly below our expectations. Generally, online survey requests are expected to 
receive a 15% to 20% response rate, but cultural differences and possible fear of 
responding (despite statements declaring that all data were confidential and anonymous) 
might have contributed to the slightly lower rate. Also, the increasing availability and use 
of online surveying might have adversely affected the response rate by contributing to 
“survey fatigue” among potential respondents. The survey results in this study may or may 
not indicate this type of fatigue or other possible circumstances might have affected this 
population sample. However AAAS conducted a separate survey with the same pool of 
potential participants and at the same time as the current survey.  
 
Some of the country coordinators requested viewing the survey questions in hard copy 
before sending out the requests for participation. Because of the number of surveys that 
were reviewed but not completed, future surveys in the region might result in higher 
response rates if hard copies of the questions are provided to potential respondents 
allowing individuals determine if they feel the survey is too risky for participation. Within 
the pilot group, almost everyone who opened and reviewed the survey terms and 
objectives agreed to participate. During the main release of the survey, 18% of respondents 
who opened and reviewed the survey terms and objectives opted out; that is, they chose to 








The project objective was to assess the overall impact of biosafety capacity building 
initiatives undertaken in recent years in the BMENA region. The specific aims of the 
project were to help assess the impact of existing initiatives, identify and evaluate gaps in 
biosurveillance and implementation of biosafety practices from individual country 
perspectives, and recommend sustainable biosurveillance and biosafety programs from 
regional perspectives. 
 
The Cartagena Protocol has been a catalyst for serious biosafety and biosecurity initiatives 
and capacity building efforts globally (excluding the United States, a non-signatory of the 
Cartagena Protocol). Most of the initiatives in the international arena have focused on 
developing national frameworks for biotechnology and practices such as control of 
genetically modified organisms and living modified organisms, and environmental effects 
of agricultural products such as Bt Cotton. However after September 11, 2001, the global 
focus of biosafety broadened to include fields such as biomedical, veterinary medicine, 
bioengineering and agriculture largely due to United States government initiatives. 
Specifically focusing on the BMENA region, biosafety priorities have concentrated on 
agricultural, biodiversity, and animal health issues rather than the biomedical and zoonotic 
concerns of the West. The terms “select agent,” “bio-threat reduction,” and “non-
proliferation” were seen as U.S.-centric. 
 
The general trend over the past 10-12 years has focused on donor agency interests in the 
region to promote biosafety and biosecurity, and local initiatives to create and sustain the 
high levels of technical competence in laboratory biosafety and biosecurity. However, 
donor efforts have been seen by regional thought leaders and survey respondents as 
uncoordinated, duplicative, insufficient to effect much change toward safer 
laboratory practice, and largely unsustainable. Such views, real or merely perceived, 
can be best avoided by donors working more closely with regional groups such as the 
International Federation of Biosafety Associations, the African Biological Safety 
Association, or the Biosafety and Biosecurity International Consortium (BBIC) 
Process to coordinate efforts according to both regional and specific local needs.  
 
Certainly more sophisticated analysis and planning for capacity building needs is required 
in the region, as needs are different across the region and local solutions are more 
necessary than global solutions. Donors need to develop more effective methods for 
promoting locally tailored, demand driven programs and projects. Developing 
common initiatives across BMENA regional networks would be an effective way to 
reduce duplication of efforts and resources.  
 
Various international organizations such as AAAS-CSTSP International Council for the 
Life Sciences, World Health Organization, U.S. Department of State Biosecurity 
Engagement Program, International Federation of Biosafety Associations, American 
Biological Safety Association, and U.N. Environment Program have provided funding for 
biosafety activities carried out in the BMENA region. Some funding organizations worked 
primarily with university scientists, but most collaborations were with local government 
authorities such as Ministry of Agriculture of Lebanon, Ministry of Regional 
Municipalities Environment and Water Resources of Oman, or National task force 
Pakistan. Successful completion of projects involving government agencies was often 
dependent on the political relationship between the donor and recipient country. 
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Collaboration with local nongovernmental organizations and universities – including the 
Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research, International Center for Genetic Engineering and 
Biotechnology, Al Najah University, Al Quds University, Aga Khan University Hospital, 
and Jordan University of Science and Technology - was primarily limited to seminars and 
training workshops.  
 
Donors have largely limited training efforts to general or introductory courses on 
biosafety, apparently not recognizing the breadth and sophistication of the biosafety 
expertise that already exists in the region, or lacking coordination of program efforts with 
local thought leaders. Future training efforts should focus on more in-depth and 
sustainable training, and include measurement of effectiveness through demonstrated 
competencies linked to the various specific professional responsibilities that make up 
the extremely broad range of agricultural and biomedical laboratory research, 
diagnostics, and forensics. As in the rest of the world, individuals and institutions in the 
BMENA region must acquire capabilities across a range of laboratory biosafety functions 
with enhanced emphasis on learning-by-doing approaches. More innovative yet targeted 
approaches for training and capacity building programs such as train-the-trainer, 
distance learning, and accredited training need to replace the heavy reliance on 
workshops as delivery mechanisms. 
 
Government-based projects have often been subject to premature halt or delay, mostly due 
to the fluid political scenarios in the region. A serious exploration of potential roles for 
private sector donors to support capacity building activities in the region is needed as 
well. 
 
One challenge of this project was the various listings of the BMENA Region countries, 
and communicating “the region” with local thought leaders. A total of 24 countries - based 
on a World Health Organization listing - were included in this review. Table 1 outlined the 
initiatives undertaken by individual member countries in the BMENA region. Almost all 
countries listed in this BMENA region had some biosafety and biosecurity activity that 
was posted or announced on the internet, which was encouraging. 
 
Countries with active functional nongovernmental biosafety associations had far more 
initiatives than those without such associations. Nonetheless, all of these countries hosted 
biosafety programs, reflecting the heightened concern in the region. Jordan appeared to be 
the regional hub for biosafety, biosecurity and biorisk activities, followed by Morocco, 
Pakistan and Egypt.  These countries have organized and hosted national and international 
conferences, seminars and training workshops on various aspects of both agricultural and 
biomedical laboratory biosafety. 
 
The desktop review showed an overall trend towards biosafety issues in biotechnology, 
risk assessment and mitigation, identification of living modified organisms, and 
biomedical laboratory sciences. Very little data were available for initiatives in other 
sectors associated with significant biosafety concerns such as veterinary and animal health 
sciences, chemical industry, or radiological industry.  
 
Most of the initiatives have been in the form of general awareness and information 
exchange workshops at the country level, with very little cross talk at a broader regional 
level. The topics most commonly addressed in these awareness sessions included basic 
biosafety, biosecurity, bio-containment, and biorisk management. Other aspects included 
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bioterrorism and means to combat it, and bio-ethics and ethical dilemmas of dual use 
research.  
 
Capacity building activities were difficult to assess, as they vary country-to-country 
depending on the local needs for successful execution of the biosafety and biosecurity 
practices. In this project, capacity building was defined as: 1) any initiative that was 
focused on technology transfer, hands-on training, assistance in the development of a 
national framework; or 2) sustainable projects with long term measureable outcome such 
as infectious disease surveillance, laboratory diagnosis, etc. in the region. Unfortunately 
very few initiatives were identified using key words “hands-on training” and “student 
exchange program, training centers, and disease surveillance.”   
 
Conducting the survey proved to be much more difficult than anticipated, with the lessons 
learned about doing such a project probably being more valuable than the actual data 
collected. Although country leaders were enthusiastic about the project and felt 
empowered to be engaged, each individual country had so many specific requirements and 
special needs that it was not possible to launch the survey in a manner other than country 
by country. For example, some countries had more than one “biosafety association,” which 
was confusing at best, impeding the identification of relevant populations to survey, and 
being a source of considerable enmity throughout the region. Other countries actually had 
laws against “assembly” and therefore did not have professional societies as we know 
them in the West; however, social media has served as a means to create collegial interest 
groups of scientists that serve a similar function as professional societies.                 
 
This process was very slow, and prevented launching follow-up with non-responders 
during the project time period. We anticipate additional surveys coming in over the next 
few months after the official completion of the project, and the co-PIs and country leaders 
plan to continue following up with non-responders with the hopes of achieving statistically 
relevant results on a country-by-country basis that can be published in appropriate 
scientific journals. 
 
To foster sustainable regional biosurveillance, cooperative research, and biosafety 
programs, the co-PIs plan to present more broadly the findings, opportunities, and 
strategies for cooperative regional engagement to the scientific and policy-making 
communities in the region through publication of results on the internet and in appropriate 
scientific journals.  
 
In addition, three innovations were piloted with privately donated funds to Frontline 
Foundation. As participation incentives for the project’s country leaders, Frontline 
Foundation provided each country leader with a new iPad-mini, plus. the opportunity for 
one country leader to attend the 2013 Annual Biosafety and Biosecurity Training Course 
(BBTC) at Colorado State University (USA) from July 11 to 18, 2013. The sponsorship 
included round trip coach airfare, the training course tuition, lodging, and per diem funds 
for meals not included in the course registration fee. Topics presented at this prestigious 
meeting included general biosafety, biosafety and biosecurity in animal research and 
veterinary clinics; plant research and diagnostics (including a plant research facility tour); 
Select Agent regulation updates (Tier 1); laboratory and Select Agent inspection 
preparations; and building design and operations. The 2013 BBTC program was approved 
for the American Biological Safety Association (ABSA) Certification Maintenance Points 
(CM Points) for biosafety professionals as well as for American Association of Veterinary 
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State Boards (AAVSB) Registry of Approved Continuing Education (RACE) credits for 
veterinarians and veterinary technicians. 
 
Frontline Foundation also provided a sponsorship for a project country leader to participate 
in the CDC Biosafety Symposium in January 2014. This sponsorship will include round 
trip coach airfare, symposium registration, lodging, and per diem funds for meals not 
included in the registration fee.  
 
Finally, through its Global Biorisk Management Institute, Frontline Foundation will 
provide to all survey respondents the opportunity to take three of its on-line, 
internationally accredited training courses at no cost. 
 
The project benefits for the BMENA region that were achieved include: 
 Cataloguing biosafety engagement activities throughout the region, thereby 
identifying significant duplication of efforts; 
 Demonstrating the need for more advanced training and collaborative engagement 
activities in biosafety;  
 Identifying successful regional nongovernmental organizations for conducting 
more advanced training and collaborative engagement activities in biosafety;  
 Building a team of country leaders for continuing collaborative research 
opportunities; 
 Demonstrating a successful model for conducting regional survey sampling; and 
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Capacity Building /Gap Analysis Questionnaire 
Thank  you  for  agreeing  to  take  part  in  this  landmark  survey.  We  estimate  that  the  survey  should  take  no  longer  than  20  minutes  to  complete.  Please  
be  aware  of  the  following  limitatations  of  the  online  survey  tool.  The  survey  tool  does  not  allow  for  completion  in  more  than  one  session,  that  is,  
the  survey  tool  does  not  allow  for  saving  responses  and  allowing  you  to  resume  at  another  time.  Please  make  certain  that  you  have  reserved  an  
occasion  when  you  have  sufficient  time  to  complete  the  survey  in  a  single  session.    
  
In  order  to  participate,  you  are  required  to  read  and  agree  to  the  terms  of  the  Institutional  Review  Board  (IRB)  policy  on  human  subject  testing,  as  
described  below:    
  
Investigators:    







e ct or),  Frontline  Foundation,  US A    
  
Funding Agency:  American  Association  for  Advancement  of  Science  USA  
  
Purpose of the study:  The  project  objectives  are  to  assess  the  overall  impact  of  global  biosecurity  capacity  building  initiatives  undertaken  in  recent  
years  in  the  Broader  MENA  region,  and  to  build  regional  cooperative  opportunities.  The  project  will  help  assess  the  impact  of  existing  initiatives,  
identify  and  evaluate  gaps  in  biosurveillance  and  implementation  of  biosafety  practices  from  individual  country  perspectives  and  recommend  
sustainable  biosurveillance  and  biosafety  programs  from  regional  perspectives.    
  
You  are  being  asked  to  voluntarily  join  this  research  as  a  subject  expert,  to  review  and  give  your  input.    
  
Procedure:  If  you  agree  to  enter  the  study,  you  will  be  invited  to  attend  a  webinar  to  discuss  the  report  and  questionnaire.    
  
Risk:  None.    
  
Benefits:  There  is  no  direct  benefit  of  this  research  for  you  however  the  outcomes  will  help  in  identifying  gaps  in  laboratory  biosafety  in  the  
Broader  MENA  region  and  help  policy  makers  with  future  strategies    
  
Compensation:  Whether  or  not  you  agree  to  fill  out  the  survey,  you  will  be  allowed  to  take  up  to  four  on-­line  biosafety  programs  from  Frontline  
Foundation  (which  is  a  USD  $100  value).  This  is  offered  simply  for  being  selected  in  the  sample  of  life  scientists  in  your  country.    
  
Confidentiality: Investigators  and  researcher  involved  in  this  project  will  ensure  confidentiality  of  your  identity.  Your  identity  will  not  be  disclosed  to  
anyone  other  than  investigators.  However,  Aga  Khan  University  Ethical  Review  Committee  (AKU-­ERC)  may  inspect  any  records/questionnaire  
obtained  as  a  result  of  your  participation  in  this  study.    
  
Alternative to participation:  You  may  decide  to  withdraw  from  this  study  at  any  time  by  informing  research  team  without  any  reimbursement  or  
repercussions.    
  
Contact: You  can  contact  the  following  should  you  have  any  questions  regarding  your  participation.    
  
Dr  Erum  Khan  (Phone):  9221-­34861605;;  (Email):  erum.khan@aku.edu  
  








By selecting the "Yes" button below, I confirm that I have read all the IRB information 
carefully and that I agree to all of its terms. I understand that I can request clarification from 
the study's principal investigators should I have any questions. 
Please  be  aware  of  the  following  limitations  of  the  online  survey  tool.    
  
The  survey  tool  does  not  allow  for  completion  in  more  than  one  session,  that  is,  the  survey  tool  does  not  allow  for  saving  responses  and  allowing  
you  to  resume  at  another  time.  Please  make  certain  that  you  have  reserved  an  occasion  when  you  have  sufficient  time  to  complete  the  survey  in  a  
single  session.    
  
If  you  should  experience  technical  difficulties  that  do  not  allow  you  to  complete  the  survey  in  a  single  session,  please  contact  either  Dr  Khan  or  Dr  
Cohen  for  instructions  on  how  to  retake  the  survey.    
  
Glossary  of  terms  used  in  survey:    
•  Biological  Safety  Cabinet  (BSC)    
•  Genetically  Modified  Organism  (GMO)  
•  Heating,  Ventilation,  and  Air  conditioning  (HVAC)  
•  Non-­Governmental  Organization(s)  (NGO)  
•  Safe  Operating  Procedure(s)  (SOP)  
You may have worked in the biorisk field in more than one BMENA country. Please list the 
































Other  (please  specify)  
 
 




Have you had any experience as a laboratory worker in [Q2] in biology laboratories?
Have you had any experience in [Q2] as a laboratory director or manager in biology 
laboratories?
Have you had any experience in [Q2] in a job where your responsibilities included 
biosafety or biorisk management? 
Have you had any experience in [Q2] as a professor, teacher, or instructor in biosafety or 
biorisk management? 
Have you had any experience in [Q2] as an elected or appointed government official with 
any responsibilities in biosafety or biorisk management?



































Are these programs for the development of biorisk management systems made available 
by: (Choose as many as apply)
Are you aware of any existing or pending legislation or government regulations in the area 










Professional  or  Scientific  Societies
  











Please give your professional opinion related to [Q2] on the following issues using the 
scale provided below:
Are you aware of any international initiatives or programs on biorisk management that 
have been conducted in [Q2] or your region over the past five years?




Availability  of  technically  skilled  laboratory  workers
Availability  of  skilled  biosafety  professionals,  or  biorisk  managers
Availability  of  scientists  skilled  in  risk  assessment  for  biohazards
Availability  of  technicians  skilled  in  overseeing  effective  engineering  controls:  (HVAC,  
BSC  ,  etc.)
Availability  of  technically  skilled  professionals  to  oversee  laboratory  design
Availability  of  technically  skilled  workers  for  laboratory  operation  and  maintenance
Availability  of  technically  skilled  workers  for  handling/transfer  of  GMO  
Availability  of  technically  skilled  workers  for  handling/transfer  of  potentially  infectious  
material
Availability  of  technically  skilled  animal  handling  workers
Availability  of  technically  skilled  workers  with  bloodborne  pathogens
Availability  of  infrastructure  and  professional  staff  to  implement  biorisk  management  
programs,  including  SOP
Availability  of  accredited  biorisk  training  for  senior  scientists
Availability  of  accredited  biorisk  training  for  lab  directors  or  managers
Availability  of  accredited  biorisk  training  for  university  and  graduate  students
Availability  of  accredited  biorisk  training/teaching  resources  and  materials
Availability  of  institutional  biorisk  management  oversight,  such  as  laboratory  audits  or  













Please list the name(s) of sponsor agency/agencies? 
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In your opinion, is the international initiative or program sustainable at your local level?
Do you know of any follow up program(s) or organizations to sustain the initiatives or 
programs in [Q2]?
In your opinion, are any projects to build biosafety or biorisk management capacity in [Q2] 
or your region established according to the local needs or demands? 
  
Middle  East  Scientific  Institute  for  Security
  
Ministry  of  Agriculture,  Lebanon
  
Ministry  of  Science  and  Technology,  Khartoum,  Sudan
  
Moroccan  Ministry  of  Education,  Higher  Education,  Training  and  Scientific  Research
  
National  Committee  for  Biosafety,  Ministry  of  Environment,  Qatar
  




Qatar  Foundation  for  Education,  Science,  and  Community  Development
  






United  Nations:  UNESCO,  WHO
  
U.S.  Department  of  State's  Biosecurity  Engagement  Program  (BEP)
  























If you are aware of any outcomes of these local or regional or international initiatives or 
capacity building projects, please explain below. If you are not aware, or if you don’t want 
to elaborate, please leave this question blank.
  
Are there any other scientific collaborative projects in the region in which [Q2] 
participates?
Please list project names or agency sponsors. If you are not aware, or if you don’t want to 
elaborate, please leave this question blank.
Should biorisk management projects be linked with other regional scientific networks 
such as biosafety, Infectious disease, biotechnology, or environmental societies, etc.? If 
you think so, please explain why. If you are not aware, or if you don’t want to elaborate, 























Please list the name(s) of sponsor agency/agencies? 
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BMENA Survey
From your perspective, what are the opportunities in [Q2] for developing regional or 
international collaborations in biorisk management and/or life sciences research? If you 
are not aware, or if you don’t want to elaborate, please leave this question blank.
  
Do you know of any agencies or programs or organizations in [Q2] that might be 
interested in investing or participating in regional or international collaborations in biorisk 
management and/or life sciences research? If yes, please respond below. If not, please 
leave blank.
  
If you would like to make suggestions or add comments to issues not appearing in this 





Middle  East  Scientific  Institute  for  Security
  
Ministry  of  Agriculture,  Lebanon
  
Ministry  of  Science  and  Technology,  Khartoum,  Sudan
  
Moroccan  Ministry  of  Education,  Higher  Education,  Training  and  Scientific  Research
  
National  Committee  for  Biosafety,  Ministry  of  Environment,  Qatar
  




Qatar  Foundation  for  Education,  Science,  and  Community  Development
  






United  Nations:  UNESCO,  WHO
  
U.S.  Department  of  State's  Biosecurity  Engagement  Program  (BEP)
  
Others  (please  specify)  
 
 









If you would like to take part in additional discussions relating biosafety or biorisk 
management to circumstances in [Q2], please provide your email below. (Your email will 
NOT be stored or reported in ANY WAY with your answers to this survey;; your email will 
simply be provided to Aga Khan University for follow up research, workshops, or biorisk 
management programs.)
  
Thank  you  for  participating  in  this  important  research  project!  
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APPENDIX E: RAW SURVEY DATA 
 
 The complete survey data are compiled into sixty three pages, in two separate files - the 
pilot data and actual survey data.  These files can be previewed and/or downloaded from 
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Commissioned Paper: 
New Approaches for Future 
Bioengagement in the MENA Region 
 
 
International Biosecurity:  
Engagement between American and BMENA Scientists 
Judi Sture 
Bradford Disarmament Research Centre 
 
 “I just don’t know why they’re shooting at us. All we want to do 
is bring them democracy and white bread. Transplant the 
American dream: freedom, achievement, hyper-acidity, affluence, 
flatulence, technology, tension, the inalienable right to an early 
coronary sitting at your desk while plotting to stab your boss in 
the back.” 
Captain Benjamin Franklin "Hawkeye" Pierce, BS, MD, 








Science and scientific practice cannot be viewed as existing in a technological bubble, or in 
terms of it being a culture of its own – it always exists and is practiced in cultural settings 
that dictate values and norms about social organization, economics, technology, religious 
ideals and linguistics to those who live and grow up within those settings. To be a scientist is 
not an identity that supersedes a scientist’s cultural identity – s/he is a scientist in terms of 
what that means in his/her culture. And that may be a very different identity to being a 
scientist in the U.S. or in the UK. Scientists who belong to non-Western cultures are subject 
to the pressures, benefits and drawbacks of those cultures. We in the West tend to assume 
that our overseas colleagues will use the same decision-making processes, the same values 
and determine priorities in exactly the same way that we do. Sometimes they do, sometimes 
they don’t. Our cultural background drives the ways in which we make decisions and value-
judgments, and it is arguably the principal driver behind our ways of prioritizing needs and 
actions. This is perhaps the major way in which scientists from various cultures differ. We 
need to acquire awareness, knowledge and understanding about these determining factors, 
and only then can we use these to apply ourselves in a skillful way to work with overseas 
colleagues effectively. We don’t need to fully understand in detail what lies behind the 
motivations of our overseas colleagues, but as long as we recognize that their personal and 
professional motivations are driven and influenced by significantly different pressures than 
those that apply to us, then we will be more than halfway to meeting them. 
 
                                                          
72 Hawkeye Pierce was a fictional surgeon in the 20th Century Fox/CBS TV series M*A*S*H, who memorably 
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This paper seeks to introduce a number of cultural and inter-cultural concepts and ideas, as a 
foundation on which to construct a culturally-sensitive and responsive approach to the issue 
of bio-engagement between scientists, science educators, science policy makers and other 
science stakeholders in the BMENA region and partners from the U.S. The concepts 
introduced here could be applied in any international context, but given the remit of the 
project for which this paper is being prepared, I will refer largely to the BMENA region. 
 
It is not my intention to come up with a “grand plan” of how future collaborations and 
interventions should be carried out. Rather, I will use this opportunity to consider what we 
know of cultural differences between what we typically refer to as “the West” and other 
regions of the world, and go on to suggest a model that could be used in planning any work 
involving collaboration between Western and non-Western partners. In my opinion and 
experience, there is no “method” of intercultural cooperation, rather, successful relationships 
and outcomes depend on an increased understanding of “the other”. If understanding is 
increased, changes in action can follow, and success is more likely to result. So most of this 
paper will be given over to increasing readers’ understanding of what culture is and is not, 
and how it affects the individual living in it. From there, it is not difficult to effect change.  
 
It is, or should be, patently obvious that there is no “one size fits all” approach to working 
with multi-cultural partners, although sometimes one would be hard pressed to argue this 
perspective when looking around at current and past efforts in this direction. I have chosen 
not to present this piece as a standard academic paper, but rather as a discussion of ideas 
about how we might best think about cultural differences in the practical forum of bio-
engagement. My aim is, after all, to encourage readers to adapt their thoughts and attitudes, 
and the best way to do that is to enthuse rather than to lecture. Hopefully, changed thoughts 
will lead to changed attitudes and understanding, and then to changed actions. I have 
included some citations as necessary in the course of writing, but these are not meant to be 
comprehensive or exhaustive, more as guides for interested readers to follow up. 
 
My personal views on this subject, based on a moderate record of bio-engagement 
interaction prior to writing this paper
73
, are bolstered by my background in anthropology, 
which has provided me with a set of skills and insights that enable me to comment on this 
topic with a degree of understanding of cultural relationships that others in the bio-
engagement field may not have. This is not a criticism of colleagues, merely an observation.  
I cannot comment on deep and intricate aspects of science, but I defer to those who have 
such skills. Let’s contribute what insightful expertise we have. 
 
As I frequently instruct my PhD students, it is usually helpful for readers to know where the 
author of a paper is “coming from”, so I should therefore identify my own academic and 
social background at the beginning of this paper, so that readers may interpret my thoughts 
in the light of their own views of my qualifications and experience (and, of course, their own 
cultural background). I have done this in Section One of the paper, so that having nailed my 
colors to the mast, I hope that readers can have at least some understanding of my 
perspective on inter-cultural issues.  
 
                                                          
73 I have worked on bio-engagement in and with partners in Iraq, Jordan, Tunisia, Dubai, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, 
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia, Egypt, Kyrgyz Republic, Saudi Arabia and 
other countries, and have been working for several years on activities to support the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention; I have presented my work on numerous occasions at the United Nations in Geneva; my work has been 
funded by several UK and international agencies and funding councils. 
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 The second part of the paper introduces some cultural theories and research, highlighting 
ways to increase our understanding of our own cultures as well as those of other people. I 
include here some points that we can take from these culture theories in the context of bio-
engagement practice. In this section, I have chosen to present in some detail two frameworks 
of culture. The first is an archaeological theory of culture, derived from the study of the 
material remains left behind by past societies. This approach is a useful one, in my opinion, 
and although it comes from archaeology, don’t let this put you off. Archaeology is classified, 
in the U.S., as a branch of anthropology; in the UK and elsewhere it is considered to be more 
closely related to history. Either way, the discipline is heavily involved in trying to 
understand unfamiliar cultures, so it’s a good starting point for us. The model of culture that 
archaeologists employ looks at five domains of culture, and these provide both an 
explanation in themselves, but also serve further as a lens, or group of five lenses, through 
which to investigate all the abstract concepts of culture, such as politics, work, health, 
knowledge, and so on.  The second framework I introduce is that of Geert Hosftede, a Dutch 
social psychologist who has worked in academia since the 1970s, following his work and 
organizational culture research with IBM in Europe in the late 1960s. His influential works 
include Culture’s Consequences (1980, reprint 2001) and Cultures and Organizations: 
Software of the Mind (2010). Perhaps his leading idea is that of “cultural dimensions”, a 
theory that proposes, and identifies, a range of cultural concepts that are common across all 
human communities, but which can differ significantly according to nationality or national 
culture. His ideas have been aimed at, and taken up by, the world of management and 
organizational studies primarily, but his insights also offer much to those working in other 
dimensions – development, security, aid, healthcare, education and more. His theories work 
by comparing cultures with other cultures and involve quantification of cultural concepts. 
 
I must admit that the social scientist in me is not too happy with the notion of “measuring” 
and categorizing human reactions and experiences, which Hofstede appears to have 
accomplished to a high degree. However, given that we are, in the context of bio-
engagement, working with scientists and as scientists, not to mention, policy-makers, 
funding bodies and politicians, like a good statistic, Hofstede seems to fit the bill. As getting 
people to engage with the idea of cultural issues in science partnerships is one of the key 
aims of this project, it seems a good idea to use a framework that will appeal to scientists. 
Further, Hofstede’s findings have been repeated and built on by others, lending an 
authenticity to his theories that indicate a degree of reliability in his work. The only caveat 
that I would highlight is this:  please read work by Hofstede (and others following his ideas) 
in the correct manner. Hofstede is talking about national cultures and dimensions of culture 
in the national context:  this means he is talking about national culture at a population level 
not at an individual level. We cannot infer national characteristics in an individual just 
because s/he “belongs” to such and such a national group. I cannot emphasize that point 
enough. Just consider how different many of your U.S. friends are in their views, habits and 
beliefs. It would be very unhelpful if we bunched all U.S. folks into a single cultural 
category, so why should we do this when thinking about better ways to understand our 
overseas colleagues and their cultures?  This avoidance of “cultural labeling” has major 
implications for our bio-engagement practice, and I will talk about this in some detail in the 
paper. As long as we bear this in mind, I think Hofstede’s ideas can offer useful suggestions 
to us. To balance the quantitative elements of Hofstede, I have also included in the first 
section some theories from Intercultural Relations and from the archaeological concept of 
culture, which I have used very successfully for years with my social science PhD students. 
These are far more “loose” in terms of theory and offer a good balance to the “if we can’t 
measure it, it doesn’t exist” approach.  
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Finally in the second part of the paper, I introduce, very briefly, Maslow’s Hierarchy of 
Needs, a psychological model that deals with personal development, motivation and 
achievement of potential. I follow this with a very brief, but important, introduction to 
Cultural Competence Theory. This model is derived from the healthcare system in the U.S. It 
draws heavily on the work of Hoftsede, and I propose that it is also a useful tool for us to use 
when planning, carrying out and evaluating biosecurity support work overseas. 
 
In the third part of the paper, I start by providing some examples of problematic inter-
cultural communications; I only do this to give some examples in which better cultural 
awareness preparation would have minimized the problematic behavior, not as a judgment 
call. I then build on the two main frameworks introduced in Section Two by showing how 
we may use some of them to improve our understanding of where our bio-engagement 
partners are “coming from”, both as individuals (to some extent) and as members of “other” 
societies. One of my principal points throughout this paper is that just because “we are all 
scientists”, we cannot assume that being a scientist somehow washes away all of our existing 
cultural baggage. Being a scientist is not a culture-neutral occupation – it is an educated 
occupation based on the cultural foundations on which the individual scientist grew up and 
became an adult. This means that every scientist is a product of his original, or dominant, 
culture, and this can result in each scientist having different views on the same issue 
depending on his cultural background. Of course, differing views can lead to differing 
practice and choice of scientific activity. Often, the cultural background is invisible and 
onlookers cannot see what the foundations are underneath any given view or practice, 
leading to questioning, disagreement and confusion. This recognition of cultural difference 
in thinking (often leading to different behaving) is a challenge to the common view that I 
encounter fairly regularly – “all scientists are scientists first, and being a scientist over-rides 
everything else”. It doesn’t. And we need to get over that if we want to work effectively with 
partners in other countries.  I trust that this paper will have some practical uses. 
 
SECTION ONE - CULTURAL BACKGROUND AS A MAJOR DRIVER OF 
WORLDVIEW 
 
What qualifications do I have to write this paper? 
Ignatius Loyola, founder of the Jesuits, famously said (allegedly) “Give me the child until he 
is seven years old and I will give you the man”. This just about describes my experience as a 
child and then as an adult. It’s also good to think of this in all of our interactions with friends 
and colleagues who come from different backgrounds. As I said in the introduction, it is 
useful to explain my own cultural background so that readers can interpret what I say, 
knowing “where I am coming from”.  
 
My background as an “intercultural” person 
I am currently Head of the Graduate School and a tenured academic at a northern UK 
university
74
 working in both postgraduate social sciences and in international biosecurity and 
biorisk management. My BSc (Hons) is in Archaeology (a branch of anthropology) and my 
PhD is in Biological Anthropology. Before I entered academia, I was a registered nurse for 
some years.  I grew up with two social workers for parents, and spent my early years in 
Australia, where my life course as an anthropologist was laid out for me from childhood 
onwards when my parents took me to live in the Western Desert with a community of 
                                                          
74 Head of the Graduate School, University of Bradford, UK; senior lecturer in Research Methods and Research Ethics; 
Research Fellow in Bradford Disarmament Research Centre, University of Bradford. See: www.brad.ac.uk/bioethics  
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Aboriginal people who had been displaced by the policies of the then Australian 
government. For some time, I was the only white child in our tiny mission school (around 50 
children). Our healthcare was provided by the flying doctor and we had only a shortwave 
radio to connect us with the rest of the world. We really did live in the “back of beyond”. 
The nearest town was 200 miles away in one direction, and well over 1000 miles in the other 
direction. 
 
We had an anthropologist living with us, and his regular questions to me - “have you seen 
this?”, “do you know the word for this?”, “what do you think this means?” and “can you find 
this out for me?” (kids get better access to secrets) - quickly illustrated to me how three 
cultures living together can have vastly differing views and interpretations of exactly the 
same event or processes. We were British and our tame anthropologist was American. We 
lived with an ancient aboriginal culture that was being decimated by the efforts of 
“whitefellas” as they tried to “integrate” the Aborigines into the Australian nation. The fact 
that the Aborigines were the original Australian nation did not seem to register at that time 
on a significant scale to many people.  
 
From an early age I saw first-hand what damage cultural misunderstandings could do. For 
example: try explaining what a government old-age pension is to an elderly Aboriginal man 
who does not speak English, has never worked (in the Western sense), does not know his age 
(was he eligible for a pension or not?), has no Western name and cannot spell his Aboriginal 
name, does not understand the concept of money (there were no proper shops in the desert 
anyway), and has lived as a nomadic hunter-gatherer all his life until one day aliens rounded 
up him and his family and transported them to a place called a sheep station where he and 
his family had to live in a permanent camp with other people all the time.  From his pension, 
the only place he could spend his money was in the station store, where he could buy clothes 
(second hand, and why should he wear them anyway), tea, sugar, flour and one or two other 
food items depending on what was available. As he does not understand what money is, he 
expects change at every transaction, even if he is not owed any – then he gets annoyed. 
Some of his money is saved for him in a named account, but how can you explain what 
“saving money” means to our old Aboriginal man?  We give him money, but as he can’t 
spend most of it, we keep some of it in a magical secret place where it will live safely, while 
he returns to his camp, no better off in many ways, but apparently integrated in some way 
into “being an Australian”. And then we repeat it all next week or next month. Amazingly, 
this did not seem to upset our elderly Aboriginal man, as he just let the “whitefellas” get on 
with whatever kept them happy, returning to camp to hunt his own meat and engage in 
activities that actually meant something to him. His younger relatives would be engaged 
intermittently in seasonal work on the station and occasionally managed to acquire alcohol 
and cigarettes if they got hold of any from folks who had walked to other settlements. When 
work was not available, the young folks were unemployed and therefore had no income. The 
whole set-up was very colonial in nature, and led to much cultural misunderstanding, of 
which we had plenty. Add in the owners of neighboring stations who believed it was 
acceptable to shoot Aborigines when they strayed onto “their” land, and you get the picture.  
 
Different start, different skills, different perspective 
Consequently, I was hooked on understanding how “others” feel and see life.  While my 
future British school friends were playing hop-scotch on paved UK streets, I was helping my 
parents with all sorts of crazy things in the desert that opened my eyes to a wider world than 
that of children’s’ television and seaside holidays. Of course, when my parents decided to 
return “home” to the UK, I was actually going to live in a foreign country. I arrived in the 
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UK thinking that it was cruel to keep budgerigars in cages as pets because where I came 
from, they were wild birds; I did not know what a Kit Kat was; I had no knowledge of 
popular culture; I did not understand English slang or how to make friends with English 
kids. I just didn’t understand how it worked to be English in England. Had I spoken a foreign 
language, I would have had an easier time as people would have recognized how “foreign” I 
actually was. Because I was a native English speaker, in the old mission school I had been 
ahead of the rest of the two classes, so I educated myself by reading encyclopedias while 
sitting in a large cupboard. In England, however, I had to sit at a desk and do proper lessons 
and I hated it for a long time. I also hated wearing shoes because I never wore them in 
Australia – only sandals to stop my feet from burning on the sand. I had a strange accent and 
was pestered as a zoo-specimen by other kids prodding me and saying “say something in 
Australian then”. This really endeared English people to me. 
 
It is hardly surprising that I have never felt British in the same way that my friends do and I 
still experience culture shock years later. This strange personal identity was further 
compounded by the fact that my mother’s family originate from Norway, so there was 
another addition to the mix – I wasn’t even properly “English” (you will note that my name 
is Swedish-Norwegian – I use my mother’s family name).  
 
Third Culture Kids 
I was relieved, eventually, to find out that I am what is known as a “third culture kid”, a 
TCK  – one of those children who was raised in one country and returned by their parents to 
their “own” passport country – only to find that they don’t actually belong to it75. Neither, of 
course, do third culture kids belong to the country of their early upbringing – they just lived 
there for a few years. So – forgive my self-indulgence here – it does have a purpose – I think 
I have a built-in cultural awareness that I suspect is not as common among educated adults 
as we often like to think. It is apparently a fairly common characteristic among third culture 
kids to have a wide understanding, and rapport with, a range of other global cultures
76
. I 
guess this is what fitted me to be an anthropologist. I was awarded my degree in Biological 
Anthropology in 2002 at the University of Durham, England, and since then I have branched 
into research ethics, research methods and now biosecurity studies. A long way around!  
However, it is interesting to me to see how many of my colleagues in the field of biosecurity 
education are also from non-standard academic backgrounds – I guess that experience in the 
“real world” outside the ivory towers of academia has its uses.  
 
Finally in this introductory section, I just want to say that I recognize that those of you 
reading this who are also TCKs, or who have multi-cultural parents, or who have studied in 
the West or anywhere outside your own country, or who have lived in a country other than 
your own for some significant length of time as an adult - you will really “get” what I am 
talking about here. Great. For those of you have been fairly monocultural so far, simply as a 
factor of your upbringing and life to date, please do bear with me when some of this sounds 
strange, illogical or completely ridiculous. There is a point to my lengthy introduction and 
focus on a third culture here.  
 
                                                          
75 Pollock, DC. and van Reken, RE., 2009 Third Culture Kids: growing up among worlds London: Nicholas Brearley 
76 Davis, P., Headley, K., Bazemore, T., Cervo, J., Sinkinger, P., Windham, M. Rehfuss, M., 2010 Evaluating Impact Of 
Transition Seminars On Missionary Kids' Depression, Anxiety, Stress, And Well-Being. Journal of Psychology & 
Theology, 38(3), 186-194. 
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Third Culture Biosecurity  
I feel very strongly that this concept of a “third culture” is also highly relevant to our 
biosecurity community. We all come from our own cultural background. We are all 
stakeholders in science and biosecurity. We are also aiming to meet one another in some 
central spot where it all makes sense to everyone and where we can all communicate and 
share ideas on an equal footing. It seems to me that this central spot is actually a third culture 
too – the biosecurity culture – and to join it, we all need to recognize that we are, first and 
foremost, members of our own culture - Arab, European, American, Hispanic, Far Eastern, 
Asian and so on. Of course, within these cultural identities we have sub-groups who may 
love or hate each other, adding a further level to the mix. And secondly, we are scientists, 
educators, science managers, policy makers and the like. This second level of identity has 
typically been assumed, in the past, to overcome or to remove our first identity – our “home” 
identity. It doesn’t. We really need to get past this idea that being a scientist somehow makes 
you into a different being from the rest of your friends and family. Thirdly, in my opinion, 
we are seeking to be members of a third level, or a third culture, where we are both home 
culture individuals and scientists (or whatever type of stakeholder you are). 
 
It is only in this central, third culture, that we can really have a chance to effectively 
communicate with our colleagues, and for both of us to truly appreciate the challenges that 
we face as people (in our roles as marriage partner, parent, child, home owner, food-
provider, and so on) and as professionals (scientist, educator, employee, boss, manager, 
budget-holder, planner, policy-maker and so on).  
 
We can start by recognizing that to our overseas colleagues, we are the “others” – and 
although we belong to a domineering culture, to them, we may be the odd ones, the weird 
ones and the awkward, problematic ones. The biggest goal, in my opinion, that we can 
achieve personally when working with colleagues from different cultures, whether in our 
own country or in theirs, or in someone else’s, is the ability to step outside of our own 
version of “normal – that is, our own cultural space - into the “third culture” space where we 
can truly recognize and accept that what is strange, odd, crazy or unbelievable to us is 
actually entirely normal to our colleagues and has a role to play in making them the scientist 
or educator that they are. We do not have to “get into” the other culture – in fact, some may 
say that it is impossible to truly get into another culture once you have reached adulthood, or 
maybe earlier – but by meeting in the mid-space, the third culture of science in our case, we 
can get close enough. Once we reach a state of awareness, then we find that knowledge and 
understanding are not far behind. The more we work with folks from the culture(s) about 
which we have an increased awareness, the more knowledge we acquire about them – then 
comes understanding – then skills to deal with the various situations in which we find 
ourselves in that third culture space alongside our “other” cultural colleagues. It’s not that 
hard once you start. 
 
SECTION TWO:  CULTURE AND CULTURAL THEORIES 
 
Cultural theories relevant to bio-engagement 
What is culture”? 
We really need to begin with a definition of “culture” before we try to understand it and 
discuss it. There are many different ways to use the word “culture”. It may refer to high art, 
civilization, or other lofty, elite aspirations, but it may also refer to material culture, music, 
food, architecture and so on, or even – appropriately for us - to a colony of growing bacteria. 
As well as being a noun, it is also a verb. When we engage in culture (noun), we are 
 
 
121 | P a g e  
 
culturing (verb) our relationships with others. For the purposes of this paper, we need to look 
at the social meanings of culture, and while there is no single definition of the word, here are 
a few to be thinking about: 
 
Culture is defined as the shared patterns of behaviors and interactions, 
cognitive constructs, and affective understanding that are learned 
through a process of socialization. These shared patterns identify the 





"…that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, law, 
morals, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man 
as a member of society."
78
  [Forgive the use of “man” in this quote – 
they didn’t have political correctness in the 19th century]. 
 
One key point to remember is that while a culture can define its members, as well as its 
members defining it, culture can also, crucially, define who does not belong to it. This is an 
aspect that is often forgotten. One glimpse of a different cultural behavior can open a whole 
new world, if embraced without fear, but can also close every door if fear of “the different” 
is allowed to take a position of power.  
 
My own attempt at defining culture is here: 
 
The conscious and subconscious expression of the norms within 
which an individual or a group of people have been raised or have 
been significantly influenced by, which are perpetuated by and 
through a range of  beliefs, attitudes and acts. 
 
The reason I refer to culture as an expression is that I don’t accept that culture exists “out 
there” as a defined entity – it can only exist by its expression through people and people can 
only express themselves through their words and actions (practical, visible expressions), and 
through their attitudes and beliefs (underlying viewpoints that drive visible expressions). 
You might argue that buildings, for example, can express culture, and that is true – but the 
building came from the mind of a culturally-influenced architect, and s/he designed it that 
way for a purpose. 
 
Norms  
The attitudes and beliefs of a group of people are formed and sustained by the development 
and maintenance of norms. A norm is simply an expected standard of behavior or belief 
within a group – in our case, a group of scientists (which may be the staff at a single lab, or 
the entire science population of a country). The principal aim of all overseas support for 
science offered in the area of biorisk management and bioethics and practical science is the 
introduction of new norms - norms of biosafety, biosecurity, the responsible conduct of 
science, and so on. These norms may be taken up in their entirety, just as they are, of they 
may be adapted to fit in with local norms that already exist. For example, the uptake of 
Standard Operating Procedures is a norm – it is a value-driven set of procedures that govern 
behavior, and result in a safe and secure working environment not only for the laboratory 
                                                          
77 CARLA Centre for Advanced Research on Language Acquisition, University of Minnesota, see: 
http://www.carla.umn.edu/culture/definitions.html  
78 Edward Tylor, 1871, 2010, Primitive Culture, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
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staff, but also for the wider community. While many of our overseas colleagues do not have 
agreed national standard operating procedures in place, all labs have some form of operating 
procedures, usually driven by the head of the unit, although these may not be in written 
form. So a norm of standard procedure already exists in some form – it is just not fully 
developed, formulated and established in writing.  
 
So offering support, teaching and knowledge is only half of the equation – the West is 
offering guidance in new norms, but recipients have to play their part and recognize the need 
to adopt these new norms, make a decision to work towards embedding those new norms 
into their thinking, planning and regular practice and then implement the new norms.  This 
is the key outcome of all of our in-country activities that will provide evidence that we have 
made a difference. A colleague of mine says that in biosecurity education we are “norm 
entrepreneurs” and I can see what he means. I will return to this point later, as I have found 
that even though our overseas colleagues typically recognize the need for new norms of 
activity, and want to implement them, there are often other issues getting in the way – and 
we need to be aware of these and be prepared to assist in overcoming the obstacles where 
possible.  
 
This business of introducing new perspectives and norms of scientific activity introduces our 
first conundrum. When we introduce new norms, or propose adapting existing norms, in 
overseas settings, we must be very careful not to give the wrong impression. Many 
recipients, I believe, have been left feeling as if the West is implying that they are initiating 
or instilling norms in the overseas region. This unfortunately implies that there were not 
already any (good) norms present in the region, which is, of course, a ridiculous proposition. 
If someone came to teach me from a foreign country and made me feel like that, I would not 
want to listen to them. I would feel insulted. Of course our colleagues in BMENA countries 
have norms in place. As visitors and guests in BMENA countries, we need to be clear that 
we are not there to implant norms.  We are there to share some of ours (for example, a 
biosafety model that will inform good practice. Further, we are there to demonstrate how 
adopting these norms into, or alongside the existing norms will assist in improvements in the 
focus area. Note I use the word “adopting” rather than “imposing” – adopting has to be done 
by the hosts, whereas imposing is done by the incomers – and as we want to see uptake, we 
need to facilitate adoption rather than implementing imposition. There’s a very big 
difference. 
 
Respect, not judgment 
Whenever I have taught research ethics (and I have taught thousands of students and 
professionals to date), whether in the UK or overseas, the opening minutes of the first 
session are always taken up in assuring the participants that when I tell them that they need 
to learn research ethics, I do not mean that I am implying that their personal values are being 
criticized, belittled or ignored, or worse, being assumed as non-existent.  All we are doing is 
introducing some new skills, some new knowledge, some new ideas, or some new 
frameworks, that can be either added to what our overseas colleagues are already doing, or 
may be used by them to replace, or partly replace what they are already doing, or may help 
them to devise new and relevant processes for them. But we need to be clear about this 
ourselves, and make it clear to our overseas colleagues that this is what we know we are 
doing – and that we respect the work they have already been doing before we arrived. 
 
I have never met an overseas scientist who did not know that s/he needed to implement some 
form of biosafety practice in the lab. Many of the people with whom I have been privileged 
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to work overseas have had to work in very limiting circumstances, yet they have all applied 
what knowledge and skills they had available to them, in an effort to meet biosafety needs. 
The fact that some of their efforts were not as effective as ours in the West is simply a factor 
of the knowledge, skills, understanding and resources available to them at the time. We are 
now trying to bring in more knowledge, skills, understanding and resources so that our 
colleagues can learn from our mistakes and protect themselves and others more effectively. 
But crucially, we need to also accept that we can learn from our hosts. Folks working with 
reduced resources or other limitations are experts at thinking laterally when it comes to 
getting the most out of what they have. We should be open to this. 
 
Old norms, changing norms and strange norms 
As I said earlier, a norm is simply an expected standard of behavior or belief within a group. 
This could be at a national level, or at a family level, or even an individual level. Even a 
single individual can maintain a norm on his own: there is an amusing English story about 
how a “gentleman” (an upper-class man) can identify another “real gentleman” – he will still 
use a separate knife for his butter even when he is dining alone! Only in England…..In my 
own case, I had a norm of dressing safely embedded in me as a child so now I still cannot 
put on my shoes without shaking them upside down first to dislodge any wildlife that may be 
hiding in them (I have not yet found any scorpions in my shoes in the UK). So norms can 
persist even when they serve no useful purpose. The idea behind a norm is that it has 
developed over time, or been imposed, and has been accepted by the group or individual 
within the group. When you see a McDonald’s or a Coca Cola sign in the middle of a 
poverty-stricken neighborhood in the developing world (or in the U.S. for that matter) where 
people claim that they cannot afford to buy good-quality groceries, then you are looking at 
changing norms – it is still cheaper to buy basic vegetables than to buy fast food, but by 
accessing fast food and junk drinks, people are making a public statement about their status 
as being “rich enough” to buy these things and to align themselves with the cool image of 
Western culture – even if it is further impoverishing them. If McDonald’s and Coke were not 
selling enough, they would not be there. So the norm of eating a nourishing but basic diet is 
lost in pursuit of chasing a poor-quality Western lifestyle – the first step in the new norm of 
Westernization via access to material goods, with all the health issues that follow. 
 
A simple example of a norm is the practice of shaking hands when greeting friends. This 
norm is widespread around the world, but is also heavily mitigated by national or religious 
custom. For example, in some countries or religious groups, it is unacceptable for a woman 
to shake the hand of a man. In others, the hand shake is extended to a kiss on the cheek; in 
Italy and France there are social norms around how many kisses to give, depending on how 
friendly you are with the person, or how important they are; in these cases, saying hello to a 
good friend can become a lengthy business and there is plenty of scope for being offended if 
you did not receive the correct number of kisses on the cheek. In some countries, such as the 
UK until recently, the idea of kissing as a greeting between non-relatives is completely 
unacceptable and even viewed with fear or disgust. Increasingly, however, it is becoming 
common in the UK, for example, for friends to greet and say goodbye with a proper hug. 
Who would have thought this fifty years ago in England?  I have Japanese colleagues whose 
norms of greeting involve bowing to each other – who bows first and lowest, and the depth 
and timing of the bow is crucially important. This means that walking down the street 
meeting a string of friends in Tokyo can become quite a good aerobic workout. All of these 
behaviors are norms, and they all mean the same thing but are totally different - and in some 
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Norm transgressions as a cultural indicator 
It is the familiarity, or not, of a person with the norms of a culture that is the clue to his or 
her belonging to that culture. I did not know what a Kit Kat was on my arrival in England, so 
my school peers immediately treated me as an outsider – because I should have known at my 
age. Norm-transgressions can, of course, be big mistakes in some cases. I remember hearing 
a story from my grandfather about the Second World War in which some German spies were 
caught in England because they did not understand the opening times of the British pub (a 
bar) and tried to get into one to buy beer during closing time. Fast-thinking British folk 
immediately spotted them as “foreign”!  So while we are thinking about how to identify 
other cultural norms, we also need to remember that we should look for norm transgressions 
too. They can be just as important. These are usually easiest to notice when the 
“transgression” is visible, such is in clothing worn, or in hairstyles or in the kind of food 
eaten or avoided.  
 
While these things sound very innocuous, we only need to think of the religious implications 
(for example) of clothing, food and hair to see how important they can be. In science too?  
Yes – you wear a lab coat at the bench, don’t you? And you have to tie up your hair if it is 
long to keep it out of your work, don’t you?  And you know not to keep your sandwiches in 
the same fridge as the samples, don’t you? But these are all simple examples of cultural 
norms for the scientist – they are all biosafety norms. Of course, this brings us back to norm 
transgressions again. When a member of one culture transgresses one of his culture’s norms 
in order to “fit in” with, or align himself with the norms of another culture, this can have a 
negative impact on him, or on those around him. Let’s say that a young science graduate 
student in a developing country really grasps the need for effective biosafety activities, and 
he wants to always wear his lab coat in the lab. His friends don’t see the need for this as the 
senior tutors don’t always wear their lab coats. We, from the safety of our Western labs, may 
think that this is a simple issue – in fact, a non-problem – let him wear his lab coat and 
ignore what the others do. Ok. Sounds good. However, what about the negative implications 
that may arise for him?  Teasing?  Probably. Bullying? Probably. Social isolation?  Possibly. 
No job on graduation?  Possibly. Death? What?   
 
On a recent work visit to Iraq I heard the worst possible accounts of the effects of scientific 
norm transgressions. A senior female academic told me that some of her science students 
refused to wear lab coats for bench work as, they stated to her and her two fellow-tutors that  
‘under democracy it is their “human right” to refuse to do so’. The two other academics who 
challenged them on this, demanding that the students wear lab coats or they could not enter 
the lab, were attacked and killed by the students. The students’ families were rich and 
influential. No repercussions followed…A science tutor spills possibly infected samples onto 
his hair and does not bother to wash it out, with no follow-up testing to see if he has become 
infected…People fall seriously ill due to contamination of their lunch in the fridge…   A 
female lab technician loses her baby through miscarriage when she drinks from an unlabeled 
plastic water bottle containing sodium hydroxide instead of water, having taken it from the 
shelf where it had been placed in the fridge with the staff drinking water bottles…. Had 
proper, appropriate scientific behavioral norms been accepted and followed by all, these 
situations would not have occurred. 
 
Now that we have thought about definitions of culture and how it may be identified and 
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The archaeological model of culture 
Don’t be put off because this model originates in archaeology. Anyone who has studied 
archaeology is actually well-educated about human societies and knows a lot of sociological 
theory. This conceptual model simply seeks to understand culture in terms of material 
culture or what is left behind by past cultures to be excavated. Of course, the principles can 
be applied to material culture today as well
79
. The discipline of archaeology can only infer 
social norms, behaviors and so on from the material objects that archaeologists dig up. 
Accordingly, it describes culture in these terms, as these categories can be used to cover all 
aspects of human activity: 
 
 Social organization (from the high level of political structures and systems down to 
the lower levels of the nuclear family structure and the value of the individual and the 
group) 
 Economics (how people made a living; diet, subsistence, trade, industry, money 
systems and so on) 
 Technology (tools, equipment and production methods to enhance life processes; 
access to and use of these) 
 Religious beliefs (worldviews, cosmologies, spirituality and so on) 
 Language and linguistics  (language as a method of communication and expression 
of beliefs and attitudes) 
 
With a little thought, it is quite easy to see that while this model was developed for the 
interpretation of material culture, it can also be used to assess and understand all aspects of 
non-material culture as well. Let me illustrate how this model can apply to understanding 
cultures today. 
 
An archaeological model of culture 
 
All specific elements of day to day life may be superimposed onto this model and 
assessed according to each of these categories. For example, abstract concepts such as 
                                                          
79 See the Arizona Garbage Project, an archaeological investigation begun in 1973 by William Rathje and colleagues at 
the University of Arizona.  They used a questionnaire to gather information from residents of Tucson, Arizona, on their 
consumption habits and then checked the questionnaire answers against their other form of gathered data – the rubbish in 
the respondents’ bins. Surprisingly enough, the rubbish thrown out revealed quite a different picture to the answers 
provided on the questionnaires. An example of this was around alcohol consumption – people did not admit on the 
questionnaire to the actual amount they were really drinking. See Rathje, W. and Murphy, C. (2001) Rubbish!: the 
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politics, healthcare, leisure, information and knowledge, gender issues, housing, ability 
to travel, or access to work may all be applied across this model and assessed according 
to the contribution of the five elements to it. 
 
Firstly, let’s look at social organization. Does your culture operate around the nuclear family 
or the extended family?  The form of the family is important – it is a source of wealth and is 
very influential in all aspects of society – and of course, it is the framework in which the 
next generation is raised and influenced, making it even more important as a social artifact. 
There is a considerable literature available on the family, derived from a number of different 
disciplines, but all of these show clearly how the nature of the family affects all aspects of 
life and society.  For example, what is the role of the individual in the family and in society? 
Is the individual more important than the family, or is the family the primary unit?  This is 
the difference between the individualist and the collectivist types of society. Western society 
is highly individualist, whereas Arab culture is still very collectivist in nature. In 
individualist societies, the individual is typically allowed to be different, to follow his/her 
own path, with fewer demands that s/he conforms to the values, behaviors and norms of the 
rest of that society. In collectivist societies, the group, often the family, is the unit of 
significance, with conformity to the needs of the group being one of the main drivers in that 
society, and this tends to limit the freedom of choice of the individual to be different or to 
follow his personal preference. Interestingly, we find that behavior in public tends to be the 
opposite of this in each type of culture. In individualist societies, people tend to hold back in 
public and give way to others. Thus the wider community benefits. In collectivist societies, 
the individual tends to “go for it” in public – every man for himself. Try driving through the 
middle of a BMENA city in rush hour, or fighting your way through many interesting 
airports in the developing world and emerging unscathed. On the other hand, it is said that 
more British people died on the Titanic than any other nationality because they all queued 
politely for the lifeboats. What does this say about how we might go about achieving 
personal advancement in our professional lives? 
 
The economic potential of a nuclear family is very different from that of an extended family 
which may marry off the children in a strict order, or may have to pay dowries for daughters.  
Gender issues are also a big factor of social organization. What is the role of women in the 
family and in society?  Do women have equal access to all levels of work and to the social 
status that goes with this?  Are the sexes viewed as equal, or is the talk not matched by the 
reality? (Issues of gender in bio-engagement are actually going to be issues of biological sex, 
not gender, which can be assigned or chosen rather than being a biological state). What 
impact does this have on the individual and on the group?  What impact does this all have on 
science, the scientific profession and biosecurity?  At various biosecurity education events 
that I have attended, one or more women have been present because their influential 
husbands were there. This resulted in places lost to other scientists who could not attend, 
because the preferential treatment of the wives of influential men had resulted in their places 
being taken – and the wives were not scientists. The husbands had sufficient influence to 
make this happen – and chose to prioritize their own needs and wishes over the greater need 
for a wide diffusion of the content of the event. Is it right?  On the other hand, I know of a 
female colleague from a BMENA county who, until recently, had to get her husband’s 
written permission to leave the country every time she had to go to a conference. If my 
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How does the family fit into a wider clan or tribe or ethnic group? Who defines the ethnic 
group?  Is it self-defined or is it defined by outsiders?  For example, in the UK it is common 
to refer to “Asians” when meaning people from the Asian sub-continent (India, Bangladesh 
and Pakistan). In reality, the term “Asian” is meaningless, as the various populations that 
make up the so-called group referred to as Asians are so different in their cultures that any 
blanket term is Useless. Further, the various groups typically feel insulted when they are 
confused for one another by white people. Then, of course, we travel to the U.S. or to 
Australia or Canada, and the term “Asian” refers to people from the Far East – China, Japan, 
and the Asia-Pacific region. This is also related to the category of linguistics as an element 
of culture – language can help, but it can also confuse. And of course, there is the Canadian-
American issue – how many Canadian tourists flash their maple leaves around so as not be 
called “American”?  Likewise, Scots and Welsh people get annoyed when they are referred 
to as “English” when the speakers mean “British”. We’ve all got something to be offended 
by. 
 
Does your culture operate under democracy or some other form of state-level or high-level 
government? If your culture is not a democratic one, what is it?  Do you have a hereditary 
ruling family? Do you have a caste system?  Can you move between castes?  One of my 
Indian students proudly told me one day that I was like him – Brahmin – the top caste (wow! 
I made it at last)…..when I voiced some concern over the plight of those stuck in the 
“bottom” castes, he immediately assured me that a person can move from one caste to 
another with the greatest of ease. I found this somewhat difficult to accept, but he was 
adamant that the system was fair – although when I asked him if he wanted to voluntarily 
move downwards into a lower caste, he pretended not to hear me, which is maybe a cultural 
norm in a high caste…..  
 
Let’s now briefly look at economics as it is expressed in culture. This term does not simply 
refer to money and the stock market. In anthropological terms it refers to the way in which a 
group or society makes a living. Thus, in archaeology, the hunter-gatherer lifestyle employs 
a form of economy based on moving seasonally around a landscape foraging, scavenging 
and hunting, and on exchange with other groups doing the same. At the other end of the 
scale, we have the level of the so-called “nation state” in our “civilized” developed world of 
today, our economy is based on capitalism, in which people own goods and hold assets. 
People buy and sell on a more or less open market and acquire what they need to survive, 
plus a range of goods and assets that are above and beyond the level of survival. This system 
replaced feudalism, which was a dominant system in the past that linked social organization 
into hereditary systems and was built around, and sustained, a hierarchy in society. Some 
forms of feudalism remain in place today while being mixed with more modern forms of 
economy. In the UK we no longer have feudalism, but we still have the person at the top of 
the feudal heap – the Queen – although she no longer presides over the same sort of 
economy or social organization that her ancestors did. In large parts of the developing world 
today, in contrast to capitalism, an agricultural economy is practiced at various levels – 
whether state-sponsored and subsidized, or at a local subsistence level in villages where no 
other way of living is possible. This is not the place to go into this in detail, but the notion of 
the survival-mode type of economy is a relevant point for this paper.  
 
I have a colleague in a former Soviet state who is a leading scientist in her country’s 
engagement with science internationally. Following the revolution in her country, she and 
her colleagues lost their salaries as there was no longer a system in place to pay them.  She 
and her colleagues continued going to work for several years without pay. This was not 
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abnormal in such economies, as under the Soviet system it had been quite usual to have to 
work without pay for months at a time until bureaucracy got around to sending money down 
the pipeline to the workers. Once salaries dried up completely after the regime change, she 
and her colleagues continued to work as best they could, with no formal income. She had to 
support herself and an elderly parent. She did this for two years by getting up at dawn, 
making a batch of biscuits with cream and eggs, and selling them on the way to work to a 
shopkeeper friend, who sold them on at a profit himself. That was her income. I asked her 
where she got the cream, and she told me it came from the farm of a friend outside the city 
each day. When I asked how she got so many eggs each day (24) she just said, looking at the 
floor, “I got them”, so I left it at that. And we complain about our pay!   
 
Now how can we expect people who have struggled like this to see life in any other mode 
than that of “survival”, for a long time to come yet?   If you have seen first-hand how 
precarious or corrupted your state’s economic system is, how would you trust it?  And if we 
go in to this country and start talking about long term norm changes and necessary changes 
in values and behavior, which could compromise this individual’s position, why on earth 
would s/he want to listen and do anything that may upset his/her delicate economic position?  
Even in BMENA countries that have been doing well economically, in the profession of 
science, there is often still the awareness of the limitations under which one has to work, and 
this in itself is stressful. When people have been used to running in a kind of survival mode, 
they cannot make decisions based on any other driver than that of what is best for them, 
right now and maybe tomorrow. This is a simple fact that we tend to overlook when 
interacting with colleagues who have been working under circumstances of extreme change 
and stresses, or of long term corruption or stagnation. Trust has to be rebuilt between this 
individual and his country’s political leadership, his bosses, and with us. We arrive, 
promising money and status through his/her cooperation with U.S., neither of which s/he can 
acquire right now from his own country itself. The survivalist does not take a long term 
view, and if he says he does, he is probably saying what he thinks we want to hear. When we 
turn up with offers of money, access to international events, new equipment and so on, why 
should we be surprised if s/he chooses to take advantage of all of this on a personal level?  
And why should we be surprised when s/he chooses to keep the new knowledge and skills to 
him or herself, and not share them with colleagues?  Knowledge is power, and if cooperating 
with us enables him/her to acquire this, then we need to be aware of the likely results in-
country.  I was at a major meeting in the UK recently with sections of the UK government; 
we were reviewing recent support activities in various countries. When I explained that 
certain areas in a particular country had expressed to me their need for help in implementing 
biorisk management frameworks and skills, I was met with the response “But we’ve already 
done biosafety there”. There was a failure to recognize the fact that overseas colleagues 
view interactions with us as a form of social and professional capital that they need to guard 
for their own personal advancement. Of course, this does not apply in every case, but I have 
seen plenty of evidence of it in practice. 
 
I don’t mean any disrespect whatsoever to individuals in such difficult circumstances – I 
have the highest regard for the tenacity and strength of character shown by many of our 
overseas colleagues who have come through extremely testing times – but we do need to 
recognize that we need to spread the net wide when seeking opinions, decisions and planning 
ideas from people in such circumstances, as personal gain an advantage are typically key 
drivers to such economically-battered folks, and while being entirely understandable, 
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Technology is, of course, the publically-stated driver for all of the interventions and support 
that we are seeking to give to our colleagues overseas in our sector. But we often fail to see 
technology from the bird’s eye view, and focus instead of each individual aspect of it. In the 
West we are privileged to have access to more technology, and to keep up to date with it, 
than in the developing areas of the world. We take this for granted almost completely. 
However, we also forget what technology actually is. Most of us tend to think of technology 
as machinery, or as systems such as the national grid that supplies our electricity or gas, or 
communications networks, for example. But in its purest form, technology simply means 
tools. A chimpanzee uses technology when he picks up a small stick and pokes it into a hole 
to retrieve ants to eat. A sea otter uses technology when he lies on his back with a flat stone 
on his chest and smashes eggs or sea shells on it to get at the contents. Interestingly, “poor” 
people tend to target technology at the expense of other things that may be more helpful to 
them in the long term – typically related to entertainment technology. We have already 
mentioned the McDonalds versus vegetables argument (above), but we might also look at 
the way that relatively poor people in all societies like to get as much access to technology as 
possible in other domains too. This applies heavily to scientists in particular. To have the 
latest biosafety cabinet or BSL3 lab is seen as a status symbol – the fact that there is no 
money to run any of it, or that it is impossible to move into the new facility because nobody 
has been trained in running it, is occasionally a secondary consideration.  
 
Let’s start with non-science access to technology first. Entertainment technology is key in all 
poor communities, both in the developed and developing worlds. Those at the poorest end of 
the social scale in the UK, for example, are still highly likely to have mobile telephones and 
iPods, which are expensive.   In the UK “poor” people will spend significant amounts on 
satellite TV and on DVD players and live on junk food that costs more than good food.  In 
the developing world there is an old anthropologists’ joke about how “the villagers” respond 
when they know the anthropologists are coming - they hide the TV and the telephones 
quickly so as to look “more native”. Interestingly, we tend to see the opposite in science 
contexts – people like to show off their lab equipment and the kind of work they are doing, 
as it is thought to indicate a socio-economic level that approaches the desired “status” of 
Western science. On the other hand, how many times do we see on the news an 
impoverished African or Indian village full of kids with no shoes and old clothes, all 
gathered around a big TV in the village open area, watching Manchester United play a big 
game? Why do people spend precious and scarce resources on entertainment instead of vital 
supplies?  Well, people use technology to entertain themselves to forget the situation they 
are in, and to them, entertainment is a vital supply. There’s nothing wrong with this in itself, 
and I don’t blame people for doing this, I’m just making the point that when folks are at the 
lower end of the economic scale, long term thinking tends to go down the drain. This goes 
for scientists too – they are not seeking entertainment, but they are seeking the recognition 
and the perceived status that comes with access to “big” technology – and all the benefits 
this association brings to them personally. This approach needs to be tackled. 
 
Access to technology has reached a stage where it is seen as an indicator of being 
“advanced” and “rich” and “powerful”, whether this is really the case or not. Plus, it is often 
used as a comparison tool to be seen to be “bigger” or more powerful than others. We only 
need to think back to the days of the Soviet May Day parades and the procession of tanks 
and missiles going through Red Square in Moscow to see this in action. Likewise in the 
West, we had, and still do have, air shows, for example, where we show off our current air 
power, and we play war games with each other at sea  to say “ours is bigger than yours” as 
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much as to see how well we can actually work together in practice. When the first signs of 
tension arise in some distant (to us in the West) geographical area of the world, one of the 
first things we Westerners do is to send an aircraft carrier to the area to concentrate the mind 
of the “troublemakers” by cruising up and down the nearest waterway. Alternatively, we 
make films about machines and equipment that show us being masters of advanced 
technology – even technology that we have not yet actually invented – all to show our status 
as masters of advanced technology. Yet sometimes this is pointless – there is a story, I don’t 
know if it is true or not – about the race to find a suitable writing implement for astronauts to 
use in space during the 1960s “space race”. The Americans were said to have spent vast 
amounts of money designing the ballpoint pen, but the Russians just took a pencil!  Go 
figure. 
 
Interestingly, we can also show our power by using and displaying old technology as it can 
“prove” our status as “old power” and therefore “lasting power”. A quick look at any royal 
event in the UK shows us the use of old technology as a representation of our old power – 
the use of horses, horse-drawn carriages and old fashioned uniforms all enhance the picture 
of old, but ongoing, power even if it is not real. The Queen does not actually have the power 
that the monarch had in previous centuries, but in the UK, the monarchy is still treated, to 
some extent, by the public as if it does. Even the dead bodies of our monarchs can be used as 
tools. When a major royal figure dies, we have an old-fashioned “lying in state” where the 
coffin is placed on a bier for display purposes in a public building. People file past to pay 
their respects, but this is also a subtle way of connecting the people with the passing of the 
old and the coming into power of the new. We might say that the coffin, and the body within 
it, becomes a tool for the representation of our old –and crucially – continuing power. Today, 
“power” is seen to rest in the acquisition of a BSL 3 lab, or a fancy new air filtration 
system, even if they are not needed or built or maintained appropriately. These artifacts 
confer what looks like power on individuals and groups in-country, yet that is not what they 
are for. In fact, there is an argument to say that such new infrastructure can cause more 
problems than it solves, due to the human relationships, working practices and networks that 
are spoiled or interfered with, as a result. 
 
 Again, this is important for biosecurity because of the effects access to effective technology 
has on scientists. We need to start looking more carefully at basic realities here. One of the 
key issues in advancing technology in the developing world is the access to affordable and 
reliable electricity. We see many cases of countries asking for BSL3 labs (for example) to be 
“given” to them, even though there is no reliable electricity supply available to maintain the 
infrastructure once built. Neither is there sufficient money to pay for the running costs of the 
lab, or the staff, or to maintain the equipment. On top of this, there is no sufficient through-
put of work available to make such a lab viable – the staff will not be using their skills and 
knowledge (assuming they have them) sufficiently often to become, and remain, skilled to the 
right levels. The lab has been built before the field operations necessary to supply the lab 
with work have been developed. In other words, to coin a technology-based phrase, the cart 
has been put in front of the horse. Yet many countries see the installation of a national BSL 3 
lab as a sign that they have reached some level of status on the international scene. This is 
not a reflection on the capabilities of the staff in that country, rather it is a limitation placed 
upon them by the circumstances in which they operate.  
 
We need to be aware of such limitations and act accordingly, and recognize that our overseas 
colleagues may need something other than that which they think they need right now. Too 
many infrastructure projects have been provided, I would argue,  without consideration of 
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sustainability, and all this has done in the long term is increase frustration, waste resources 
and demotivate people. A colleague of mine in the UK Ministry of Defence was asked 
recently, on a visit to a very poor former Soviet state, if the UK would provide them with a 
BSL 3 lab because all the neighboring countries had “got one” and this country was feeling 
embarrassed and left behind. My colleague asked these friends how much they thought it 
would cost – they said “about one million pounds”. When he told them that one million 
pounds would not even cover their power bills for a year, they went quiet, and when he told 
them that their neighbors’ BSL 3 labs had cost tens of millions each, they started to get the 
picture. This needs to be handled tactfully and in consultation with overseas colleagues, so 
that together we can identify achievable responses to high-priority needs that can be met and 
maintained until such countries gain in economic terms, have a sufficiently developed 
infrastructure and can move ahead to bigger things. It is, however, a difficult task as 
technology is deemed to be such a status - proclaimer and aid-trophy. When we tackle these 
realities, we must avoid being patronizing and taking a parent-child attitude to our overseas 
colleagues. Difficult, I know, but we must do this, as to give in to the aid-game and to 
engage in competitive donating and receiving is a short-cut to failure. We need to find ways 
to match technological support to countries at the level at which they find themselves, not 
at the level at which they want to be seen to be. 
 
Religious beliefs tend, in the West, to be treated as something totally separate from scientific 
activity in the West. However, I personally think that we can make use of religious ideals 
where they can help us, especially in the developing world, where religion still plays a much 
greater role in everyday and public life. I also think that we need to be more honest about the 
degree to which religious values already inform our own practice. We need to acknowledge 
that our Western values have most of their origins in Judeo-Christian religious ideals. We 
may be moving away from these publically, in some areas of life, but in general, our social, 
legal, medical, and other norms have been driven and guided massively by these two ancient 
religions, whether we like it or not.  
 
In the UK, religion tends to get put together with ethics a lot, and this is arguably an easy 
way today of managing what might have previously been called “religious” values in a more 
scientific world. There is, I would say, a generally negative view of religious belief among 
the majority of scientists working in the West. Of course, scientists can be practicing 
Christians, Muslims, Jews, Hindus and so on, but there tends to be an unspoken expectation 
that these values will be hung up with the coats at the door, and once in the lab, the religious 
person “turns into” a scientist. Of course, this is nonsense, as nobody can really do this. We 
all have a view, for example, on start-of-life and end-of-life technologies (assisted 
reproduction technologies, euthanasia issues) but these tend to be highly debatable in wider 
society, as they are so visible and so all-encompassing – we are all born and we all die. But it 
would be wrong to say that religious views do not have a place in public debates around 
these issues. Much public debate is couched, in the West, in terms of “you can’t mess with 
nature” or “it’s God’s will” or “this is just how it is meant to be”. In some countries, for 
example, a woman cannot choose or request a termination of pregnancy unless certain life-
threatening criteria are present. This is a law led by a religious value – and it affects all 
people in the country, whether they share that value or not; it results in restricted access to 
technology based on religious values. Typical responses to this and similar value-led debates 
tend to invoke the presence or role of a higher power, whatever you may wish to call it, but 
even if we “educated” people think that these are just ill-informed views, we cannot ignore 
them, as people do have rights and must be allowed to express their views (without resorting 
to violence, of course). Beyond the medical arena, we also tend to see significant value-led 
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public debate around GM crops (“we need to be in control of what we eat” – no irony there 
with the McDonalds situation), and issues such as DNA records being held by law-
enforcement agencies, or organ donation (“I own my own body and you cannot have bits of 
it or information about it”). These things touch on human rights, and once we start talking 
about the value of the human, or of the environment, it is only a short hop to religious or 
ethical values.  
 
On a wider, global level, it is probably reasonable to suggest that as socioeconomic 
development rises, the influence of religious values tend to decrease, especially among those 
who are actively engaged in that socioeconomic advance. This does not mean that religious 
values disappear or actually decrease in terms of prevalence in society but rather, they may 
tend to lose their status as the first point of reference when seeking a value to underpin an 
advance. This need not always be the case, of course, and science and religion can be seen to 
mix effectively in some ways. 
 
At a workshop in Baghdad in 2012, when working with a range of Iraqi science experts 
(scientists, educators, graduate students) from Baghdad universities, the links between 
religious values and scientific ideals and advances were clear. Having grown up in a 
relatively fundamentalist Christian household, I was comfortable speaking about the role of 
religious values in life in general and in science as well. The participants of the workshop 
were quite openly surprised by this, as their experience with international visitors up until 
then had indicated to them that overseas scientists were generally “unreligious”. Once I had 
suggested that religious values may have a role to play in explaining and supporting 
scientific values, many participants engaged with the sessions by referring to verses from the 
Koran when we were discussing scientific principles. 
 
For example, when we discussed public health measures, such as quarantine, participants 
quoted or referred to verses in the Koran in which the Prophet had instructed that those 
suffering from disease were to keep away from those people and places where the disease 
had not reached. To Western ears, this sounds “crazy”, unscientific and unnecessary. 
However, to some of the Iraqi participants, experts in their field and accomplished 
educators, this was a useful sociocultural tool to enhance the uptake of scientific ideals and 
to support their implementation in public life.  
 
When I reported this positively at a meeting in the U.S. in 2013, I was met with some hostile 
reactions from U.S. government and education colleagues. It was suggested that I was 
promoting “Islamic biosecurity” and that I was “playing a dangerous game” by linking 
Islamic values and teaching to the promotion of science and scientific values. I find this 
attitude to be very security-focused and based on fear rather than on reality. I could have 
asked in return, “are we promoting Catholic science by restricting embryonic stem cell 
research in the U.S.?” (but I didn’t). However, in the context of this presentation in 
Washington DC, and in the discussions that played a part in it, I was delighted to hear from 
one colleague working in the U.S. who told me, after my talk, of his own experience with 
science and religious values in the U.S. Notably, this colleague, although working in the 
U.S. for years, was not originally a U.S. national, but from another Western country, and he 
had (in my opinion) a more global view of values. 
 
He explained to me how he supported what I was saying about linking religious values to 
scientific values and illustrated this with an anecdote from his own experience. While 
speaking on biosecurity in one of the southern states a year or two ago (part of the “Bible 
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Belt”), he had ended a talk by stating “Where there is no hope, there is no future”. This final 
line had then met with a loud response from a man at the back of the room, who called out 
“Jeremiah 29!” (Jeremiah is a book of the Old Testament). I then caused further laughter 
following this anecdote when I was able to immediately supply the verse to this chapter – 
Jeremiah 29:11.  I was not raised in a fundamentalist Christian household for nothing….so I 
find it quite hard to criticize colleagues in developing and non-Western countries for relating 
religious ideals and values to science, when it goes on in some areas of the West as well. Are 
we saying that scientists from the southern “Bible Belt” states of the U.S. are not really 
scientists, because many of them like to quote the Bible?  Of course not. So why should we 
object when Muslim scientists want to quote verses from the Koran when they discuss their 
work?   
 
Our objections to Islamic views on science stem from our misunderstanding of what we see 
in the news. The vast majority of Muslims want to live peacefully with the rest of the world 
– but we only see the activities of the extremists on the news. How would we feel if all 
Christians (or those who come from “Christian” areas of the world) were thought of as 
extremists, based on the activities of a few so-called Christians who have bombed abortion 
clinics or shot doctors who carry out abortions?  Western society is, as I said above, founded 




 centuries, we 
still hold too many of these values unwittingly, as the foundations of our own world views 
and perspectives…and they are not all bad. Having said that, there is still considerable 
disagreement within western Christian circles about values and interpretations of history, 
and we need to be honest and open with ourselves about these as well as casting judgments 
on non-Christian populations. I was once at a meeting with some Catholic friends, including 
some very elderly, and lovely, Irish Catholic ladies. These ladies had been brought up in 
Ireland to believe that the English, and their Protestantism, were “doing the devil’s work”. 
One of these old ladies was ranting about the English Queen Elizabeth I, because “she had 
burned so many Catholic martyrs”. When I pointed out that Elizabeth’s sister, Queen Mary, 
had burned many Protestants, her justification was “Yes, but not as many”. I often think that 
our arguments and prejudices against all Muslims, based on the activities of a few, are pretty 
much like the old Catholic lady who hated Elizabeth I because “she killed more than we 
did”. When will we get over this misguided attitude?  Before any U.S. colleagues take 
offense at this view, please remember that the UK (my country) has also suffered from 
terrorism for many decades, and we in the UK know what it is like to be subject to religious 
and political attacks. We just need to get a sense of proportion and be prepared to re-think 
our natural responses, which are often of the knee-jerk variety rather than the result of 
considered, rational thought.  
 
I should note at this point that I am not in favor of “approving” science or scientific values 
by reference to religious ideals, values and writings. I am merely suggesting that where a 
religious ideal, value or writing seems to support a scientific point, then let us be open to use 
it if it helps the promotion of that scientific issue. The converse is, of course, always a 
problem – we may find that some religious ideals actually contradict some scientific 
activities – but this is an opportunity for debate, not a cut-off point for scientific activity. 
Ongoing debates on embryonic stem cell research, abortion, reproductive technologies and 
euthanasia are all cases in point and are subject to social scrutiny at the highest levels, so I 
do not feel that my “let’s use it if it is useful” approach is any more “dangerous” than the 
current ethical topics under debate in the West. The fact that I “lost” some of my 
Washington DC audience in early 2013 because they saw the words science and religion on 
the same slide says more about them than it does about my approach.  
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In short, I think that religious values should be embraced where they help in science, and 
debated rigorously when they seem to raise challenges – or are we afraid that we cannot 
“win” the debate?  As scientists, surely we should be seeking the best ways forward, and 
seeking various aspects of “truth” and fact. Religious values may not be credited as fact but 
they are certainly held as versions of truth by many scientists, and if this can help us 
promote core human and environmental values, let’s use them. We simply cannot expect 
scientists to leave their religious values at the lab door – if we do, we are opening ourselves 
up to the possibility of cheating, internal conflict, poor work and problems in working 
practices and relationships. It’s no good putting a Catholic in charge of the abortion unit – 
and the same thing applies to any scientific work that may cause a value-conflict in those 
expected to carry out the work. We need to be open about this and not pretend it doesn’t 
have a role in our combined efforts to promote good science. A scientist who is required to 
work on projects with which s/he has ethical or religious disagreements is a dangerous 
person to have in that role. The conflict that is set up between the demands of his work and 
those of his religious beliefs or ethical stance will eventually lead to  negative outcome – 
either by a loss of commitment to the work, or of some action taken against the work, or of 
loss of the job. All of these bring adverse outcomes not only to the employer but also to the 
individual. They need to be avoided, but we can’t identify them at all if we don’t discuss 
openly religious and ethical views at work. 
 
Linguistics, or how we speak about issues and realities, is a big subject, but I will just 
introduce some ideas about it here, followed by some cautionary points.   The area of 
language includes not only the words we use, but the concept of discourse, or how we frame 
concepts and ideas with words, and the way we speak of issues and people. It is closely 
allied to our religious, social, technological and economic status, and as speaking is “visible” 
to others, it is often used as a status signifier, or at least as a signifier of the status we would 
like to be seen to have.  An example of language as a status signifier would be when people 
deliberately try to lose their natural accent in order to take on another, for reasons of social 
or economic advancement. An example of the use of language as religious discourse would 
be the Islamic tradition of blessing the Prophet (“peace be upon him”) whenever his name is 
mentioned in discussion; this indicates that the speaker is either a devout Muslim, or he at 
least wishes to appear so, and he is declaring his religious values through his words. We tend 
to forget, of course, that millions of Americans think it is ok to pepper their conversation 
with “Praise the Lord” but we get edgy when we hear a Muslim bless the Prophet.  
 
In the West, especially in the UK, it is easy to discern what part of the country someone 
comes from due to their accent – in our country, with its big population, there can be three or 
four different accents in just a few square miles. And we all know that your accent says a lot 
about it – whether it should or not. As well as accent, we can listen to the way that people 
construct their sentences; do they use a lot of slang? Do they shorten words, or do they 
invent new words for their own group?  In the East End of London (the traditionally poor 
area around the old docks) the accent is the Cockney accent – and some people use “rhyming 
slang”. It is said that this developed among criminal gangs so that they could talk without 
fear of being understood by law enforcement people or “others” outside their circle. So in 
rhyming slang, “apples and pears” means “stairs” and the “trouble and strife” means “wife”. 
A thief is a “tea leaf”. In Yorkshire, where I live, it is normal to call another person “love”, 
without any sexual connotation at all. You could be served by a man or a woman in a shop 
and they will pass the bag of goodies to you and say “there you are, love”. Many confused 
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old Yorkshire-men have been slapped in the face by outraged southern old ladies who 
thought they were “getting fresh”. Cultural miscommunication can have its problems. 
 
In the UK, traditionally, accents have been associated with social “class” – and the British 
have been bound by class for hundreds of years. This has been changing now since the early 
20
th
 century, but the attitudes will take generations to disappear. Until recent decades, it was 
not possible to get a broadcasting job on TV or radio in the UK if you had a regional accent 
and did not “speak BBC”. Typically, we could say, however, that your class, or social 
background, or whatever you want to call it, may be associated with your speech patterns 
and style.   
 
So what impact can language and the way that we use it have on science practice? Today, 
some overseas colleagues use language as a means to advance themselves – entering a 
“westernized” (supposedly “advanced”) class. They engage with us in support activities, and 
then have access to a whole new discourse, and all the jargon that goes with it. This then 
becomes, for them, a form of social and professional capital that they can use to help 
themselves, and hopefully, their colleagues. The discourse we use is a major component of 
our social and economic standing, and is often directly related to our potential for 
advancement.  
 
In terms of biosecurity education, the onus is on us to make sure that we can be understood 
clearly. Not everyone has 100% excellent English – why should they?  Does language use or 
lack of skills prevent certain individuals or groups accessing jobs or study in science?  How 
do we use language to impress, manipulate, deceive, or cut people out? 
 
This brings us to professional groups. The ability to speak the “lingo” is key to belonging to 
a professional group. Medical people are notorious for speaking in medical jargon and 
making heavy use of abbreviations. Anyone who has watched a medical drama series will be 
familiar with this. Arguably, this use of language and medical discourse serves to maintain 
the mystique of medical knowledge and to divide the insiders from the outsiders, while 
making the jargon-speakers seem to be important, clever, and of a higher social status, 
somehow, than the poor ignorant patient on the bed.  In science contexts, we tend to speak 
also in jargon, although probably more to other insiders with fewer outsiders hearing us. We 
all know of the likes of PCR, ESR, DNA, GC-MS, IAT, and so on (look them up), but we 
also tend to keep our jargon to ourselves in public more than happens in the medical field.  
 
Where we do tend to have our own discourse, it often relates to an anti-religious one (in the 
West), in which Darwinism is favored over traditional religious views underpinning “old” 
pre-Enlightenment science. Interestingly, however, I would suggest that some ardent 
Darwinists are actually beginning to pass into the realms of religion and religious discourse 
themselves, not seeming to be aware that Darwinism is taking on many of the characteristics 
of a fundamentalist religion. 
 
In general, I would suggest that the category of linguistics and language is perhaps the 
easiest cultural domain to improve in terms of science and science culture, when compared 
to the influences of social organization, economics and so on in our science context. We 
might not be able to fix the problems that our BMENA colleagues are experiencing, but we 
can use language better to help them. However, it is important to remember that we can use 
words and discourse to hide things, to intimidate, to keep others out, to belittle and to 
influence, without even knowing it. All of these outcomes can be reached, wittingly or 
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unwittingly, in the context of overseas science support, and I would suggest that we, as 
visitors to other countries, need to be reflective and consider how we speak, when we speak, 
to whom we speak, and the effect of our words and discourse on those with whom we are 
working from the host country.  
 
Perhaps the most important aspect of language and linguistics that we need to take on board 
is that of communication in general (which is, after all, the purpose of our visits). And this 
leads me to a sensitive point, but one that needs to be made. As my grandmother used to say 
– “you have two ears and one mouth for a purpose: you need to listen more than you talk”. I 
think that we definitely need to take this on board in our role as overseas visitors – we need 
to remember to LISTEN.  And to do this more and more often. We tend to get so carried 
away with the sound of our own expert voices that we miss all of the depth and richness that 
our overseas colleagues can offer to the debate if we would only let them get a word in 
sideways. I know that we in the UK tend to talk too much when we get the chance, but I 
have to say that some of my U.S. colleagues (not you, friends) seem to seek out ways to say 
the simplest thing in the most long-winded, wordy way possible. Be brief! (I need to remind 
myself of this too). If English is not the first language for the audience, keep it easy to 
understand. And please bear in mind that the lovely American accent, which allows a torrent 
of words to flow out quickly, can be very hard to understand by a non-English speaker (I 
even have trouble myself sometimes) because it is very easy to let the words all run into each 
other, making it hard to understand. I work regularly at the UN in Geneva and you can see 
the interpreters in their glass cubicles tearing their hair out at the speed with which many 
Americans speak in public. Please speak more clearly by clarifying words with some space 
in between, and enunciate your words more clearly. If you have something to say, you need 
people to understand it. Not all U.S. folks speak fast of course – but think about this if you 
do….. 
 
The penultimate point I want to make here about language is also a cautionary one. Just 
because someone uses the jargon, or seems to be able to engage in the “in” discourse quite 
well, don’t assume that they really understand what they are talking about (which goes for 
us too). An easy way to acquire advancement and status is to “talk the talk”. Many of my 
PhD candidates do this all the time when they arrive at my class – they think they can 
impress me with lots of postmodern jargon: “I’m taking a postdialectic socialist-feminist 
approach to my data collection” [really?]; “I’m intending to make a critical use of capitalist 
post-textual theory to read society in my home country” [but you clearly don’t speak the 
language]; “I tend to find that the ideology of teleological narrative can easily be made 
compatible with the invention of process” [good for you]…..to which my response is Fail – 
until you can tell me what this actually means in terms of what you will do in plain English. 
If anyone comes to me “speaking postmodern”, I immediately smell a rat – although that’s 
just my bias – but we need to watch out for this in practice too. Sending individuals who 
speak in jargon only to teach folks whose first language is not English is not good. Second 
(or third or fourth) language communication is hard enough as it is without blinding our 
participants with science, literally. If we can’t understand what our fellow-tutor is talking 
about, what hope is there for the participants, who will be too polite to ask for further 
translation?! 
 
My final point is this. If and when you make language-based mistakes - as long as they are 
not truly dire and likely to start a war – just laugh it off. In my experience, participants have 
loved it when I make a mistake – and they love it even more when I laugh at myself. My best 
one to date was in Iraq – when I had had to jiggle some Arabic slides around myself (I don’t 
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speak Arabic). I was teaching about a U.S. scientist who had been prosecuted for serious 
illegal and unethical activities when I put up one slide only to see a tiny wave of something 
flitting across the class. At a coffee break, I knew I would be confronted by the most senior 
person present, who would be deemed sufficiently senior to ask me about whatever it was. 
This duly happened, so with all eyes on me in the coffee room, I asked Mr. Senior Professor 
what was wrong on the slide. He said “Dr. Judi, I think you wanted to say that Dr --- was an 
‘eminent’ scientist”. Yes. “But you got the letters mixed up in the word for “eminent” and it 
said ‘Dr ---   is a sh*t scientist”. The whole class dissolved into raucous laughter, especially 
when I joined in and said “Well it’s still right then”. This opened the door for much more 
class interaction, honesty and discussion in the following sessions – all because I had not 
taken myself too seriously and not been afraid to laugh at myself. These were also the folks 
who quoted the Koran to me. The language slip-up helped open the door to this. We all need 
to be able to get over ourselves. Laughter over silly mistakes is a great “way in”, and 
language probably offers us the best opportunities to achieve this. 
 
Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions Theory 
In this section I have selected some quotes, quite lengthy ones, from Hofstede’s 2010 book, 
Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind –Intercultural Cooperation and Its 
Importance for Survival. I recommend it to anyone who wants to pursue inter-cultural 
understanding more deeply. I have chosen to Use direct quotes because as Hofstede puts his 
points across so well, there is little benefit in me trying to paraphrase them. I have chosen a 
few points relevant to our discussion here, starting first with a quote from an internet 
interview that he gave not too long ago: 
 
“It is difficult to explain to people that I am talking about societies and not 
individuals. I run into this problem a lot in North America, if I might say so, which 
tends to be very individualistic. Society is to an individual like a forest is to a tree 
and you cannot describe a forest as just a bunch of trees. The mistake was made by 
Margaret Mead. She talked about culture as personality writ large. It is not so. It is a 
society with all kinds of personalities interacting. It is true that personality tests 
partly reflect the culture of origin. The formative time is actually before puberty, 
and the environment you grow up in influences certain aspects of your personality. 
Only part of it, but if you have enough people who have grown up in that same 
environment, then their personalities will have common elements. Lots of people 
ask me, particularly Americans, if they can have culture tests for their students so 
they can see their culture. This is absolute nonsense because a student can only 
describe his or her personality. If you want to talk about culture, you should take a 
group of people and see what they have in common. This is difficult to explain in an 
individualist culture.”80 
 
Different minds, common problems
81
 
“Understanding the differences in the ways [people] think, feel and act is a 
condition for bring about worldwide solutions that work. Questions of economic, 
technological, medical, or biological cooperation have too often been considered as 
merely technical. One of the reasons why so many solutions do not work or cannot 
be implemented is that differences in thinking among the partners have been 
ignored [emphasis mine]. ….The objective of this book is help in dealing with the 
                                                          
80 Hofstede, 2011, interview at http://www.international.gc.ca/cfsi-icse/cil-cai/magazine/v02n03/1-3-eng.asp 
81 Hofstede, G., Hosftede, GJ., Minkov, M. (2010) Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind –Intercultural 
Cooperation and Its Importance for Survival McGraw Hill: New York, p. 4 
 
 
138 | P a g e  
 
differences in thinking, feeling and acting of people around the globe. It will show 
that although the variety in people’s minds is enormous, there is a structure in this 
variety that can serve as a basis for mutual understanding.” 
 
Culture as mental programming
82
  
“Every person carries within him- or herself patterns of thinking, feeling and potential 
acting that were learned throughout the person’s lifetime. Much of it was acquired in 
early childhood, because at that time a person is most susceptible to learning and 
assimilating. As soon as certain patterns of thinking, feeling and acting have established 
themselves within a person’s mind, he or she must unlearn these patterns before being 
able to learn something different, and unlearning is more difficult than learning for the 
first time.” [Emphasis mine].  
 
Symbols, heroes, rituals and values
83
 
“Cultural differences manifest themselves in several ways. From the many terms used 
to describe manifestations of culture, the following four together cover the total 
concept rather neatly: symbols, heroes, rituals and values. …symbols are words, 
gestures, pictures or objects that carry a particular meaning that is recognized as such 
by only those who share the culture. The words in a language or jargon belong to this 
category, as do dress, hairstyles, flags, and status symbols. New symbols are 
developed and old ones disappear; symbols from one cultural group are regularly 





The onion diagram, representing four manifestations of culture 
(After Hofstede et al, 2010, p. 8) 
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“Heroes are persons, alive or dead, real or imaginary, who possess characteristics that 
are highly prized in a culture and thus serve as models for behavior. Even Barbie, 
Batman….or Snoopy [a cartoon dog in the U.S.]…have served as cultural heroes. In 
the age of television, outward appearances have become more important in the choice 
of heroes than they were before. 
 
“Rituals are collective activities that are technically superfluous to reach desired ends, but 
that, with a culture, are considered socially essential. They are therefore carried out for 
their own sake. …..business and political meetings organized for seemingly rational 
reasons often serve merely ritual purposes, such as reinforcing group cohesion or 
allowing leaders to assert themselves. Rituals include discourse, the way language is used 
in text and talk, in daily interaction, and in communicating beliefs.  
 
“In [the onion diagram] symbols, heroes and rituals have been subsumed under the term 
practices. As such, they are visible to an outside observer; their cultural meaning, 
however, is invisible and lies precisely and only in the ways these practices are 
interpreted by insiders. 
 
“The core of culture according to [the onion diagram] is formed by values. Values are 
broad tendencies to prefer certain states of affairs over others. Values are feelings with an 
added arrow indicating a plus and a minus side. They deal with pairings such as the 
following: 
 
Evil versus good 
Dirty versus clean 
Dangerous versus safe 
Forbidden versus permitted 
Decent versus indecent 
Moral versus immoral 
Ugly versus beautiful 
Unnatural versus natural 
Abnormal versus normal 









“There is a powerful stabilizing force in [cultural patterns of upbringing] that biologists 
call homeostasis. Parents tend to reproduce the education that they received, whether they 
want to or not. And there is only a modest role for technology. The most salient learning 
in your tender years is all about the body and about relationships with people. Not 
coincidentally, these are also sources of intense taboos…..Because they are acquired so 
early in our lives, many values remain unconscious to those who hold them. Therefore 
they cannot be discussed nor can they be directly observed by outsiders. They can only be 
inferred from the way people act under various circumstances. If one asks people why 
they act as they do, they may say that they just “know” or “feel” how to do the right thing. 
Their heart or their conscience tells them.” 
 
No group can escape culture
85
 
“There normally is continuity in culture. But what if you were [stranded on a desert island] 
with twenty nine unknown others, what would you do? If you [all] are from different parts 
of the world, you would lack a common language and shared habits. Your first task would 
be to develop an embryonic common language and some shared rules for behavior, 
cooperation and leadership. Role divisions would emerge between young and old, men and 
women. Conflicts would arise and somehow be handled. Whose responsibility would it be 
…[to] take care of the sick, the dead, and children born on the island?...The point of this 
example is to show that no group can escape culture. Creating shared rules, even if they are 
never written down, is a precondition for group survival [emphasis mine]. This pioneer 
group of thirty people united at random will have to create a new culture. The particulars of 
that culture will largely depend on chance, inheriting from existing values, particularly 
those of the most prominent group members. However, once the culture is set, and 
supposing children are born into the group, the culture will reproduce itself.” 
 
Boundaries of the Moral Circle: Religion and Philosophy
86
 
“Philosophy, spirituality and religion are ways of sorting out the difference between good 
and bad. For 2,500 years, philosophers in the east and West have taught the Golden Rule: 
“Do to others as you would wish them to do to you” – which reads like an affirmation of 
the moral circle. Religious prescriptions such as “Love thy neighbor as thyself” serve the 
same purpose. Religious sects tend to draw their moral circle around member of their own 
community. Morals rights and duties, as well as rewards in the afterlife, are granted only to 
members of the faith. Religion, in essence, and whatever the specific  beliefs of a particular 
one, plays an important role in creating and delineating moral circles….Nations and 
religions can come into competition if they both attempt to delineate a society-level moral 
circle in the same country…..the violence of these conflicts testifies to the importance of 
belonging to a moral circle. It also shows how great a prerogative it is to be the one who 
defines its boundaries.” 
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“The invention of nations, political units into which the entire world is divided and to one of 
which every human being is supposed to belong – as manifested by his or her passport – is a 
recent phenomenon in human history. Earlier, there were states, but not everybody belonged 
to one of these or identified with one. The nation system was introduced worldwide only in 
the mid-twentieth century. It followed the colonial system that had developed during the 
preceding three centuries. On this colonial period the technologically advanced countries of 
Western Europe divided among themselves virtually all territories of the globe that were not 
held by another strong political power. ….Nations, therefore, should not be equated to 
societies. Societies are historically, organically developed forms of social organization. 
Strictly speaking, the concept of a common culture applies to societies, not to nations 
[emphasis mine].…..Within nations….[there are] usually one dominant national language, 
common mass media, a national education system, a national army, a national political 
system…a national market for certain skills, products and services….they are the source of a 
considerable amount of common mental programming of their citizens.  
 
“In research on cultural differences, nationality – the passport one holds – should be used 
with care. Yet it is often the only feasible criterion for classification. Rightly or wrongly, 
collective properties are ascribed to citizens of certain countries: people refer to “typically 
American”, “typically German”, “typically Japanese” behavior. [But] using nationality as a 
criterion is a matter of expediency, because it is immensely easier to obtain data for nations 
than for organic homogeneous societies. Nations as political bodies supply all kinds of 
statistics about their populations….[but] where it is possible to separate results by regional, 
ethnic, or linguistic group, this is useful.” 
 
National Identities, Values and Institutions
88
 
“Countries and regions differ in more than their cultures…[there are] three kinds of 
differences between countries: identities, values and institutions. Identity answers the 
question “To which group do I belong?”  It is often rooted in language and/or religious 
affiliation….identity, however, is not a core part of national cultures….identity differences 
are rooted in practices (symbols, heroes and rituals), not necessarily in values…Identity is 
explicit: it can be expressed, such as “woman”, “a bicultural individual”, “and American 
citizen”. In fact, the same person could report being any of these three things, depending on 
the setting in which you asked. Individualistic environments such as modern cities, 
academia, and modern business allow people to have several identities and to easily 
change their identity portfolio. In collectivistic societies, in which most of the world’s 
population still lives, one conceives as oneself much more as belonging to a community, 
whether this be ethnic, regional or national, and one’s sense of identity derives mainly from 
that group affiliation [emphasis mine].  
 
Values are implicit: they belong to the invisible software of our minds. Talking about our 
values is difficult, because it implies questioning our motives, emotions and taboos. Our own 
culture is like the air we breathe, while another culture is like water – and it takes special 
skills to be able to survive in both elements.” 
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“There is inequality in any society. Even in the simplest hunter-gatherer band, some people 
are bigger, stronger or smarter than others. Further, some people have more power than 
others: they are more able to determine the behavior of others than vice versa. Some people 
acquire more wealth than others. Some people are given more status and respect than 
others…Physical and intellectual capacities, power, wealth, and status may or may not go 
together …such inconsistencies among the various areas of inequality are often felt to be 
problematic. In some societies people try to resolve them by making the areas more 
consistent. Athletes turn professional to become wealthy; politicians exploit their power 
and/or move on to attractive business positions in order to do the same; successful business-
people enter public office in order to acquire status. This trend obviously increases the 
overall inequalities in these societies.” 
 
The Individual and the collective in society
90
 
“The Swedes and the Saudis [for example] have different concepts of the role of personal 
relationships in business. For the Swedes, business is done with a company; for the Saudis, 
it’s done with a person whom one has learned to know and trust [emphasis mine]. When one 
does not know another person well enough, it is best that contacts take place in the presence 
of an intermediary or go-between, someone who knows and is trusted by both parties. At the 
root of the difference between these cultures is a fundamental issue in human societies: the 
role of the individual versus the role of the group….the vast majority of people in our world 
live in societies in which the interest of the group prevails over the interest of the individual. 
We will call these societies collectivist [without any political connotations here]. [This] 
refers to the power of the group. The first group in our lives is always the family…in most 
collectivist societies, the family …consists of …parents, and other children….grandparents, 
uncles, aunts, servants...or other[s]. …they learn to think of themselves as part of the “we” 
group….[this] is the major source of one’s identity and the only secure protection one has 
from the hardships of life….one owes lifelong loyalty to one’s in-group, and breaking this 
loyalty is one of the worst things a person can do [emphasis mine]. A minority of people in 
our world live in societies in which the interests of the individual prevail over the interests of 
the group, societies that we will call individualist. In these, most children are born into 
families consisting of two parents and, possibly, other children…..other relatives live 
elsewhere and are rarely seen. This type is the nuclear family. Children from such families, 
as they grow up, …think of themselves as “I”.  This “I”, their personal identity, is distinct 
from other people’s “I”s, and these others are classified not according to their group 
membership but instead according to individual characteristics [emphasis mine]. Playmates, 
for example, are chosen on the basis of personal preferences. The purpose of education is to 
enable children to stand on their own feet. Children are expected to leave the parental home 
as soon as this has been achieved….neither practically or psychologically is the healthy 
person in this type of society supposed to be dependent on a group.” [Emphasis mine].  
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“The acquisition of intercultural communication abilities passes through three phases: 
awareness, knowledge, and skills. Awareness is where it all starts: the recognition that I carry 
a particular mental software because of the way I was brought up and that others brought up 
in a different environment carry a different mental software for good reasons. ….Knowledge 
should follow. If we have to interact with particular other cultures, we have to learn about 
those cultures. We should learn about their symbols, their heroes and their rituals; while we 
may never share their values, we may at least get an intellectual grasp of where their values 
differ from ours….skills are based on awareness and knowledge, plus practice. We have to 
recognize and apply the symbols of the other culture: recognize their heroes, practice their 
rituals, and experience the satisfaction of getting along in the new environment, being able to 
resolve first the simpler and later on some of the more complicated problems of life among 
the others….Intercultural communication can be taught. Some students are more gifted at 
learning it than others. Persons with unduly inflated egos, a low personal intolerance for 
uncertainty, …or known racist or extreme left- or right-wing political sympathies should be 
considered bad risks for a training program that, at its core, assumes people’s ability to 
distance themselves from their own cherished beliefs. Such persons are probably unfit for 
expatriation anyway.” 
 
I will return to Hofstede’s ideas in the following pages. 
 
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs92 
This is a theoretical concept that seeks to prioritize the various human needs that drive our 
thoughts, beliefs and actions through motivation. When we are engaged in work with overseas 
colleagues with the aim of achieving outcomes involving changes in behavior and the acceptance 
and imposition of new or adapted norms, then we have to consider issues of motivation as a key 
driver in all that we and our colleagues do. Please note that this applies to our motivation as well 
as to the motivation of our overseas colleagues.  
 
I have already raised here a range of cultural issues that put stress on individuals and groups, and 
therefore drive their responses. Maslow, in the first half of the 20
th
 century, developed his theory of 
the hierarchy of needs, as can be seen in the figure below. Maslow suggested that we can’t function 
effectively on any level, or for any length of time, unless the levels below it have been effectively 
addressed. Thus, you would not expect a homeless person to be bothered too much about morality 
if he has to steal to eat; likewise, a person without a caring family and friends is likely to have 
problems with self-esteem, or feel that nobody is impressed with him, and he may then feel that it 
is acceptable to have less respect for others. 
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Maslow said:  
 
“If all the [physiological] needs are unsatisfied, and the [person] is then dominated by the 
physiological needs, all other needs may become simply non-existent or be pushed into the 
background [emphasis mine]. It is then fair to characterize the whole [person] by saying 
simply that [s/he] is hungry, for consciousness is almost completely preempted by hunger 
[for basic needs to be met]. All capacities are put into the service of hunger-satisfaction, and 
the organization of these capacities is almost entirely determined by the one purpose of 
satisfying hunger. The receptors and effectors, the intelligence, memory, habits, all may now 
be defined simply as hunger-gratifying tools. 
 
“Capacities that are not useful for this purpose lie dormant, or are pushed into the 
background. The urge to write poetry, the desire to acquire an automobile, the interest in 
American history, the desire for a new pair of shoes are, in the extreme case, forgotten or 
become of secondary importance. For the man who is extremely and dangerously hungry, 
no other interests exist but food. He dreams food, he remembers food, he thinks about food, 
he emotes only about food, he perceives only food and he wants only food. The more subtle 
determinants that ordinarily fuse with the physiological drives in organizing even feeding, 
drinking or sexual behavior, may now be so completely overwhelmed as to allow us to 
speak at this time (but only at this time) of pure hunger drive and behavior, with the one 
unqualified aim of relief.” 
 
 
Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs 
 
This quote from Maslow’s 1943 paper may be directly related to the situation of the person 
whose country, culture and environment have undergone recent serious changes, or suffered 
long term economic or other challenges that interfere with his well-being. He may not have even 
his basic needs met, or they may only be met intermittently, and when this happens, these needs 
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begin to outweigh his consideration of all else. Externally he may be able to put on a show of 
acting normally, but internally, all he can think of is regaining a state of balance in which his 
needs are met – needs of regular and good quality food and drink, for example, at the most basic 
of levels.  
 
“Another peculiar characteristic of the human organism when it is dominated by a certain 
need is that the whole philosophy of the future tends also to change [my emphasis]. For our 
chronically and extremely hungry man, Utopia can be defined very simply as a place where 
there is plenty of food. He tends to think that, if only he is guaranteed food for the rest of 
his life, he will be perfectly happy and will never want anything more. Life itself tends to 
be defined in terms of eating. Anything else will be defined as unimportant. Freedom, love, 
community feeling, respect, philosophy, may all be waved aside as fripperies which are 
useless since they fail to fill the stomach. Such a man may fairly be said to live by bread 
alone.” 
 
While Maslow is referring here to basic physiological needs, and he does go on to detail “higher” 
needs in his paper, we can see here the principle that underpins human reaction to extreme stress. 
Earlier in the paper I mentioned my friend in the former Soviet state who had to feed herself and 
a dependent for two years by selling cookies on the way to work. Her need to get the ingredients 
for those cookies outweighed everything, and was the major driving force of her life for a long 
period of time. This has major psychological effects on people’s ability to prioritize and to make 
future plans. There is no future, or no meaningful future, if you have had your basic security and 
provision removed from you. Survival becomes everything.  
 
“It cannot possibly be denied that such things are true but their generality can be denied. 
Emergency conditions are, almost by definition, rare in the normally functioning peaceful 
society. That this truism can be forgotten is due mainly to two reasons. First, rats have few 
motivations other than physiological ones, and since so much of the research upon 
motivation has been made with these animals, it is easy to carry the rat-picture over to the 
human being. Secondly, it is too often not realized that culture itself is an adaptive tool, one 
of whose main functions is to make the physiological emergencies come less and less often. 
In most of the known societies, chronic extreme hunger of the emergency type is rare, 
rather than common. In any case, this is still true in the United States. The average 
American citizen is experiencing appetite rather than hunger when he says "I am hungry." 
He is apt to experience sheer life-and-death hunger only by accident and then only a few 
times through his entire life.” 
 
So here we see the concept of the “emergency situation” as being relatively uncommon (by 
comparison) in the American life. But when we look at the conditions under which our BMENA 
friends have to live, we can see quite easily how the securities and benefits of our Western lives 
do not always exist in their countries. We hailed the Arab Spring as the arrival of democracy, 
forgetting that it has taken us hundreds of years to “get it right” in our own countries, and that 
democracy does not arrive as a culture, fully-formed and ready to go. You cannot just go out and 
“buy” a democracy package ready-made. Democracy is a mind-set as well as a political theory. 
The population has to accept democracy into its consciousness and to accept what it means in 
practice. The population has to learn what the boundaries of democracy are, and to go through a 
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process of education and experience that instill democracy into heads, hearts and minds. Our 
politicians, and we ourselves, have naively assumed that once democracy “arrives” in Arab 
countries, people will just get on with life under this new system and all will be well.  
 
Applying Maslow to scientists and biosecurity  
While the levels in Maslow’s diagram are defined in terms of the needs of the human individual on 
a social level, we can also apply the concept to individuals in a science context. 
 
Physiological needs, the most fundamental of all, can equate, in terms of our biosecurity work, to 
the acquiring of a place on a course of scientific study, or a professional position. This is the 
doorway into a science career (birth is the doorway into Maslow’s original diagram). 
 
Safety needs can equate to security in that position, in terms of adequate salary, other rewards and 
recognition of our efforts and achievements, and physical safety and security. We could also 
include wider concepts such as political security and financial security. 
 
Love/belonging needs equate to our sense of belonging to a recognized, defined group; in this case 
we are talking about the professional group – the community of scientists, both local, national, 
regional and international. If our scientist does not feel he belongs to a community of peers, or he 
does not wish to belong to a community of peers, then we have a problem. 
 
Esteem needs equate to our acceptance by our colleagues, managers, employers, and so on; it can 
also apply to our social acceptance that results from our holding this studentship or professional 
position; it includes all also all of the respect and rewards that we expect or hope to receive as 
professional and personal recognition of our abilities and prospects for future gain. 
 
Self-actualization means to reach our full potential. Once we have got all the lower levels sorted 
out, we can be freed up to do “the fluffy stuff”. Nothing at this level equates to simple survival – it 
is all to do with non-urgent issues that require thought, planning, objectivity, critical skills and an 
open mind. Here, self-actualization as a scientist equates to being able to spend time and effort in 
being objective rather than always subjective; being able to engage in ethical debate (the kind of 
difficult issue that tends to get left on the shelf if there are other more pressing problems that need 
attention), being creative rather than just repetitive in our thoughts and actions, solving long term 
problems in advance rather than just reacting to today’s crisis, and accepting that we can’t fix 
everything, and some things will continue to be problematic. 
 
I think it’s quite clear how these levels of need can be applied to the individual working in 
biosecurity. We may note, of course, that some folks like to look as if they have reached the higher 
levels, but underneath, there are some shaky foundations (this goes for all of us). Clearly this is just 
a model, and there are people who can function at the self-actualization level when undergoing 
serious challenges that would knock most of us off our perches – and many of our BMENA 
colleagues fall into this category. However, as supporters of our BMENA colleagues,   we need to 
be aware that people can only function at this level under severe stress for a fixed length of time 
before stress becomes overwhelming, resulting in personal and professional problems. We need to 
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Perhaps one of the most important factors on the diagram is “self-esteem” in our work. I have 
mentioned status several times here, and it is a vitally important element in all we do in BMENA 
countries (and in our own if we are honest). It is arguably one of the key drivers (or even “the” key 
driver) that motivates our overseas colleagues to join with us. This has both positive and negative 
consequences. When colleagues use preferential access to our courses through nepotism or other 
social favoritism, other people, who may be better placed to use the course materials, will lose out. 
On the other hand, participants who really use our educational events to gain awareness of the 
issues, acquire more knowledge about them, and apply this in practice, thus developing skills, 
ought to gain more status in their home community as they will be well-placed to become 
influential promoters of biosecurity. 
 
When people are engaged in a daily struggle to survive or progress in any way that they wish to, 
sometimes in terms of personal advancement, furthering their professional skills, in their economic 
situation or in terms of technological access, or around religious disagreements or political 
upheaval, or in post-conflict situations, it is very hard for them to prioritize the same things that 
we prioritize in the West. When we know that our job is safe as long as we perform it well, when 
we know that our union is looking after our interests in salary disputes, that our mortgage is well 
on the way to being paid off, that our kids are safe at school, that we have more than sufficient 
food for ourselves and our families and that the elections really are fair and open (even if we don’t 
like the results), then we can easily focus our efforts on the details of advanced practice and the 
“fluffy stuff” of continuing professional development, networking to promote our scientific ideas, 
pursuing grants on high-level or blue-skies research. But when our colleagues overseas cannot rely 
on any stability in the same way, or on very little of it, why on earth should they be bothered about 
all the high level “fluffy stuff”?  If survival is the priority, then let’s be honest – the finer points of 
biosecurity networking and every little detail of good biorisk management are highly unlikely to 
get a lot of attention. 
 
Cultural Competency model 
I’ve left this to the end of this section because it simply provides a useful framework that I will 
return to in Section 3. Anyone who is interested can read up on this model as there is quite bit of a 
literature out there dealing with it. For now, just look at it as a way of guiding engagement and 
planning. 
 
This is a concept that grew from healthcare in the later part of the 20
th
 century in the United States, 
in response to the changing needs of the population for effective health interventions. It became 
apparent to the majority white, educated, English-speaking healthcare establishment that many 
parts of the American population were not receiving the care they needed, for language, social, 
religious and other cultural reasons. As a result, a movement to make the majority of healthcare 
providers more aware of the different needs of minority groups began to emerge. The idea of 
cultural competency has grown from this. It includes these elements: 
 
 Awareness (of one’s reactions to other cultures) 
 Attitude (do you have a general head-knowledge of the need for cultural understandings or 
do you actually engage in it in your own life and experiences) 
 Knowledge (do you really understand the needs of other cultures and do you actually 
“practice what you preach”?) 
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 Skills (do you have the ability to actually communicate effectively with people from other 
cultures?  Can you manage verbal and non-verbal communication effectively in a multi-
cultural setting?  Have you practiced?!) 
 




SECTION THREE: PRACTICAL PROBLEMS AND RESPONSES 
 
Some examples of problematic behavior  
I’ve just collected here some anecdotes, admittedly some of them are extreme, from my personal 
experience that may shed some light on how and why members of non-U.S. cultures may 
occasionally find it difficult to handle U.S. folks in practice. All of the quotes or paraphrases below 
were actually said, and none of the speakers had any clue as to how they sounded to listeners. The 
actions described were all carried out as normal, routine and assumed to be acceptable by the folks 
doing them. Of note, the problems described here were caused by non-scientists. Rather, they were 
caused by people associated with the support of scientific education activities. I think that this is 
something that we need to look at. (Can I please make the point here that I am not saying that all 
U.S. communication is problematic – I’m just giving you some strong examples here to make my 
point. I have many U.S. friends and colleagues who are consummate communicators – it’s just that 
when public communication goes wrong, it goes really wrong). In my experience, all the scientists 
and educators that I have worked with on overseas projects have been excellent or good 
communicators and have formed good relationships with local participants. However, my 
impression is that those who “come with us” or who have a public, official voice seem to be in 
need of the inter-cultural skills training. I leave it to you to decide. These are all examples of the 
worst sort of unhelpful discourse employed by thoughtless folks who simply never questioned the 
right of the U.S. to be “top dog” because of power and money. 
 
“You break it, you buy it” 
On a recent visit to Iraq, I was talking to a U.S. individual from a military background. His entire 
perspective was one of threat identification and reduction. By the end of our time together I 
assumed that I was also probably seen as a threat to him. One day we were passing some bombed 
out buildings that had not been repaired yet. I wondered aloud who would one day fix them up. He 
said “Oh you know, it’d probably be us – you break it, you buy it”. I could not think of a response 
that was polite and repeatable. What our Iraqi colleagues listening in thought of this, I cannot 
imagine. But this phrase, so casually thrown out, just said it all. We broke it (we had to bomb it in 
order to achieve our ends); we will fix it (because “they” can’t or won’t); we have money, “they” 
don’t; we can do what we want here (because we just can); if it’s our responsibility, then we own 
it. The same chap kindly told me also, when I was discussing UK defense and the European Union, 
that “What are you talking about – I thought it was us that defended you guys”. Nice. No doubt he 
owns us too. 
 
When we see a threat, we go in and we deal with it 
I was at a high-level meeting in the UK recently, discussing UK support activities overseas, at 
which some U.S. government colleagues were present. The senior of the visitors got up and opened 
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his talk with an explanation of what his government section did. He said, describing the U.S. 
response to security challenges from other countries, “When we see a threat, we go in and we deal 
with it”. This was said as if it was absolutely normal and with about as much insight as if he had 
announced he was going out for a take-away meal. Now just think, for a minute, how this would be 
received if it came from, say, Pakistan, or Jordan? Let’s imagine that senior government staff from 
one of these countries, when visiting overseas with partners, said this in a meeting. And let’s 
imagine that their country has the money and capacity to do this in practice. How would it be if a 
BMENA country saw a perceived threat in the U.S. and just decided it was acceptable to “see it, go 
in and deal with it”?  It’s just not a good way to make friends and influence people – in the UK 
we’re on the U.S. side, but even we don’t like it. 
 
Some of you may have noticed this 
Following on from this perspective, I have a good example of how this “we just go in and fix it” 
approach can cause bad feeling. At a major international meeting in the U.S. a while ago, I was 
present at a session that had an audience from all over the world, especially from the Middle East 
and Far East. The session was focusing on biosecurity in industry. A relatively high-level U.S. 
government individual (one of several) addressed the meeting by emphasizing the power of the 
U.S. compared to the rest of the world, and peppered his speech with examples of U.S. 
intervention powers. There was not really any need for this, given the motivated audience who had 
come to hear the session, yet he made a comment that was presented as being 
amusing/ironic/illustrative, when he said that U.S. power could achieve anything it wanted, “as 
some of you may have noticed recently in Abbottabad”. There was an audible murmuring of 
discomfort in the audience, but he just ploughed on. The audience was heavily skewed towards 
science and had many scientists in it, including many BMENA scientists or science 
representatives. How did this comment and those that went with it, make them feel?  Is it 
appropriate to broadcast U.S. “might” in such a setting?  Is it helpful to make what sounded like a 
flippant comment about the killing of an individual, even if that individual was widely known as a 
terrorist?  Many people in the Middle East did not see this individual this way – but to use a 
reference to his death as an illustration of U.S. power and reach seems to me to be crass and 
insensitive. I didn’t like it even though I support anti-terrorism efforts.  
 
Car bombs as a norm 
I was at a meeting in Washington, DC, recently at which a senior and well-respected scientist made 
the statement, when discussing biosecurity in terms of national values, that “the reason that car 
bombs are largely unknown in the U.S. is because in the U.S., car bombs are not a norm”. When I 
criticized this statement, and said that I did not know of any country where car bombs are a norm, I 
was met with some degree of shock in the room. Heads turned in amazement. Further, at the 
subsequent coffee break, two different people approached me to talk. The first, a senior academic 
at a northern U.S. university, thanked me for my critique of the comment about car bombs and told 
me that she had never before thought that people in the villages of  Pakistan could be upset by car 
bombs  – it was news to her that car bombs would be considered abnormal in such countries. I also 
wondered what she thought of our attitudes to car bombs in the UK – we have had plenty - but I 
was so stunned that I did not think to ask her. The second person told me that I was clearly not 
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Better late than never 
I was recently at an educational event in a BMENA country and a representative from the U.S. 
Embassy was coming to give an opening address. We were all ready to start, but he had not 
arrived. So we filled, and filled, and filled. Eventually, he turned up. Instead of apologizing for his 
late arrival, which had delayed the start of the sessions, and inconvenienced us all, he breezed in 
and immediately just assumed control of the room. No eye contact with us or with the participants, 
he just strolled across to the lectern saying “Ok, here we go…..let’s get started…..is everybody 
here?….is everything ready?….” and off he went on his speech. We just looked at each other in 
disbelief. But as the U.S. was paying for the event, we all just went along with it. He focused his 
speech on the inconveniences to him caused by “the terrorists” who had caused recent changes in 
his travel plans and emphasized how “We know that none of us let the terrorists get us down or 
stop us doing our work”. Ok. But this was in front of a local audience, some of whom may have 
had some sympathy with “the terrorists”, who were after all, members of the host population, in 
whose country we were guests. Some of these terrorists may have been relatives of those present 
(which does not excuse their activities, but puts a different slant on how the audience may have 
heard this speaker). While I can see the need to fight terrorism in all its forms, is it a good idea to 
refer to the cultural (or actual) kinsmen of your hosts as terrorists, when you are holding an event 
that is aimed at influencing hearts and minds?  Why would you, as a local, change your behavior if 
you didn’t like the sentiments expressed in the opening speech? Those comments may have ruined 
the whole event for some participants. 
 
Guns’n’toilets 
I had another example of a cultural upset described to me by people who attended similar event at 
which I was not present. An important U.S. individual was arriving at an educational event in a 
BMENA country to give a speech, and came with a number of armed soldiers as his security. Upon 
arrival to the building, the armed soldiers walked straight into the female toilets, without any 
warning, with weapons, and inspected the toilets for threats. While female participants at the event 
were in there. I have to say that had I been in the toilet when armed soldiers walked in, I would 
have had something to say about it. Why is it that the security “needs” of one visiting individual 
were considered of more importance than the privacy and dignity of local women?  This is not 
security, it is appalling bad manners, discourteousness in the extreme, and a very poor way of 
getting people “on side”. What did this action say to the local participants about respect and the 
value placed on them as individuals and professionals? 
 
Hopefully, these examples will focus your mind on how the adverse effects of these may have 
been avoided. You will note that most of these anecdotes resulted in people being disrespected, 
annoyed, insulted, shocked, or all four. We can also see how an accumulation of such experiences 
could really upset an individual or group, possibly resulting in behavior changes that nobody 
wants to see. At the very least, these examples reduced the desire for interaction with the 




We need to think about our motivations in biosecurity education carefully. It seems to me, and I 
am happy for someone to put me right if I am wrong, that U.S. (and UK to a large extent) support 
and interventions in the field of biosecurity and all biorisk management activities, is still modeled 
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closely on the old post-Second World War and post-Cold War paradigm of diverting scientists 
away from something, and towards something else in case they hurt us
93
. After the Second World 
War, many German rocket scientists were “diverted” to the U.S. After the Cold War, much effort 
has been put into “diverting” Soviet weapons scientists into other activities. There are many 
arguments to be had over these historical approaches, and this is not the place to go into them. It 
seems to me that many U.S. people think that this is the way to treat all overseas biotechnology 
scientists, because it seems so normal for people in the U.S. to consider other countries as a threat 
to security. This is not just a U.S. issue – when I took a trip to St Petersburg in Russia in 2006, my 
father was seriously worried because I was going to be with “the Russians” – who in his mind had 
been an enemy for decades. However, given the examples of problematic discourse and behaviors 
that I gave on earlier pages, this is a problem, because it this approach is “picked up” by our 
overseas colleagues, whether we say it openly or not. I think that this needs to be recognized and 
addressed. 
 
It seems to me that as we are not in a war or a post-war situation (despite the so-called War on 
Terror), we should not be couching our biosecurity support and interventions in the same terms as 
we have done in the post-war situations of the twentieth century. Today we all face risks from the 
abuse of biotechnology, so is it really appropriate to approach today’s problem from yesterday’s 
perspective?  Especially when doing so serves to impede our efforts, thereby defeating the purpose 
of our work?  
 
This approach assumes that: 1) non-Western scientists are planning, or are likely to plan at some 
point,  to involve themselves in hostile (to the West) scientific activity; and 2) the West is at risk in 
some way from a “real” threat in the form of people (scientists). Of course, this is very different 
from diverting scientists after wars from work that we know for a fact they were involved in. 
Today, we seem to be trying to divert folks from work that they might be involved in at some point 
in the future. Hence the security approach rather than the development approach. But how would 
we feel if we were being viewed this way? 
 
Too much talk is focused on getting “them” to “our” standards. Teaching “them” how to do it. And 
so on. All against a background that seems to be largely driven by the need for “our” security. Now 
this seems an inappropriate way to get folks to want to actually take up the norms, knowledge and 
skills that we are trying to “sell”. Yes, people will want to engage with us to get new equipment and 
so on, but we really want our colleagues in other countries to adopt and adapt the norms, 
knowledge and skills we’re sharing and run with them. In order to do this, we need to win, to coin 
a phrase, hearts and minds. And if we are seen to be constantly driven by the prioritization of our 
own security and of our own benefits, why should they bother with it all once we have delivered the 
new biosafety cabinet, held a seminar, ticked a funding box and gone home?   
 
This is a major issue and needs to be tackled from the top down. One could say that this approach 
is also being driven by our old friend, democracy – no politician who wants to be elected, or stay 
elected, in the U.S. is now prepared to “let up” on “the threat” from the Middle East. In the 
anticipation therefore that nothing much is going to change anytime soon, I suggest that we at least 
try to be aware of this and the effect it can have on our work and on our BMENA colleagues.     
 
                                                          
93 See, for example, the Russian Transition Initiative, at https://www.llnl.gov/str/JanFeb05/pdfs/01_05.2.pdf  
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Bio-engagement as a development activity, not a security endeavor 
Following on from this, it is my opinion, based on my experiences, that the education of, and 
awareness-raising activities among, BMENA scientists and science educators should be 
considered as a long term development activity rather than as a threat reduction enterprise. To 
consider engagement between the U.S. and counterparts overseas, from any region, from the 
perspective of defense, is to immediately cast the overseas partner(s) as a potential threat, thereby 
imposing an unequal and hierarchical nature upon the relationship. Indeed, one may argue that by 
taking a defense approach, it is not possible to initiate any type of connection that may be 
considered a relationship; rather, the “defender” views his connection with the “potential threat” as 
no more than a convenient association that seeks, in real terms, to only benefit itself. I would 
propose that we need to ask ourselves why we are assisting overseas countries at all, questioning 
the rationales for such interventions. 
 
If we seek to encourage overseas partners to engage with us in improving the capacity and 
sustainability of their biorisk management endeavors, we must demonstrate to partners how such 
activities will benefit them. In other words, there must be “something in it for them”, and this needs 
to be something more than funding. This precludes, of course, any approach that seeks to protect 
the position of one side at the expense of the other. It has been said, for example, that while the 
United States seeks to support overseas countries in improving their biorisk management capacities 
(including issues of both biosafety and biosecurity), it is important – from the U.S. perspective – to 
“maintain a competitive advantage” economically. While this is understandable at some level, one 
has to question what this and similar responses to overseas support actually implies.  
 
Is it the aim to only support overseas countries up to a certain point?  If so, what is that point, and 
how would that point be recognized or categorized?  What happens if Country A, having been 
supported by U.S. interventions such as assistance in biotechnology education, begins to compete 
with the U.S. in the biotechnology or biotechnology education sector?  Are we to actively look for 
signs of such competition emerging in Country A and then reduce our assistance to prevent the loss 
of U.S. competitive advantage?  Clearly, this poses some theoretical and practical challenges to 
U.S. engagement with other countries, not to say ethical ones. 
 
Different standards do not always mean unacceptable standards 
It should be borne in mind that by “engaging” with overseas individuals and organizations, 
Western actors are, to some extent, actually practicing a form of neo-colonialism. It can be argued 
that by passing on “our” knowledge and skills to “them” that we are in fact pressuring them to take 
up and comply with values and/or systems that they may not wish to accommodate. This can be 
disguised in many ways, usually with at least one hidden agenda, including “education” (“we know 
better than you and will help you to think more like us so you are less of a threat to us”); 
“development” (“we can help you to improve your country because it needs it”); “aid” (“we will 
give to you out of our generosity because you cannot afford to help yourselves, even though much 
is lost to corruption inside your country”) and “disaster relief” (“we will help you in an emergency 
because it makes us look good and gets  into places easily”), among others. We can, of course, be 
engaged in overseas support activities out of altruistic motives, and these may indeed be the 
underlying motives of individuals engaged in in-country support work.  However, my opinion is 
that nation states rarely engage in activities for altruistic reasons (feel free to disagree). Politicians 
need to be elected or re-elected, and while balancing popularity against duty, or a moral 
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imperative, I would suggest that most governments are principally interested in seeking “what’s in 
this for us?” rather than “let’s see how we can help you out of the goodness of our hearts”.  
 
One only needs to look at differing standards in health and safety law and practice to see that 
Western values are not always required or welcomed in all countries. A man who has to climb up 
40 floors of bamboo scaffolding to carry out his day’s work on a building site, without a helmet or 
safety net
94
 may actually be glad of the job and the funds it provides. We may think that he has no 
choice but to work in these dangerous conditions, but he may well have decided that the risks are 
acceptable to him in order to achieve the outcomes he wants, at least for now – the necessary funds 
to raise a family. Who are we to assume that he needs us to intervene and remove his workplace by 
imposing “our” standards of health and safety, if these put him out of a job?  Likewise, the woman 
working in a “sweatshop” producing cheap tee shirts for our supermarkets may consider herself 
content if she earns enough to feed herself and her children. Who defines what “ethical shopping” 
is?  Ethical to whom?  The tee-shirt buyer, the supermarket chain or the machinist who loses her 
job when the sweatshop closes after adverse publicity on our evening news? 
 
How is this different from teaching biorisk management?  Given that one of the principles of 
biorisk management is risk evaluation and characterization – defining how acceptable a risk is - 
why are we so slow to accept that our overseas colleagues are already doing the same everyday 
themselves?  We think we are passing on our skills to result in a safer environment, safer labs, 
safer personnel, and so on. But if a laboratory has been working effectively (in the eyes of the lab 
workers and management) for years, what gives us the right to arrive and start telling them “how to 
do it properly”?  Are we seriously saying that labs in the non-Western world that are working with 
dangerous pathogens are regularly allowing their staff to become infected and fall ill and die, or 
allowing serious exposures which endanger the public?  Do we not think that management and 
workers are not already committed to working in ways that keep them safe?  Why would they 
knowingly put themselves at risk?  
 
Of course, we know from experience that many of our colleagues in BMENA countries (and 
elsewhere) are well aware of the limitations under which they have to work. Stories abound of how 
biosafety rules in any given laboratory or scientific facility actually depend on what “the boss” 
lays down as the law – which depends, of course, on how up-to-date and well-informed are the 
skills and understanding of that boss. In such circumstances, a scientist will find him or herself 
working to different biosafety standards in different facilities. Many facilities are hampered by a 
lack of Standard Operating Procedures for even basic activities such as hand-washing protocols. 
Infrastructure problems mean that waste cannot be effectively disposed of, for example. Lack of 
maintenance of equipment is an ongoing problem – how often is the autoclave checked, and what 
evidence signals that it is not sterilizing contents properly?  Basic standards such as labeling of 
bottles and samples are not always implemented, sometimes with terrible consequences; fridges 
are shared between units with conflicting biosafety needs, and even contain staff lunches! 
However, in my experience, most labs are run on the biosafety principles put in place by the boss. 
This means that s/he is requiring that staff work to a set of rules – they may not be as effective as 
they could be, but they are rules all the same. The will is already there to engage with us, but we 
do not sufficiently recognize this. In my view, the best way to help here is to start with the rules 
folks are already using, and base teaching around those. The participants will see the problems as 
                                                          
94 See: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kjtsDsgHCFY  You must watch to the very end…… 
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teaching progresses, and be able to make changes accordingly. In this way, folks have ownership of 
their “new” rules because they are simply the old rules, adapted – and better still – adapted by 
themselves, not us. 
 
Biosafety and biorisk management before biosecurity 
On top of the awareness of our BMENA colleagues of the limitations under which they work, there 
is also the issue of being open and honest with funding agencies and visiting colleagues from the 
U.S. (or elsewhere) who are trying to assist development. We need BMENA colleagues to be 
honest in their interactions with us. It is difficult, of course, to tell a guest who is bringing gifts (in 
effect) that the gift is no good without something else to go with it. Worse, it is almost impossible to 
tell a gift-bearer that while his gift is welcomed, it is actually not the thing that is really needed 
right now. 
 
On a recent trip to a former Soviet state, where I was delivering teaching materials focusing on 
biosecurity, the audience of students, professors and professional scientists were clearly keen to 
engage with the topic. However, when I asked some pointed questions in discussion after the 
session, I found that one or two of the audience (professors and facility directors) asked me, 
carefully, for some help with basic biorisk management skills. Once this was aired openly, more 
chipped in and said that they also needed the same things. Nobody wanted to offend me, or to seem 
ungrateful, but in the public session it was not possible to be open about the priorities actually 
facing them in “the real world”.  
 
The science educators and the facility directors saw that biosecurity is important, but what chance 
is there of implementing it effectively when basic biosafety practices are not standardized or in 
place?  To admit such a need is not a weakness, but a necessity. I felt awkward when this was 
aired, not because I looked down on the audience’s expressed needs, but for myself because we 
had simply not been well enough informed to recognize this basic level of need. We were there at 
considerable expense to deliver fairly high-level materials. This was being done to meet some of 
the needs of our own country’s foreign policy strategy, as well as wanting to help colleagues 
overseas, but we were missing some of the point. 
 
This brings us back to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs in a way, and to the point I made earlier about 
difficulties getting in the way of the implantation of recognized needs and norms. Colleagues need 
to be able to implement effective biosafety before they can implement effective biosecurity. In my 
view, biosecurity encompassed biosafety – both are based around the need for containment: 
 
 Biosafety addresses the containment of pathogens, toxins and other dangerous materials; 
 
 Biosecurity addresses the containment of pathogens, toxins and other dangerous materials 
AND the containment of information, knowledge, data, equipment and intellectual 
property. 
 
Thus, biosafety needs to be in place first. It’s no good trying to put the cart before the horse. But in 
my experience many colleagues are embarrassed to ask for this. I know that massive biosafety 
work has been done already by the U.S. in the BMENA region, but it has not reached everybody, 
and many still fall through the cracks.  
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On top of this, status is huge in BMENA cultures, and affects all interactions with us. For example, 
some professors won’t teach juniors, but do not know all the relevant knowledge in detail 
themselves so they have to appear to know it. This is stressful on them and impedes uptake of our 
support. Much of our teaching simply reinforces the lack of infrastructure and knowledge that 
many of them experience and this can make them feel worse. They have to smile and say 
“brilliant”, knowing that they will never be able to achieve what we’re saying due to lack of 
money, leadership or opportunities. Politics get in at every level and other priorities take over 
biosecurity or any other issue we are trying to address or support.    As supporters of overseas 
colleagues, we need to provide very basic training and require professors to attend so that they can 
pass it on to others – in this way we can say we are training the trainers when we are actually 
saving face and training them. 
 
A simple way forward to address both the need for basic information and the status issue, that I 
want to explore myself, is the production of a series of YouTube videos on all aspects of biosafety, 
biosecurity and biorisk management. These could range from five minutes on how to don personal 
protective equipment properly, through hand washing, bench techniques and so on, right up to 
planning policy and risk assessment. The videos would be in English with a choice of language 
subtitles. This avoids judging any particular society. If we provided such videos on YouTube, 
senior scientists as well as junior ones would be able to watch them in the privacy of their own 
homes, and acquire new knowledge, understanding and the theory of skills, without their 
colleagues knowing it. This seems to me to be a quick, affordable and easy way to start remedying 
the problems I’ve outlined here. 
 
Associated with biosafety needs, we also need to recognize that biosecurity and biosecurity 
networks are too far off for many just yet – trying to run a safe lab is all that many can manage 
and that is a huge achievement when it happens. Let’s provide the networking opportunities and be 
the focus of biosecurity networks while they can focus on lab-based stuff first. Then they can look 
at national and regional networks for biosecurity. I’m not saying that nobody in a BMENA country 
is ready to engage in a biosecurity network, or that nobody has got biosafety right – I’m just saying 
that there are still too many gaps and we should not try to advance our own ideas too quickly. 
Unfortunately, when our funding is directed from the top, a long way from the grassroots of 
reality, this is a hard point to get across. Plus, many overseas colleagues, when quizzed about their 
abilities, standards and so on after training will never feel able to admit the problems they still 
have. We need to cultivate real communication, such as I have described above where folks 
disclose important things to me at coffee time – only in such interactions are we likely to hear the 
real needs expressed. And if we are too senior or distant to attract the personal, quiet chats, we 
have a problem. 
 
Long term planning 
Let’s have better planning for long term support when we provide infrastructure overseas – no 
BSL3 labs to be built unless 5-year maintenance and maintenance training is implemented from 
day one, with a clear take-over plan for when the five year is completed. When we provide new 
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Partnerships with U.S. universities and with equipment suppliers should be the norm – but as 
equals not as benefactors.  I know that many exchange programs have been running for many 
years, but can we not run more of them?  What about instigating whole academic posts in 
universities purely for work with overseas countries?  The post holder could be required to spend 
so much of each year in the overseas country, co-leading, with local professors, serious research 
projects tailored to the level of infrastructure in-country and focusing on a topic that will advance 
that country’s growth, health and so on effectively. We also need to prioritize the development of 
field infrastructure in order to supply all the labs and equipment we provide, with good quality 
samples.  And the overseas partner should have to achieve certain goals as well to qualify for 
benefits. We need to develop good working relationships with individual and groups in-country 
over the long term – this is not always possible given upheavals and high staff turn-around, but 
should still be the aim. Successful personal and institutional relationships will enhance uptake of 
norms and stimulate new ideas for collaboration. 
 
It’s not “their” culture that’s the problem, it’s ours 
We are doing some good work overseas, but we could do better if we got our eyes off our own 
needs and onto the needs of the people we are trying to help – defined by them – not us. 
 
There are a few things that U.S. scientists need to change in what they do in their interactions with 
BMENA scientists, but the biggest change needs to be in how they understand where BMENA 
scientists are coming from in terms of: 
 
 the challenges of their recent and not-so-recent political upheavals and of their social 
situation as members of majority or minority groups in their society, as males or females, 
as juniors or seniors, etc., as all of these are linked to the level of power they have as 
individuals and the levels at which they can respond and act 
 the role of their religious ideals in underpinning their actions and beliefs,  
 the limitations of their economic situation, and the actions that they may not be able to 
take 
 the limitations and pressures placed on them by their lack of access to the technology that 
they would like to have 
 the ways in which they speak and engage with us when the “aid-game” is going on.  
 
Some Americans tend, without recognizing it, to be quite loud, as well as being very positive and 
assertive, from the stage of greeting right through entire conversations and bringing these to a close 
on their own terms. These qualities have great strengths, but can also be off-putting to non-
Westerners. It is over-bearing and can be quite overwhelming sometimes. Please be aware that to 
folks whose social norms require more modesty and quiet negotiation, this is like being hit with a 
sledge-hammer. Don’t do it if you want to influence people effectively (see my example above of 
the embassy guy arriving late and just taking over the room on arrival, or the guy who introduced 
Abbottabad unnecessarily into a speech on industrial biosecurity issues) . 
 
I also have something to say here to BMENA colleagues. Get away from the idea that to be 
practicing Western-standard science you need to have all-singing all-dancing equipment and be 
doing all the “big” stuff – if there is no call for it in your country, or the field work systems are not 
yet in place, don’t ask for it. Focus instead on capacity-building in your country in terms of 
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awareness (of actual need), knowledge (of how to develop responses to the needs), understanding 
(of how you can implement the responses) and skills (the application of your new or enhanced 
awareness, knowledge and understanding to address the problems in your country through 
effective scientific activity). Then you can move on to the bigger things. 
 
Outcomes, not individuals 
I believe that in order to improve interactions between the U.S. and its BMENA partners, we need 
to look at outcomes first, not the individuals employed in doing the work leading up to the hoped-
for outcomes. If we look at the desired outcomes of our interventions, then we can step back and 
try to understand what the U.S. and the BMENA drivers are likely to be that will result in 
successful outcomes, partially successful outcomes or even occasional failures. 
 
Stage One 
First, define, in collaboration with BMENA colleagues (the right ones for the job, meaning, the 
ones who will have the most influence at home in promoting biosecurity, not the ones with the 
most influence in getting to the table) what the in-country need is. This may, for example, relate to 
healthcare, agricultural issues, zoonoses, or other issues. Then, with local partners, formulate what 
the desired outcomes would be after an intervention or series of interventions. By involving 
BMENA colleagues in this definition process, we will be able to formulate outcome aims that meet 
the need and will be culturally manageable “at home”. This presupposes, of course, that the 
BMENA colleagues are open to being honest and realistic in terms of what their 
country/area/institution actually needs rather than what it wants for purposes of status, income, 
power or any other personal gain. So choosing realistic BMENA partners in planning is crucial – 





•Healthcare - who, what, where, when, how 
Disease 
prevention 




•Agriculture Improvements - who, what, where, when, how 
Animal 
disease 
• Food Production - who, what, where, when, how 
Wild bird 
disease 




•Animal Disease - who, what, where, when, how  
 
 







Applying a real-need concept to the archaeological theory of culture “pie” 
 
Stage Two 
Having defined the desired outcomes of the project or intervention, use the archaeological theory 
of culture and look at all of the five domains involved. Ask how each domain may enhance or 
impede the achievement of the desired outcomes. For example, under “social organization” we 
need to know the personalities and the people-history of an institution before we go in and provide 
funds. We need to know the social organization of the institution. Is there anyone there who could 
cause a problem on a personal level and act against the desired outcomes?  Then, in the third stage 
(below, using the Cultural Competency Model) work out a way to address this threat in a non-
contentious way that does not undermine them. Under “economy”, for example, it is a foregone 
conclusion that we will be asked for more money – but work with BMENA colleagues to find ways 
to better use what’s there already, and don’t let money be the driver of anything. Once it is clear to 
colleagues that money is not always going to be forthcoming, priorities will become more practical 
and realistic.  
 
The easiest way to use the archaeological theory of culture is to take your active needs 








Allocation to domain(s) has to be done by local partners, not US partners 
Our efforts are then applied to that/those domains in practice 
Each possible driver/factor involved in the need is allocated to one or more domains in the pie 
TARGETTING of SUPPORT EFFORTS 
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possibility of zoonotic transfer of disease from wild birds to domestic poultry and possibly to 
humans?”  Then we can mind-map all of the people, institutions, resources, and abstract influences 




Once all the possible actors, infrastructure, and resources are allocated (by the in-country locals, 
not U.S. partners) to one or more domains in the “pie”, then we can see which domains in which 
to apply our efforts. If a key actor is allocated to the social organization domain, then we need to 
apply our efforts there; if a key piece of infrastructure is allocated to the economics domain, then 
we apply our efforts there. If more than one domain is implicated in one 
actor/infrastructure/timing, or other consideration, then we need to discuss with local partners how 
best to prioritize our efforts. 
 
This is basically a kind of risk assessment exercise – using the culture framework as a means of 
identifying and assessing the risk of the desired outcome being thwarted. 
 
Once this assessment has been done, then go to the Cultural Competency Model to plan the 
practical response to the risk, within the domains you have identified in Stage Two: 
 
 Awareness – you have done this with the application of the archaeological model 
 Attitude – now you know in what cultural domain (social organization, economics, 
technology, etc) the possible problem lies, and you can take a positive attitude to tackling it 
– you understand where at least some of the problem lies and this gives you optimism 
 Knowledge – work with your BMENA planners to seek the best way to tackle the possible 
problem  
 Skills – implement the planned response to the possible problem 
 
Summary 
This model closely mirrors Hofstede’s theories. Remember that he said: 
  
“We have to recognize and apply the symbols of the other culture: recognize their heroes, 
practice their rituals, and experience the satisfaction of getting along in the new 
environment, being able to resolve first the simpler and later on some of the more 
complicated problems of life among the others….Intercultural communication can be 
taught.” [Emphasis mine].  
 
This is where the scientists and the educators come in – they are the ones who will interact with the 
BMENA colleagues “at the coal face” in the lab and the classroom, and crucially, in the lunch 
room where so much vital exchange takes place. They are the ones who need to use the symbols 
(words, gestures, pictures or objects that carry a particular meaning that is recognized as such by 
only those who share the culture), recognize the heroes (persons, alive or dead, real or imaginary, 
who possess characteristics that are highly prized in a culture and thus. serve as models for 
behavior ) and practice the rituals (collective activities that are technically superfluous. to reach 
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I cannot specify what are the symbols, heroes and rituals in BMENA societies. Only locals can do 
that. But I would suggest that it is vital for educational activities and materials to be formulated in 
conjunction with BMENA colleagues who do understand the relevant symbols, heroes and rituals. 
This should not be done in a patronizing way, but in a similar way to that which I advocated with 
regard to the use of religious values and ideals. We don’t need to go trawling for symbols, heroes 
and rituals, but a local BMENA colleague would immediately recognize certain issues has having 
some resonance with some local norm, value or tradition that a U.S. colleague would not.  
 
So if there are certain local or regional customs, concepts and so on that will assist in the uptake of 
the educational aims, then use them. Only a local or someone with relevant experience can do this. 
I managed to do this with some success in Iraq (you will remember my “Islamic biosecurity”) - 
with discussing how the Koran provides useful verses in support of public health – not because I 
am a Muslim, but because I grew up in a Christian fundamentalist home, so I understood how folks 
with a heavy dose of religious ideals in daily life might think and feel. The class suggested the 
Koranic verses once they recognized that I respected their views even if I did not belong to the 
Islamic faith. We met in the middle and it worked.  
 
Third Culture Biosecurity 
I mentioned quite a bit about Third Cultures in the introduction to this paper. I hope that by now 
you will be able to visualize this yourself. It seems to me that in order for us to move forward 
effectively, we need to recognize that we, and our overseas colleagues, must meet in the middle 
somewhere in order to interact effectively. Neither of us needs to abandon our cultural identity, but 
we do need to recognize and get rid of, or adapt, some of our cultural “baggage” that may be 
getting in the way of effective communication and action. We also need to recognize each other’s 
baggage and take it into account. Overleaf on page 62 is my diagrammatic picture of Third Culture 
Biosecurity.  
 
In this model, we both have to increase our awareness of ourselves and our own weaknesses, 
strengths and limitations, and each other’s; acquire and increase our knowledge of each other’s, 
and our own, weaknesses, strengths and limitations; work to increase our understanding of these; 
then develop our skills with each other by sharing our norms, followed by applying skills 
effectively. These activities should result in effective outcomes.  
 
Crucially, the Third Culture space, as defined here, includes activities that result in equality 
between the partners. We must implement respect in our talk, our actions and our approach. This 
needs to start in our thoughts. Once we have both established a respectful space, we can listen to 
each other. This then allows us to engage in safe, honest and open communication, through which 
we can share our norms (both ways). This space does have to somehow exist “out there” in the 
sense that it has to be ongoing and not be limited in time or in space. It should not just exist for the 
partners in just one workshop and then stop once the workshop is over.  
 
It would be helpful for there to be a literal space defined for this concept, perhaps as a web 
presence. Then all partners in U.S.-BMENA biosecurity endeavors would have a web-space to 
which they could go to see accounts of the activities that they have engaged in, ongoing 
discussions on discussion-boards, and other activities that they may not be involved in. In this way, 
the Third Culture space is visible and ongoing. 
 
 










A model of Third Culture Biosecurity 
Cultural training 
I would suggest that all individuals who are to be engaged in either planning, organizing, carrying 
out, monitoring, or evaluating science support work overseas (in any area of the world outside the 
Effective outcomes 
Applying skills as effective actions 
Sharing norms, developing skills 
Understanding 
Knowledge 
Awareness of BMENA cultural drivers and pressures 
US Culture Folks 
Effective outcomes 
Applying skills as effective actions 
Sharing norms, developing skills 
Understanding 
Knowledge 
Awareness of US drivers and own REAL needs 
BMENA Culture Folks 
EQUAL PARTNERS 
Ongoing, not time- or space-bounded 
Exchange of ideas, not one-way only 
Safe, open communication 
Respectful, listening 
In the middle – all retain their identity 
Third Culture Biosecurity Space 
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U.S.) should be REQUIRED to undergo cultural awareness training BEFORE they start. This 
includes policy-makers as well as trainers/tutors and grant-holding organizers. Such a training 
course should last two-three days, and involve a mix of teaching and of group exercises applied to 
scenarios such as these: 
 
 A scientist is required to work on a project that involves research that conflicts with his 
religious values;  
 A scientist is told that he can only be appointed to his desired position if he agrees to focus 
on research that economically benefits certain sections of society, and that he has to avoid 
work that he knows could benefit those most in need; 
 A junior scientist has a better understanding of biorisk management than his seniors in the 
facility and can see a lot of problems that could be solved easily if simple SOPs were put in 
place; 
 A scientist applies for an six-month exchange post in the U.S.; he has good English; a 
colleague who is related to his boss, but has weak English, is recommended by the boss 
instead, and gets the post; 
 A scientist has to teach students who come from rich and influential families in the area, 
who believe that democracy means that rules no longer apply; they threaten the science 
tutor if they do not receive the marks they want;  
 A facility director is asked if he will host a workshop with visiting U.S. scientists focusing 
on biosecurity implementation; this is to be a national event with colleagues coming from 
other institutions across the country; the facility director knows he needs to get a grip on 
biosecurity, but he also knows that his facility has major weaknesses in biosafety; he is 
worried about his colleagues from around the country seeing the weaknesses of his facility, 
but he needs the prestige that hosting a U.S.-led event will bring; 
 And so on…… 
 
Groups must identify cultural norms that underpin the scientist’s responses, and identify 
possible problems that may arise out of these; then they must devise ways of effectively 
minimizing the risk of these adverse outcomes in ways that are acceptable to both host and 
visitors. 
 
Only when folks have been exposed to thinking in some depth about how “the others” think, can 
they really start to recognize that their version of “normal” is only one version of it. To date, I have 
seen too many examples of U.S. folks just not getting this, and most of these examples have come 
from the folks driving the policy, rather than the folks engaged in meeting and working with 
overseas colleagues (although I have encountered some trainers who have worked overseas who I 
personally would not want to let out of the country). However, given the comments made by 
scientists in the U.S. that I have heard (not on overseas workshops), there is a high level of cultural 
illiteracy evident among them that really needs to be addressed. They are simply thinking this way 
because the current U.S. national mind-set is directed to seeing off threats – it’s not a moral failing 
on their part. They are responding to a cultural perspective, just as our overseas partners are 
responding to theirs. Unfortunately, the attitude of policy-makers filters down through all the other 
levels of folks until it reaches our hosts in overseas countries. This is one of the major sources of 
problems. But I believe that even a small amount of training, around the ideas I have presented 
here, would go some way to improving this situation. 
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It’s the culture, stupid 
We need to remember that it’s our culture that is largely the problem, not anyone else’s. We in the 
West tend to forget that the majority of the world’s populations do not live in “our” culture. It’s 
easy to see that global populations do aspire to share in some of our cultural baggage – food, 
fashion, music, entertainment among other domains. However, just because we see overseas folks 
drinking our Coca Cola and eating our McDonalds burgers, we should not fall into the trap of 
assuming that they also want to adopt our values into their social, economic, technology, religious 
and language norms. This misunderstanding leads eventually to the ways in which we have been 
expecting our overseas science partners to take up our scientific norms without recognizing that 
these do not exist in a vacuum. We just do not recognize ourselves how our norms reflect our 
values and social systems. We need to understand their norms and then support them in adopting 
effective biosafety, biosecurity and biorisk management norms into the norms that they already 
live under. This is very different from assuming that all non-U.S. scientists are a threat in some 
way. It is very different from thinking that we need to “divert” our overseas colleagues from some 
possible anti-U.S. activity that might take place in the future.  
 
We also need to remember that we have not yet got biosafety and biosecurity completely sorted out 
yet in our own back yard. Why do we have laboratory accident logs in place if we do not continue 
to have laboratory biosafety accidents, mishaps, oversights, and negligence incidents?  I have been 
teaching biosecurity now for several years and I have never yet met a scientist or science educator 
in the UK or the U.S. who thinks that s/he needs to consider biosecurity in his/her work…..all 
scientists are convinced that their work is harmless and totally beneficial until we point out the 
possibilities of misuse. Even then, not all are convinced. We only need to look at the H5N1 debate, 
and see the responses of Fouchier and Kawaoka
95
 to critique their work, to see this in action. So 
let’s be aware of our own weaknesses and not approach the rest of the world as if we have got it 
all 100% right. We may be a lot further down the road to safety and security than some of our 
overseas colleagues, but this is largely to do with our economic status and the relative security we 
experience in our political and social systems. It is not a reflection on the attitudes of folks who just 
happen to live in more challenging environments. We laugh now at “old fashioned” ideas such as 
phrenology – the science of understanding a person by measuring the bumps on his head – but we 
still seem, at times, to practice a cultural phrenology, in which we think we can judge a person’s 
attitudes towards us just because of his cultural origins.   
 
I offer the ideas in this paper to you and hope that they go some way to introducing you to the 
concept of different cultures as different patterns of seeing everyday life. That’s all it is. But it is 
important as different views on everyday life result in some unnecessary misunderstandings that it 
is relatively easy to avoid, if we all get the idea of mutually-beneficial, shared-benefit outcomes. I 
think that the concept of the Third Culture Biosecurity (or Third Culture any other aspect of 
science) is a useful starting point. We don’t expect anyone to jump into the “other” culture, simply 
to meet us in the middle space between our culture and theirs. Then we each retain our own 
“selves” and all that means to us, but recognize that our “different” colleagues are also retaining 
their own selves and all that this means to them. But when we meet in the middle, we can share 
and exchange ideas, norms and critiques in a safe place. 
 
                                                          
95  See:  http://www.redicecreations.com/article.php?id=23629  
 
 
164 | P a g e  
 
Finally, my own view, personally, is that if an individual anywhere in the world is set in his or her 
mind to develop a malign use for science, then s/he will do it, regardless of our efforts to educate 
and inform. Ultimately, I do not see how it will ever be possible to stop ill-intentioned people from 
making biological or chemical weapons.  But what we can do is to share our knowledge, skills and 
understanding of risk management and the responsible conduct of science, as widely as we 
possibly can. This will, in turn, promote the safe and secure use and practice of science for most of 
the people most of the time. And that is probably the best we can achieve. So let’s get to it. 
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Canada Global
World Health Organization 
(WHO)
Strengthening Global Biological Security at the 
Health-Security Interface
Canada provided funding to support International Health 
Regulations (IHR) implementation and strengthen Global 
Alert and Response activities.
Biological 9/2010 - 6/2012
Canada Global
World Organisation for 
Animal Health (OIE)
Strengthening Global Biological Security at the 
Animal Health-Security Interface
Canada provided funding to support, inter alia, 
emergency preparedness response, disease surveillance 






US DoS Support to the Iraq science fellowship 
programme
Support to Iraqi scientist fellowship programme Biological 2011-12
United Kingdom Iraq US DoS - FETP supplementary training.
In country capacity building in public health, biosafety 
and security, disease surveillance and outbreak response.
Biological 2012
United Kingdom Middle East / North Africa
Contribution to US DoS - MENA infectious 
diseases / biosecurity workshop
In country capacity building in public health, biosafety 
and security, disease surveillance and outbreak response.
Biological 6/1/2012
United Kingdom Middle East / North Africa
Contribution to US DoS Scientists 
engagement/training - Training courses on 
modern diagnostic techniques
Follow-on diagnostics training by Jordan University of 
Science and Technology for scientists from priority 
countries. Promote improved biosafety and biosecurity 
and build capacity in disease control, surveillance and 
training in modern diagnostics.
Biological 2011 -12
United Kingdom Morocco Morocco Contribution to US DoS - FETP
In country capacity building in public health, biosafety 
and security, disease surveillance and outbreak response.
Biological 2012
United Kingdom Middle East / North Africa
Middle East disease surveillance / regional 
capacity building
Funding contribution to a Middle East disease 
surveillance project.
Biological 2012 -2013
United Kingdom Middle East / North Africa OIE
Support to the OIE-PVS tool for the Evaluation 
of Performance of Veterinary Services (OIE-
PVS tool).
Assessment of in country veterinary services. Biological 2011 -12
United Kingdom Middle East / North Africa OIE
Rift Valley fever workshop: regional network 
to address diagnosis and control
Support disease specific workshop. Biological 2012
United Kingdom Afghanistan
Contribution to US DoS - Afghan-Tajik FETP 
“One-Health” project.
Enhancement of regional capacities to detect, diagnose, 
and manage outbreaks of infectious diseases.
Biological 2012
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United Kingdom Afghanistan OIE
Support to the OIE Reference Laboratory 
twinning program.
Development of lab twinning project. Promotion of 
improved biosafety and biosecurity and build capacity in 
modern diagnostics, disease control, and surveillance.
Biological 2011-12
United Kingdom MENA WHO Global Alert and Response Programme
Support to development of training materials for the 




Non-FSU (South Asia, 
Southeast Asia, Middle East, 
Africa)
DoD COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION (CTR) 
PROGRAMS - Cooperative Biological 
Engagment Program (CBEP): Projects provide 
bio-engagement support and disease 
reporting/research in non-FSU territories 
including various countries in Africa, 
Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Middle 
East.
Projects include efforts in South Asia, Afghanistan, Iraq 
and East Africa to enhance disease surveillance, 
detection, diagnosis and reporting, biosafety & 
biosecurity assistance, and cooperative biological 
research. Expansion occurring in FY12 for efforts in 
southern Africa and Southeast Asia. Bio-engagement 
included biosafety and biosecurity upgrades to existing 
facilities, and building partner nation capacity to detect, 
diagnose, report, and respond to biological pathogen 
outbreaks.




DoD Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center - 
Global Surveillance for Emerging Infectious 
Diseases
Surveillance of the following priorities: antimicrobial 
resistant organisms (ARO), respiratory infections, 
gastrointestinal infections (GI), sexually transmitted 
infections (STI), febrile and vector-borne infections 





Middle East and North Africa
Biological Security Engagement (BEP): 
Provides technical and financial assistance to 
improve laboratory biosafety and biosecurity 
in high-risk areas through securing biological 
laboratories, best practices trainings, capacity 
building, and cooperative research and 
development.
BEP supports developing infectious disease laboratory 
system capacity, disease diagnostic capabilities, safe and 
secure sample transportation, technical training for 





United Nations Central Fund for Influenza 
Action
This multi-donor trust fund, managed by UNDP, will 
coordinate UN efforts to prevent, prepare, and respond 
to a global influenza pandemic.
Biological 9/2007 - 9/2012
United States
USAID
35 Countries in Asia and 
Africa
IFRC
Humanitarian Pandemic Preparedness (H2P) 
Programme
H2P was designed to support the development of 
influenza pandemic preparedness plans and protocols for 
communities in the areas of health, food security and 
livelihoods in those countries most vulnerable to a 
pandemic influenza outbreak.
Biological 9/2007 - 3/2012
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Mutiple country specific 
partners such as WHO, the 
Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation, US Dept of State, 
US Dept of Defense, USAID, 
Bloomberg, and others.
Field Epidemiology Training Program (FETP)
Established in 1980, CDC’s FETPs help countries build 
sustainable capacity for detecting and responding to 
health threats and develop expertise so disease 
outbreaks can be detected locally and prevented from 
spreading. FETPs provide actionable information so 
public health workers use science and data to detect and 
monitor disease outbreaks and determine public health 
policy and programming. As part of their mission to 
strengthen public health systems globally, FETPs also 
assist countries to meet their core capacity requirements 
for surveillance and response under the revised 
International Health Regulations (IHR, 2005).
Currently 24 CDC-supported FETPs worldwide serving 
over 40 countries. Over 2600 public health leaders have 






The international outreach of FDA and partner agencies is 
vital to fulfilling the FDA’s Strategic Priorities of 
strengthening the safety and integrity of the global 
supply chain and ensuring the safety of the food supply 
from farm to table. Main objectives of international food 
defense outreach are to raise global awareness of the 
issue and establish global person/centers of food defense 
expertise; build relationships with key counterparts in 
government, the private sector and academia; and 
identify opportunities for continued collaboration in 





FDA assists foreign governments in investigating large or 
unusual food borne outbreaks when requested, providing 
reference laboratory consultations, and assisting in 
foreign disease surveillance projects. USG labs serve as 
collaborating centers and reference laboratories for the 
OIE and FAO, providing reference assistance, diagnostic 
tools and expertise, development, distribution and 
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Countering Biological Threats: National 
Implementation of the Biological Weapons 
Convention and Multinational Outbreak 
Response and Bioterrorism Investigation 
Demonstration, in Tbilisi, Georgia, 17-19 May 
2011
The workshop aimed to promote interagency (in 
particular public health-law enforcement but also civilian-
military) cooperation, coordination and synchronization 
for preparing, detecting, and responding to infectious 
disease outbreaks; to establish regional partnerships to 
enhance training and disease surveillance and 
containment initiatives; and to strengthen the core 
capacities required by the WHO International Health 
Regulations and existing national measures consistent 
with the obligations under the BWC and the UNSCR 1540 
to deter, prevent, and respond to biological incidents or 
threats. There were about 100 participants from US, 
Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Romania, 
Moldova, Turkey, Poland, and Kenya, as well as 
representatives of inter-governmental organizations 







International capacity to manufacture 
influenza vaccine in developing countries.
The HHS Biomedical Advanced Research and 
Development Authority (BARDA) provided four sets of 
grants totaling $40.4 million to help WHO strengthen the 
ability of developing countries to produce influenza 
vaccines, potentially reducing the global threat of 
influenza pandemics.
Biological 9/2006 - 9/2011
United States
HHS
Worldwide Foreign Regulators Seminar
Seminar offered to foreign regulators in response to a 
steadily increasing demand for information and training 
in regulation of biologics. It provides information about 
the US biologics regulatory processes in an efficient, 
organized and integrated manner. The program allows 
experts to explain the regulatory role of FDA biologics, as 
well as the science, technology, regulations and 
processes used to do its work. The program offers many 
advantages to traditional visits such as providing our 
foreign regulatory counterparts with the opportunity to 
hear from a broader array of FDA experts, and providing 
an opportunity for FDA staff and their foreign 
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Worldwide WHO Prequalification program
FDA has been involved in discussions with WHO’s 
Diagnostics and Laboratory Technology team (DLT) to 
define a potential collaboration regarding the WHO 
Prequalification of Diagnostics Program, within the 
context of promoting access to good quality, safe, and 
reliable diagnostics appropriate for use in resource-
limited settings, and establishing the necessary 
infrastructure to ensure that diagnostic testing in these 
settings is sustainable and contributes to improved 





FDA has been significantly engaged in providing expert 
review for the assessment of new WHO diagnostic-
related international standards and reference materials 
project proposals presented annually at the WHO's 
Expert Committee on Biological Standardization meeting. 
The development and use of international biological 
reference standards support the standardization of 
materials and approaches used in medical diagnostics 






A member of the CDRH Office of In-Vitro Diagnostics 
(OIVD) Staff functions as a consultant to the 
WHO/Tropical Disease Research Diagnostic Evaluation 
Panel, which developed guidelines on recommendations 
for best practice in clinical trials for the evaluation of 
tropical disease diagnostic assays and have addressed 
different issues and methods for evaluating the impact of 
new diagnostics that do not perform as labeled in disease 
endemic countries. The representative meets with the 
group annually. The group discusses the impact on 




Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and 
Pakistan.
Dual use bioethics for the life sciences. 
Development of a five country specific lecture 
series.
Promote culture of integrity, accountability, and 
responsibility guided by codes of conduct, bioethics 






International Federation of 
Biosafety Associations (IFBA)
IFBA Secretariat Activities
Canada provided funding to support secretariat services 
and other initiatives allowing IFBA to advocate effectively 
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European Committee for 
Standardization (CEN)
CWA 15793 "Laboratory Biorisk Management"
Canada provided funding to support the dissemination of 






Contribution to US DoS - Support to Afghan 
biorisk association.






Support to WHO Biorisk Management Train 
the Trainer (TtT) Programme.
Development of training (Biosafety and Biosecurity) 





Support to WHO national training courses on 
biorisk management and the shipment of 
infectious substances.
Promote safe and secure working practices. Cooperation 







WHO Advisory Committee on Variola Virus 
Research
Support the activties of the WHO ACVVR which monitors 
the research with live Variola virus and performs visits at 
the two authorized repositories of live variola virus (CDC 
and VECTOR) with the aim of ensuring that the 
conditions of storage of the virus, and that the research 
done in the laboratories meet the highest requirements 
of biosafety and biosecurity, as mandated by the World 





Mediterranean region and 
South-East Europe
Istituto Superiore di Sanità, 
Rome (Italy)
IFS/2010/238-194 EpiSouth: a network for the 
control of health and security threats and 
other bio-security risks in the Mediterranean 
Region and South-East Europe
to increase through capacity building the bio security in 
the Mediterranean region and South-East Europe (10 EU 








Biosafety, Biosecurity and Biological Non-
proliferation
In 2009, the ROK financed the installation of biosecurity 
equipment and sponsored a training program on its use 
at the Central Veterinary Laboratory.In 2011, the ROK 
financed the installation of physical protection system at 
the Animal Vaccine Production Laboratory (AVPL). * in 





Request under UNSC Res 
1540
Bio-Security Training for Iraqi Specialists (in 
Switzerland)
Technical support in order to restore Iraqi capacity in the 






Contribution to US DoS - Assessment of 
physical security requirements at laboratories.
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Global Threat Reduction (GTR)- Biological 
Security Engagement (BEP): Provides technical 
and financial assistance to improve laboratory 
biosafety and biosecurity in high-risk areas 
through securing biological laboratories, best 
practices trainings, capacity building, and 
cooperative research and development.
BEP helped address global biosecurity risks from 
bioterrorism and infectious disease outbreaks through 
providing technical assistance, training, and workshops in 
strengthening biosafety and biosecurity capabilities and 
developing safe, secure, and sustainable lab capacity 








Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund 
(NDF) - Development of a Biosecurity Training 
Center
A project to build an international biosafety and 
biosecurity training center at the Jordan University of 







Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund 
(NDF) - Pathogen Security Training Materials 
for the World Health Organization








Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund 
(NDF) - Guidelines for Security of Dangerous 
Pathogens and Toxins
A project to assist the World Health Organization to 








Distribution of WHO Guidance Document: 
Responsible life sciences research for global 
health security
Distribution of the WHO Guidance document, 
Responsible life sciences research for global health 
security, aimed to consider the risk associated with 
accidents, with research that may pose unexpected risks 
and with the potential deliberate misuse of life sciences 
research. The purpose of this guidance document is to 
inform Member States about the risks posed by accidents 
or the potential deliberate misuse of life sciences 
research and to propose measures to minimize these 
risks within the context of promoting and harnessing the 
power of the life sciences to improve health for all 
people. This guidance contributes to the implementation 
of Resolution WHA55.16 and promotes a culture of 
scientific integrity and excellence, distinguished by 




UN Office for Disarmament 
Affairs
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 
(BTWC) Implementation Support Unit (ISU)
Canada provided funding to support outreach activities 
of the BTWC ISU, and to facilitate participation in the 
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Training and Information 
Centre (VERTIC)
National Implementation Measures (NIM) 
Programme
Canada is providing funding to support VERTIC's NIM 
Programme, in support of universalization and effective 





Council Joint Action 2008/588/CFSP of 10 
November 2008 in support of BTWC
The overall objective is:
- to support the universalisation of the BTWC, - to 
enhance the implementation of the BTWC, including the 
submission of CBM declarations, and
- to support the best use of the Inter-Sessional Process 






Council Joint Action 2008/307/CFSP of 14 
April 2008 in support of the World Health 
Organisation activities in the area of 
laboratory bio-safety and bio-security
The overall objective is to support the implementation of 
the BTWC, in particular those aspects that relate to the 
safety and security of microbial or other biological agents 
and toxins in laboratories and other facilities, including 
during transportation as appropriate, in order to prevent 
unauthorised access to and removal of such agents and 
toxins.
- Promotion of bio-risk reduction management through 
regional and national outreach,
- Strengthening the security and laboratory management 





The Graduate Institute of 
International Studies, Geneva
Council Joint Action 2006/184/CFSP of 27 
February 2006 - BTWC
Overall objective: to support the universalisation of the 
BTWC and, in particular, to promote the accession to the 
BTWC by States not Party (signatory States as well as non-
signatory States) and to support the implementation of 
the BTWC by the States Parties.
- Promotion of the universality of the BTWC;








Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund 
(NDF) - Establishment of legislation to restrict 
Biological Weapons activities worldwide
A project to assist the International Criminal Police 
Organization (INTERPOL) to develop, establish and enact 
domestic penal measures in foreign countries to 
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DoD COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION (CTR) 
PROGRAMS - Regional Security Engagement 
Program. The Regional Security Engagement 
Program (RSEP) is designed to build partner 
capacity with regard to Combatting WMD and 
Combatting Terrorism. RSEP's two main vehicles 
for engagment are the Seminar on Combating 
WMD and Terrorism and the Regional Combating 
WMD Symposium. The two-week seminars, 
sponsored by the Threat Reduction Engagement 
Program and by the Combatting Terrorism 
Fellowship Program, are executed by the Defense 
Threat Reduction Agency in collaboration with the 
Regional Centers, (under the Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency) to address concerns 
associated with the nexus between proliferation 
of WMD and terrorism. The one-week symposium 
is focused on building partner capacity to address 
concerns associated with the proliferation of 
WMD and supports the Geographic Combattant 
Commands' CWMD Program participation by 
partner nations. Both types of engagment 
promote the creation of a collaborative network 
of mutual support and long-term regional inter-
ministerial integration and civil-
RSEP began with one Seminar in collaboration with the 
George C. Marshall Center for EUCOM and AFRICOM 
countries, and one Symposium in collaboration with the 
Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA) 
for CENTCOM in FY12. In FY13, we have conducted two 
Seminars with the Marshall Center, one Seminar with 
NESA, and one Sympsium with CENTCOM. We are 
currently planning Symposiums for PACOM, CENTCOM, 
and AFRICOM and are scheduled to conduct three 
seminars with the Marshall Center and NESA in FY13.
Combatting WMD and 
Terrorism
RSEP does not 
have dedicated 
funding. We use 






DoD COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION (CTR) 
PROGRAMS - Threat Reduction Engagement 
(TREP): Projects facilitate cooperation with the 
combatant commands, build relationships 
with international partners, support 
relationship building for CTR Program 
development in new geographic areas, and 
help advance the mission of the CTR Program.
Bilateral defense consultations, multi-lateral regional 
exchanges, bilateral cooperative planning conferences, 
security working groups, exchange visits, sponsorship of 
tabletop exercises and field exercises, workshops, and 
training that supports and advances CTR mission areas.






Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund 
(NDF) - Libyan Threat Reduction
A project to eliminate conventional weapons systems in 
Libya in excess of defense requirements, remove or 
destroy WMD-related items, weapons, or delivery 
systems, and to secure weapons stockpiles, WMD-related 
sites, and secure and improve border crossings.






Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund 
(NDF) - WMD Efforts in Libya
A project to assist Libya completely eliminate its WMD 
infrastructure.






Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund 
(NDF) - WMD Disarmament Activities in Libya.
A project to completely eliminate Libya's WMD materials 
and infrastructure.
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Council Decision 2010/430/CFSP of 26 July 
2010 establishing a European network of 
independent non-proliferation think tanks in 
support of the implementation of the EU 
Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction
The objective of this network of independent non-
proliferation think tanks is to encourage political and 
security-related dialogue and the long-term discussion of 
measures to combat the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems 
within civil societies, and more particularly among 
experts, researchers and academics. It will constitute a 
useful stepping stone for non-proliferation action by the 
Union and the international community.
The Union wishes to support this network as follows: 
– through organising a kick-off meeting and an annual 
conference with a view to submitting a report and/or 
recommendations to the representative of the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy (HR), 
– through creating an Internet platform to facilitate 
contacts and foster research dialogue among the 





IFS/2008/145-130 Assistance in export control 
of dual-use goods
The specific objective is to support the development of 
the legal framework and institutional capacities for the 
establishment and enforcement of effective export 
controls on dual-use items, including measures for 
regional cooperation with a view of contributing to the 
fight against the proliferation of WMD and related 






North Africa and selected 
countries in the Middle East
UNICRI
IFS/2009/200-523 Knowledge management 
system on CBRN trafficking in North Africa and 
selected countries in the Middle East
The aim of the project would be to develop a durable co-
operation legacy in the area of trafficking of CBRN 







South East Europe and for 
North Africa
UNICRI
IFS/2010/253-484 Knowledge Management 
System on CBRN risk mitigation - Evolving 
towards CoE "Mediterranean Basin"
to integrate the existing Knowledge Management 
Systems, namely for South East Europe and for North 
Africa, and to prepare the evolution towards a Centre of 
Excellence in the Mediterranean Basin dealing with CBRN 







IFS/2010/256-885 Assistance in export control 
of dual-use goods
Continuation of the on-going activities in this field in the 
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Middle East, Gulf region, 
Mediterranean Basin, Central 
Asia and Southern Africa, 




(actions) CBRN Centres of Excellence – Second 
phase
Set-up of three to four new Centres in the Middle East 
and, possibly, Gulf region, Mediterranean Basin, Central 
Asia and Southern Africa and extension of the projects in 
South East Asia and in Ukraine / South Caucasus and 







Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear 
(CBRN) Centres of Excellence – Third Phase
(1) to extend existing activities (management contracts 
with JRC and UNICRI) till the end of 2014 with the aim of 
improving national CBRN policies and defining 
comprehensive tailored assistance packages, in a 
coherent and effective combination of national and 
regional dimensions [€5.5 million], (2) to improve 
national CBRN policies through the implementation of 
concrete actions in the areas of export control of dual-
use goods, illicit trafficking of CBRN materials, bio-safety 










Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear 
(CBRN) Centres of Excellence – Fourth Phase
(1) To extend existing activities (management contracts 
with JRC and UNICRI) until the end of 2014 with the aim 
of improving national CBRN policies and defining 
comprehensive tailored assistance packages, in a 
coherent and effective combination of national and 
regional dimensions [€5.5 million], ( (2) to improve 
national CBRN policies through the implementation of 
concrete actions in the areas of export control of dual-
use goods, illicit trafficking of CBRN materials, bio-safety 









Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund 
(NDF) - Support for Proliferation Security 
Initiative Interdiction Activities
A project to support the interdiction of WMD and WMD-







Middle East and North Africa
Confidence-Building Measures: Middle East 
Scientific Institute for Security (MESIS)
Promotion of regional capacity-building activities 






Co-operation in export control of dual-use 
goods
To strengthen the export control systems of partner 
countries, with a strong link with the Regional Centres of 
Excellence activities, by aligning them to the standard of 
the international export control regimes and treaties and 




To be signed in 
2012
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Worldwide WHO International Roundtables
A series of roundtables aimed to determine the scope of 
other countries’ activities, interests, and concerns 
pertaining to dual use life sciences research; informing 
other countries and the international community about 
NSABB draft work products and obtaining feedback; 
establishing and maintaining communication with other 
countries and the international science and policy 
community on dual use research issues; and 
collaborating with other countries and the international 
community to establish a larger, more robust dialogue on 





North and South America, 
Europe, China, and the 
Middle East/Gulf region
European Molecular Biology 
Organization, the European 
Science Foundation, the 
European Society of Clinical 
Microbiology and Infectious 
Diseases, and Institut 
Pasteur, CAS, InterAcademy 
Panel (IAP), the International 
Union of Microbiology 
Society, the International 
Union of Biochemistry and 
Molecular Biology, Kuwait 
Institute for Scientific 
Research
International Webcasts and Video-
teleconferences
International outreach, region by region aimed to foster 
international engagement of life sciences researchers, 
biosafety and biosecurity experts, government policy 
officials, and ethicists on the issue of dual use life 
sciences research, including an awareness of strategies 
for managing dual use research of concern and an 
appreciation of how these issues are being addressed 
around the globe; and to examine various approaches to 
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Worldwide NIH/OSP DUR outreach and NSABB reports
For the past several years, NIH has conducted an extensive program of 
outreach to foster awareness of the dual use research issue and 
promote a culture of responsibility in addressing it. This has included 
presentations and training sessions on the issue of dual use research 
in the life sciences at major scientific meetings of key constituency 
groups. Audiences have included life science researchers, senior 
research administrators and research oversight and compliance 
officials. In addition, in order to promote enhanced understanding of 
the dual use issue within the research community, NIH has staffed 
exhibit booths at meetings and events to disseminate educational 
material about dual use research, answer questions, and receive 
feedback from the community. Numerous educational resources have 
been developed including a video that is available on the NIH Dual Use 
Research Program Web site as well as on YouTube, a brochure 
targeted to investigators conducting life sciences research, and a 
toolkit encompassing a slide set and a module that articulates steps 
for developing and disseminating a code of conduct for dual use 
research. NIH also manages the National Science Advisory Board for 
Biosecurity (NSABB), a Federal advisory committee
The NSABB has produced two reports on outreach and education, 
specifically, and a body of other reports – a proposed framework for 
DUR oversight, biosecurity concerns related to synthesis of select 
agents and synthetic biology, ways to enhance personnel reliability 
and strengthen the culture of responsibility, and considerations for 
development and dissemination of codes of conduct for DUR –that are 







DoD COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION (CTR) 
PROGRAMS - Program Support: Expenses 
related to administrative and advisory 
support, and conduct of audits and 
examinations.
Provide funding for CTR audits and examination 
requirements, continue support to seven overseas offices 
within FSU, support CTR overall program expansion, 
project development costs, and advisory and assistance 
contracted support.





Middle East, but global.
Consequence Management Assistance 
Program (CMAP)
DoD, through the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 
initiated CMAP in FY 2012 to assist Combatant 
Commands (COCOMs) with building consequence 
management capacity in partner nations. CMAP 
increases the tactical training and operational capabilities 
of partner nations to effectively respond to WMD 
incidents and will support COCOM requirements to aid 
partner nations in building capacity to prevent the spread 
of WMD. CMAP has conducted planning and training 
events in the Middle East.
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Internationalisation of Iraqi institutions and 
scientific facilities and collaboration with 
Italian scientific and academic centres
Academic publications and technical and scientific 
equipment provided to selected Iraqi academic and 
scientific institutions. Project carried out by the Landau 
Network – Centro Volta (LNCV).




Contribution to US Civilian Research and 
Defence Foundation (CRDF). Support to the 
Iraq national reconstruction and judicial 
reform programme.
Objective: Support to the Iraq national reconstruction 
and judicial reform programme.








The Iraq Scientist Engagement Program (ISEP) 
engages Iraqi scientists, technicians, and 
engineers with WMD and weapons-applicable 
skills to promote Iraqi scientific and 
technological development.
ISEP sponsors scientific conferences, trainings, and 
research grant competitions aimed at promoting 
chemical and biological security best practices and 
engaging scientists, technicians, and engineers on 
peaceful, civilian pursuits.






Global threat Reduction (GTR) - The Iraq 
Scientist Engagement Program engages Iraqi 
scientists, technicians, and engineers with 
WMD and weapons-applicable skills to 
promote Iraqi scientific and technological 
development.
The Iraq scientist engagement program provided training, 
travel grants, research and development grants, and 
technical expertise to engage and redirect scientists, 
technicians, and engineers to peaceful, civilian pursuits.






Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund 
(NDF) - Iraqi Scientist Redirection
A project to assist former Iraqi weapons scientists 
transition to peaceful, commercial research.






Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund 
(NDF) - Redirection of Iraqi Weapons Scientists
This is a project to assist former Iraqi WMD scientists 
perform legitimate, peaceful, commercial research.




Internationalisation of Iraqi institutions and 
scientific facilities and collaboration with 
Italian scientific and academic centres
4 international workshops; 4 closed roundtables; 7 
intensive seminars and training courses; 59 short-term 
fellowships and 52 long-term fellowships (2-9 months) 
for retraining at Italian Universities and scientific 
institutes (205 months in Italy). Project carried out by the 
Landau Network – Centro Volta (LNCV).
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Training and Reorientation in the field of bio-
chem technology for peaceful applications
Three phases: a preliminary phase in Iraq, an intensive 
phase in Italy and a final phase in Iraq. Two modules: 
Chemical products in agriculture and environmental 
pollutants and Prevention, evaluation and management 
of the environmental pollution: polluted sites and 
remediation techniques. 24 Fellowships. Project led by 
the Insubria Center on International Security of the 
University of Insubria.






Global Threat Reduction (GTR) - The Libya 
Scientist Engagement Program supports the 
transition of former Libyan WMD scientists to 
civilian careers through technological 
partnerships.
The Libya scientist engagement program provided 
training, travel grants, research and development grants, 
and technical expertise to engage and redirect scientists, 
technicians, and engineers to peaceful, civilian pursuits.
Scientist Engagement - 
Libya
2002-2010
15
